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In this thesis we study the problem of extracting almost truly random bits from imperfect sources
of randomness. This is motivated by the wide use of randomness in computer science, and the
fact that most accessible sources of randomness generate correlated bits, and at best contain some
amount of entropy. We follow Chor and Goldreich [CG88] and Zuckerman [Zuc90], and model weak
sources using min-entropy, where an (n, k)-source X is a distribution on n bits and takes any string
x with probability at most 2−k. It is known that it is impossible to extract random bits from a
single (n, k)-source, and Chor and Goldreich [CG88] raised the question of extracting randomness
from two such independent (n, k)-sources. Existentially, such 2-source randomness extractors exist
for min-entropy k ≥ log n + O(1), but the best known construction prior to work in this thesis
requires min-entropy k ≥ 0.499n [Bou05b]. One of the main contributions of this thesis is an
explicit 2-source extractor for min-entropy logC n, for some constant C.
vii
Other results in this thesis include improved ways of extracting random bits from various
other sources of randomness, as well as stronger notions of randomness extraction. Our results
have applications in privacy amplification [BBR88,Mau92,BBCM95], which is a classical problem
in information cryptography, and give protocols that achieve almost optimal parameters. Other
applications include explicit constructions of non-malleable codes, which is a relaxation of the
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In this thesis we study objects known as randomness extractors. Informally, an extractor is a tool
to purify a source of randomness. The need for such extractors arises out of the following two
reasons. First, randomness is widely used in various areas of computer science, e.g., algorithms,
distributed computing, cryptography, stochastic simulations of complex systems and more. Second,
most sources of randomness that are easily accessible produce bits that are biased and correlated.
It is very common that randomized algorithms are often much simpler than their (known)
deterministic counterparts, and also outperform them. In fact, in many cases such as polynomial
identity testing, it is open to find efficient deterministic algorithms for problems with simple ran-
domized algorithms. Here a major open question is if every efficient randomized algorithm has a
deterministic counterpart, or more technically whether P = BPP. Further, in cryptography, it is
possible to prove that many of the protocols become provably impossible to execute without access
to high quality sources of randomness [DOPS04].
However a major problem in practice is the lack of good quality sources of randomness.
For example, a common way operating systems collect random bits (such as Linux) is to maintain
an entropy pool. This entropy pool is typically filled by a device known as a hardware random
number generator (HRNG) that uses some physical phenomenon (e.g., radioactive phenomenon,
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Zener diodes, clock drift) for generating randomness. There is also work showing Bitcoin [BCG15]
as a potential source of randomness. However, in most of these sources the bits produced often
follow certain patterns and at best only contain some amount of entropy. In practice, to derive
uniform bits, often a cryptographic hash function is applied to this imperfect source of randomness
and used in applications. However, there is no theoretical guarantee that the bits produced are
actually uniformly random, which can be a major issue, for example, if these bits are being used
to carry out important cryptographic protocols. Another motivation to study weak sources of
randomness comes from cryptography. For example, consider a shared key S that is uniform on n
bits and is being used for executing some cryptographic protocol. An adversary who gains partial
information about this secret can be modeled as a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, m < n, with the
partial information being the random variable Y = f(S). Thus, the secret S conditioned on the
leak Y is now only weakly random. These applications motivate the need to construct functions
(extractors) that provably output uniform bits given access to such weak sources of randomness.
1.0.1 A Brief History of Extractors
The first work of modeling a weak source dates back to the 1950’s when von Neumann [vN51]
considered extracting random bits from a stream of independent bits with the same unknown bias.
This was considerably generalized by Blum [Blu86], who designed an explicit extractor for sources
generated by a constant sized Markov chain. Santha and Vazirani [SV86] further generalized this
model and introduced SV-sources (in [SV86], these sources are called as slightly-random sources),
where each bit in the sequence is “slightly random” and takes the value 0 with probability in the
range (δ, 1 − δ), 0 < δ < 1/2, for any conditioning of the previous bits in the sequence. They
proved that it is impossible to extract from a single SV-source and gave an efficient algorithm to
extract from O(log n log∗ n) independent SV-sources, and left as an open problem to extract from
two independent SV-sources.
Chor and Goldreich [CG88] introduced a model of weak sources called block sources, and
Zuckerman [Zuc90] generalized this to model weak sources using the notion of min-entropy. A
2
source X on n bits is said to have min-entropy at least k if for any x, Pr[X = x] ≤ 2−k.
Definition 1.0.1. The min-entropy of a source X is defined to be: H∞(X) = minx(− log(Pr[X =
x])). The min-entropy rate of a source X on {0, 1}n is defined to be H∞(X)/n. Any source X on
{0, 1}n with min-entropy at least k is called an (n, k)-source.
This is now the standard way of modeling a weak source. However, it turns out that the
class of (n, k)-sources is too general and the following simple lemma shows that it is impossible to
extract from this class. We first introduce the notion of an extractor for a class of sources.
We use statistical (or variation) distance to measure the performance of an extractor in
terms of the closeness of the output to the uniform distribution.
Definition 1.0.2. The statistical distance between two distributions D1 and D2 over some universal
set Ω is defined as |D1 −D2| = 12
∑
d∈Ω |Pr[D1 = d]−Pr[D2 = d]|. We say D1 is ε-close to D2 if
|D1 −D2| ≤ ε and denote it by D1 ≈ε D2.
Definition 1.0.3. An efficiently computable function Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is an (deterministic)
extractor for a class of sources X with error ε if, for any source X ∈ X , |f(X)−Um| ≤ ε.
Lemma 1.0.4 ([CG88]). There cannot exist an extractor for the class of (n, n − 1)-sources with
error < 1/2.
Proof. Suppose Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is an extractor that extracts for min-entropy n−1 with error
ε < 1/2. Since |Ext−1(0)| + |Ext−1(1)| = 2n, W.lo.g, let |Ext−1(0)| ≥ 2n−1. Let X be a source
uniform on the set Ext−1(0). Clearly, the min-entropy of X is at least n − 1 but Ext is constant
on X, which contradicts the assumption that the error of Ext is less than 1/2.
To circumvent this difficulty, Chor and Goldreich suggested the problem of extracting from
two or more independent sources.
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Definition 1.0.5 (2-source extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is called a
(k, ε)-two-source extractor if for independent (n, k)-sources X and Y, we have
|Ext(X,Y)−Um| ≤ ε.
Ext is said to be strong in Y if it also satisfies |(Ext(X,Y),Y) − (Um,Y)| ≤ ε, where Um is
independent from Y.
A simple probabilistic argument shows the existence of 2-source extractors for min-entropy
k ≥ log n + 2 log(1/ε) + 1. However, for applications, one is interested in efficiently constructing
such extractors. Chor and Goldreich [CG88] used Lindsey’s Lemma to show that the inner-product
function (see Theorem 2.5.3) is a 2-source extractor for min-entropy more than n/2. No further
progress was made for around 20 years, when Bourgain [Bou05b] constructed a 2-source extractor for
min-entropy 0.499n. His result was based on breakthroughs in the area of additive combinatorics.
Raz [Raz05] obtained an improvement in terms of total min-entropy, and constructed 2-source
extractors requiring one source with min-entropy more than n/2 and the other source with min-
entropy O(log n). There is also a different 2-source extractor on the Paley graph function matching
the entropy bounds of [Raz05] (see Theorem 2.5.4). Prior to work in this thesis, it was a challenging
open problem to construct a 2-source extractor that works when both sources have min-entropy
significantly smaller than n/2.
An explicit 2-source extractor directly yields explicit Ramsey graphs, a central object in
extremal combinatorics. Recall that a graph on N vertices is called a K-Ramsey graph if it does
not contain any independent set or clique of size K. In 1947, it was shown by Erdös in one of the first
applications of the probabilistic method that there exists K-Ramsey graphs for K = 2 logN . He
posed as a challenge to explicitly construct such a graph, and this has drawn a lot of attention over
the last 69 years. Frankl and Wilson [FW81] used intersection theorems to construct K-Ramsey
graphs on N vertices, with K = 2O(
√
logN log logN). This remained the best known construction for
a long time, with many other constructions [Alo98,Gro00,Bar06,Gop14] achieving the same bound.
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Finally, subsequent works by Barak et al. [BKS+10,BRSW12] obtained a significant improvement
and gave explicit constructions of K-Ramsey graphs, with K = 22
log1−α(logN)
, for some absolute
constant α.
An impressive line of work considered the problem of constructing extractors having access
to multiple independent sources. Several researchers managed to construct excellent extractors
using a constant number of sources [BIW06,Rao09a,RZ08,Li11a,Li13a,Li13b,Li15e,Coh15a], with
the best known result being a 3-source extractor construction for (log n)C min-entropy by Li [Li15e].
Raz and Yehudayoff [RY11] introduced a natural generalization of the class of independent
sources, which called interleaved sources. Roughly, the symbols from C independent source are
mixed( in some unknown order) into one long string and given as input to the extractor. Besides
being a natural generalization of independent sources, the original motivation for studying these
sources came from an application found by Raz and Yehudayoff [RY11] in proving lower bounds
for arithmetic circuits. Further, such extractors give examples of explicit functions with high best-
partition communication complexity. Using the probabilistic method, one can show that extractors
exist for C = 2 and k = Ω(log n). The construction in [RY11] works however works for k > (1−δ)n
and C = 2, where δ is a small constant.
A different line of work considered the problem of simulating randomized algorithms with
access to only weak sources of randomness [VV85, CG88, Zuc96, SSZ95, ACRT97]. This led to
the introduction of the notion of seeded extractors [NZ96]. Informally, a seeded extractor uses a
short uniform seed to extract randomness out of an (n, k)-source X (see Chapter 2 for a formal
definition). A long line of work spanning two decades culminated in excellent constructions of seeded
extractors (see [LRVW03, GUV09, DKSS09] for current optimal constructions). Further various
applications of seeded extractors were found in seemingly unrelated areas like inapproximabilty
[Zuc96, Uma99, MU02], error correcting codes [TZ04, Gur04a], expander graphs [WZ93] (see also
[NT99] for more applications).
In another line of work, Trevisan and Vadhan [TV00] introduced the problem of constructing
seedless extractors for the class of samplable sources, where the weak random source is generated
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by a computationally bounded algorithm. The simplest sources in this model are bit-fixing sources.
Informally, a bit-fixing source is a source where some subset of the bits are fixed and the remaining
ones chosen in some random way. Such sources have applications in exposure resilient cryptography
and have been investigated in a line of work [CGH+85, KZ07a, GRS06, Rao09b]. Generalizing
oblivious bit-fixing sources (see Chapter 5 for a definition) are a class of sources called as affine
sources. Here the source is assumed to be uniform on some unknown affine subspace of Fnp of
dimension k. For p = 2, (which is the most interesting setting in applications to computer science),
the best known affine extractor until very recently worked for k ≥ n/
√
log logn [Bou07,Li11b,Yeh11]
(a recent work of Li [Li15c] improves this to k ≥ logC n using components from work in this thesis).
For larger p, Gabizon and Raz [GR08] constructed almost optimal extractors even for k = 1. Ben-
Sasson and Zewi [BSZ11] showed some connections between affine extractors and 2-source extractor
based on conjectures in additive combinatorics. In [TV00], they constructed explicit extractors for
sources generated by polynomial sized circuits based on strong complexity-theoretic assumptions.
Kamp, Rao, Vadhan and Zuckerman [KRVZ11] studied the problem of constructing extractors
for small-space sources, where the weak source is generated by a small width branching program.
Roughly, their extractor construction works for min-entropy n1−δ, for some small absolute constant
δ.
Recently, Dodis and Wichs [DW09] initiated the study of seeded non-malleable extractors
with applications to cryptography. These extractors strengthen the notion of seeded extractors in
a non-trivial way. Very informally, a non-malleable extractor has to satisfy the property that the
output of the extractor looks random even to an adversary that has access to the output of the
extractor evaluated on a correlated seed. In some more detail, suppose X is an (n, k)-source, and
A : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d is a function such that A(y) 6= y for all y. We think of A as an adversary, and
call such functions as tampering functions. Let Y be a uniform independent seed on d bits. Then,
a non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m satisfies the property that for most
fixings of Y = y, we have nmExt(X, y), nmExt(X,A(y)) ≈ Um,nmExt(X,A(y)). It turns out that
this property is quite non-trivial to satisfy, and the first explicit construction was found by Dodis,
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Li, Wichs and Zuckerman [DLWZ14]. Subsequent works [CRS14, Li12a, Li12b, DY13] improved
various parameters, but all these constructions required the min-entropy of the source X to be at
least 0.499n. However, existentially the work [DW09] proved the existence of such extractors for
k ≥ log n (for polynomially small error).
The main applications of such non-malleable extractors comes from the problem of privacy
amplification with an active adversary [BBR88,Mau92,BBCM95]. As a basic problem in informa-
tion theoretic cryptography, privacy amplification deals with the case where two parties want to
communicate with each other to convert their shared secret weak random source X into shared
secret nearly uniform random bits. On the other hand, the communication channel is watched by
an adversary Eve, who has unlimited computational power. To make this task possible, we assume
two parties have local (non-shared) uniform random bits. If Eve is passive (i.e., can only see the
messages but cannot change them), this problem can be solved easily by using strong seeded ex-
tractors. However, in the case where Eve is active (i.e., can change, delete and reorder messages),
the problem becomes much more complicated. The major challenge here is to design a protocol
that uses as few interactions as possible, and outputs a uniform random string R that has length
as close to H∞(X) as possible (the difference is called the entropy loss).
A 2-source variant of non-malleable extractors, called seedless non-malleable extractors, was
introduced by Cheraghchi and Guruswami [CG14b]. Here, roughly, the tampering functions act
on both X and Y. Thus, the guarantee we would want is nmExt(X,Y), nmExt(f(X), g(Y)) ≈
Um, nmExt(f(X), g(Y)), where X and Y are independent weak sources and f, g are arbitrary
tampering functions (with one of them not mapping any input to itself). Their main motivation
for initiating the study of these objects are in applications to non-malleable codes. Non-malleable
codes (introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [DPW10]) are a natural weakening of error-
detecting codes in hope to handle more severe forms of tampering on the codeword (see Section
12 for a definition). These codes also have applications in tamper-resilient cryptography [DPW10].
In [CG14b], they showed a black-box way of constructing non-malleable codes via explicit seedless
non-malleable extractors. Further, they showed the existence of such non-malleable extractors for
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min-entropy Ω(log n). However, no known constructions of such seedless non-malleable extractors
were known prior to work in this thesis, and it was posed as an open problem in [CG14b] to
construct such an extractor even for full min-entropy (i.e., k = n).
1.0.2 Our Results
2-Source Extractors One of the main contributions of this thesis is an explicit 2-source extractor
that works for min-entropy k ≥ logC n, for some constant C. This is based on joint work with David
Zuckerman [CZ16a]. In subsequent work with Xin Li [CL16a], we improve the constant C. We
present this in Chapter 6. The construction needs material that is developed in Chapters 4 and 5.
Ramsey Graphs As a corollary of our 2-source extractor, we obtain explicit K-Ramsey graphs
on N = 2n vertices with K = 2(log logN)
C
for some constant C. This result was also obtained by an
independent work by Cohen [Coh16c], who constructed a weaker object called a 2-source disperser
(see Definition 2.5.2) for min-entropy logC n to obtain this result.
Seeded Non-Malleable Extractors and Privacy Amplification We give explicit construc-
tions of seeded non-malleable extractors that requires min-entropy k = Ω(log2 n/ε) and seed-length
d = O(log2 n/ε), where ε is an error parameter. In fact our construction is more general, and this
is a crucial ingredient in our 2-source extractor construction. This result is based on joint work
with Vipul Goyal and Xin Li [CGL16]. Subsequently, we improve this to k = Ω(log1+o(1) n/ε) and
seed-length d = O(log1+o(1) n/ε). This is based on joint work with Xin Li [CL16a]. This improve-
ment is crucial to obtain new results in the problem of privacy amplification, where we obtain a
protocol with almost optimal parameters (a substantial amount of research over the last 25 years
has focussed on obtaining such a protocol, and our result is nearly optimal). We present these
results in Chapter 4. A substantial amount of tools for these results are developed in Chapter 3.
The techniques in Chapter 3 crucially rely on the powerful technique of “alternating extraction”
that was introduced by Dziembowski and Pietrzak [DP07].
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Resilient Functions An ingredient in our 2-source extractor construction are functions that have
low influence with respect to small subsets of co-ordinates. Such functions were initially studied
by Ben-Or and Linial [BL85] when they introduced the perfect information model. We obtain new
results on explicitly constructing such resilient functions and present this in Chapter 5. This is
based on joint work with David Zuckerman [CZ16a].
Small-Space Sources We give improved extractors for small space sources that work for min-
entropy k = no(1). This is based on joint work with Xin Li [CL16b]. The results are presented in
Chapter 9. This uses results from Chapter 8.
Sumset Sources We generalize the class of affine sources and study sources of the form X1+. . .+
XC where each Xi is an independent source on Fn2 (the addition being the usual vector addition).
We show how to extract when each Xi has min-entropy at least log
C n. We also show applications
of sumset extractors to extract from many other weak sources that have been previously studied.
This is based on joint work with Xin Li [CL16b]. We present the results in Chapter 8. We use
some components from Chapter 3 for this construction.
Seedless Non-Malleable Extractors and Non-Malleable codes We present two construc-
tions of seedless non-malleable extractors. The first construction uses 10 sources (instead of 2,
generalizing the definition so that each source is tampered) and is based on joint work with David
Zuckerman [CZ14]. As a result, we obtain the first construction of a non-malleable code with
constant rate in a well studied “split-state” model. The second construction uses just 2 sources
and thus resolves the open question of [CG14b]. Further, this construction generalizes to handle
multiple tamperings, and using this we give the first explicit constructions of non-malleable codes
that can handle multiple attacks in the information theoretic setting. We present our result on
non-malleable extractors in Chaper 11 and our results on non-malleable codes in Chapter 12. Some
of the results uses components from Chapter 3.
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Interleaved Sources We give improved constructions of extractors for interleaved sources. We
use Chapter 10 to present these results. The results are based on joint works with Xin Li and David
Zuckerman [CZ16b,CL16b].
Multi-Source Extractors The best known multi-source extractor (in terms of min-entropy) is
from a recent work of Cohen and Schulman [CS16] and requires O(1/δ)+O(1) independent sources,
each with min-entropy at least log1+δ(n). We improve this result and give extractors that work for
O(1) (an absolute constant) independent sources, each with min-entropy log1+o(1) n. This is based




We use Um to denote the uniform distribution on {0, 1}m, and US to denote the uniform distribu-
tion on any set S.
For any integer t > 0, [t] denotes the set {1, . . . , t}.
We use bold capital letters for random variables and samples as the corresponding small letter,
e.g., X is a random variable, with x being a sample of X.
For an ` ×m matrix V , and any S ⊆ `, |S| = q, we use VS to denote the q ×m sub-matrix of V
corresponding to the rows indexed by S. If S = {i} is a singleton, we use Vi instead of V{i}.
A distribution D on n bits is t-wise independent if the restriction of D to any t bits is uniform.
Further D is (t, ε)-wise independent if the distribution obtained by restricting D to any t coordi-
nates is ε-close to uniform.




Definition 2.1.1. A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, ε)-seeded extractor if for
any source X of min-entropy k, |Ext(X,Ud)−Um| ≤ ε. Ext is called a strong seeded extractor if
|(Ext(X,Ud),Ud)−(Um,Ud)| ≤ ε, where Um and Ud are independent. Further, if for each s ∈ Ud,
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Ext(·, s) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a linear function, then Ext is called a linear seeded extractor.
We recall an explicit seeded extractor construction with almost optimal parameters.
Theorem 2.1.2 ([GUV09]). For any constant α > 0, and all integers n, k > 0 there exists a
polynomial time computable strong-seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d =
O(log n+ log(1/ε)) and m = (1− α)k.
For some applications we need to ensure that for each x ∈ {0, 1}n, Ext(x, s1) 6= Ext(x, s2)
whenever s1 6= s2. A simple way to ensure this is to concatenate the seed to the output of Ext,
though it is no longer strong. We record this formally.
Corollary 2.1.3. For any constant α > 0, and all integers n, k > 0 there exists a polynomial time
computable seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(log n + log(1/ε)) and
m = (1− α)k. Further for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, Ext(x, s1) 6= Ext(x, s2) whenever s1 6= s2.
We also use the following strong seeded extractor constructed by Zuckerman [Zuc07] that
achieves seed length log(n) +O(log(1ε )) to extract from any source with constant min-entropy rate.
Theorem 2.1.4 ([Zuc07]). For all n > 0 and constants α, δ, ε > 0 there exists an efficient construc-
tion of a (k = δn, ε)-strong seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with m ≥ (1 − α)k
and D = 2d = O(n).
In some of our constructions, we require explicit linear seeded extractors with strong pa-
rameters.
Theorem 2.1.5 ([Tre01,RRV02]). For every n, k,m ∈ N and ε > 0, with m ≤ k ≤ n, there exists
an explicit strong linear seeded extractor LExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m for min-entropy k and






A drawback of the above construction is that the seed length is ω(log n) for sub-polynomial
min-entropy. An improved construction of Li [Li15c] achieves O(log n) seed length for even poly-
logarithmic min-entropy.
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Theorem 2.1.6 ([Li15c]). There exists a constant c > 1 such that for every n, k ∈ N with c log8 n ≤
k ≤ n and any ε ≥ 1/n2, there exists a polynomial time computable linear seeded extractor LExt :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m for min-entropy k and error ε, where d = O(log n) and m ≤
√
k.
We record useful lemma which shows that seeded extractors work even when the seed is not
fully uniform, but has sufficiently large min-entropy.
Lemma 2.1.7. Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a strong seeded extractor for min-entropy
k, and error ε. Let X be a (n, k)-source and let Y be a source on {0, 1}d with min-entropy d− λ.
Then,
|Ext(X,Y) ◦Y −Um ◦Y| ≤ 2λε.
Proof. Since Y is a source with min-entropy d− λ, we can assume it is uniform on a set A of size
2d−λ. Thus














where the last inequality uses the fact that Ext is a strong seeded extractor.
2.2 Conditional Min-Entropy
Definition 2.2.1. The average conditional min-entropy of a source X given a random variable W
is defined as















We recall some results on conditional min-entropy from the work of Dodis et al. [DORS08].
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Lemma 2.2.2 ([DORS08]). For any ε > 0, Prw∼W
[




Lemma 2.2.3 ([DORS08]). If a random variable Y has support of size 2`, then H̃∞(X|Y) ≥
H∞(X)− `.
We require extractors that can extract uniform bits when the source only has sufficient
conditional min-entropy.
Definition 2.2.4. A (k, ε)-seeded average case seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
for min-entropy k and error ε satisfies the following property: For any source X and any arbitrary
random variable Z with H̃∞(X|Z) ≥ k,
Ext(X,Ud),Z ≈ε Um,Z.
It was shown in [DORS08] that any seeded extractor is also an average case extractor.
Lemma 2.2.5 ([DORS08]). For any δ > 0, if Ext is a (k, ε)-seeded extractor, then it is also a
(k + log(1/δ), ε+ δ)-seeded average case extractor.
2.3 Some Probability Lemmas
We say that a distribution D1 is ε-close to another distribution D2 if |D1 −D2| ≤ ε.
Definition 2.3.1. The collision probability of a distribution D is defined as : cp(D) = Pr[D = D′],
where D′ is independent and identicaly distributed as D.
For the sake of convenience, we make the following definition.
Definition 2.3.2. For a set A, define cp(A) to be the collision probability of the uniform distribution
on A.
The following lemma was proved in [BIW06].
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Lemma 2.3.3. Let D be a distribution with cp(D) = 1KL . Then D is L
−1/2-close to a distribution
with min-entropy at least logK.
Definition 2.3.4. We say that a distribution D on a set S is a convex combination of distributions
D1, . . . , Dl on S if there exists non-negative constants (called weights) w1, . . . , wl with
∑l
i=1wi = 1
such that Pr[D = s] =
∑l
i=1wi · Pr[Di = s] for all s ∈ S. We use the notation D =
∑l
i=1wi ·Di
to denote the fact that D is a convex combination of the distributions D1, . . . , Dl with weights
w1, . . . , wl.
Definition 2.3.5. For random variables X and Y , we use X|Y to denote a random variable with
distribution: Pr[(X|Y ) = x] =
∑
y∈support(Y ) Pr[Y = y] · Pr[X = x|Y = y].
We note the following lemma which follows from the above definitions.
Lemma 2.3.6. Let X and Y be distributions on a set S such that X =
∑l
i=1wi · Xi and Y =∑l
i=1wi · Yi. Then |X − Y | ≤
∑
iwi · |Xi − Yi|.
The following result on min-entropy was proved by Maurer and Wolf [MW97].
Lemma 2.3.7. Let X,Y be random variables such that Y takes at ` values. Then
Pry∼Y
[






Lemma 2.3.8 ([BIW06]). Let X1, . . . ,X` be independent random variables on {0, 1}m such that
|Xi −Um| ≤ ε. Then, |
∑`
i=1 Xi −Um| ≤ ε`.
Lemma 2.3.9 ([GRS06]). Let X be a random variable taking values in a set S, and let Y be a
random variable on {0, 1}t. Assume that |(X,Y)− (X,Ut)| ≤ ε. Then for every y ∈ {0, 1}t,
|(X|Y = y)−X| ≤ 2t+1ε.
Lemma 2.3.10 ([Sha08]). Let X1,Y1 be random variables taking values in a set S1, and let X2,Y2
be random variables taking values in a set S2. Suppose that
15
1. |X2 −Y2| ≤ ε2.
2. For every s2 ∈ S2, |(X1|X2 = s2)− (Y1|Y2 = s2)| ≤ ε1.
Then
|(X1,X2)− (Y1,Y2)| ≤ ε1 + ε2.
Using the above results, we record a useful lemma.
Lemma 2.3.11. Let X1, . . . ,Xt be random variables, such that each Xi takes values 0 and 1.
Further suppose that for any subset S = {s1, . . . , sr} ⊆ [t],
(Xs1 ,Xs2 . . . ,Xsr) ≈ε (U1,Xs2 . . . ,Xsr).
Then
(X1, . . . ,Xt) ≈5tε Ut.
Proof. We prove this by induction on t. The base case when t = 1 is direct. Thus, suppose t ≥ 2.
It follows that
(Xt,X1, . . . ,Xt−1) ≈ε (U1,X1, . . . ,Xt−1).
By an application of Lemma 2.3.9, for any value of the bit b,
|(X1, . . . ,Xt−1|Xt = b)− (X1, . . . ,Xt−1)| ≤ 4ε.
Further, by the induction hypothesis, we have
|(X1, . . . ,Xt−1)−Ut−1| ≤ 5(t− 1)ε.
Thus, by the triangle inequality for statistical distance, it follows that for any value of the bit b,
|(X1, . . . ,Xt−1|Xt = b)−Ut−1| ≤ (5t− 1)ε.
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Using Lemma 2.3.10 and the fact that |Xt −U1| ≤ ε, it follows that
|(X1, . . . ,Xt)−Ut| ≤ (5t− 1)ε+ ε = 5tε.
This completes the induction, and the lemma follows.
We also record the following simple lemma.
Lemma 2.3.12. Let X be a source on Fnp with min-entropy k. Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be a collection
of vectors such that dim(span{V }) ≥ n − A. Then XV =
∑
i xivi : x ∼ X is a source with
min-entropy ≥ k −A log p.
2.4 Sampling Using Weak Sources
A well known way of sampling using weak sources uses randomness extractors. We first introduce
a graph-theoretic view of extractors. Any seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m can
also be viewed as an unbalanced bipartite graph GExt with 2
n left vertices (each of degree 2d) and
2m right vertices. We use N (x) to denote the set of neighbours of x in GExt. We call GExt the
graph corresponding to Ext.
Theorem 2.4.1 ([Zuc97]). Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a seeded extractor for min-
entropy k and error ε. Let D = 2d. Then for any set R ⊆ {0, 1}m,
|{x ∈ {0, 1}n : ||N (x) ∩R| − µRD| > εD}| < 2k,
where µR = |R|/2m.
Theorem 2.4.2 ([Zuc97]). Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a seeded extractor for min-
entropy k and error ε. Let {0, 1}d = {r1, . . . , rD}, D = 2d. Define Samp(x) = {Ext(x, r1), . . . ,Ext(x, rD)}.
17
Let X be an (n, k + k′)-source. Then for any set R ⊆ {0, 1}m,
Prx∼X[||Samp(x) ∩R| − µRD| > εD] < 2−k
′
,
where µR = |R|/2m.
2.5 2-Source Extractors
Definition 2.5.1 (2-source extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is called a
(k, ε)-two-source extractor if for any independent (n, k)-sources X and Y, we have
|Ext(X,Y)−Um| ≤ ε.
Ext is said to be strong in Y if it also satisfies |(Ext(X,Y),Y) − (Um,Y)| ≤ ε, where Um is
independent from Y.
Definition 2.5.2 (2-source Disperser). A function Disp : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is called a
(k, ε)-two-disperser if for any independent (n, k)-sources X and Y,
support{Ext(X,Y)} = {0, 1}.
We recall a construction of a two-source extractors based on the inner product function
[CG88, Zuc91]. This essentially is a stronger version of Lindsey’s Lemma. We include a proof for
completeness.
Theorem 2.5.3 ([CG88, Zuc91, Rao07] ). For all m, r > 0, with q = 2m, n = rm, let X,Y
be independent sources on Frq with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively. Let IP be the inner product
function over the field Fq. Then, we have:
|IP(X,Y),X− Um,X| ≤ ε, |IP(X,Y), Y −Um,Y| ≤ ε
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where ε = 2
−(k1+k2−n−m)
2 .
Proof. Let X,Y be uniform on sets A,B ⊆ Frq respectively, with |A| = 2k1 and |B| = 2k2 . Let ψ be
any non-trivial additive character of the finite field Fq. For short, we use · to denote the standard






















ψ((x− x′) · y)
 12
where the first inequality follows by an application of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Further,
whenever x 6= x′, we have ∑
y∈Frq
ψ((x− x′) · y) = 0.

















Using Lemma 2.6.1, it now follows that
|IP(X,Y),Y −Um,Y| ≤ 2
n+m−k1−k2
2
It can be similarly shown that |IP(X,Y ), X − Um, X| ≤ 2
n+m−k1−k2
2 .
The following folklore result on two-source extractors is based on the Paley graph function.
The following double character sum estimate was obtained by Karatsuba [Kar71,Kar91].
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Theorem 2.5.4 ([Kar71, Kar91]). Let p be any prime. Let χ be a non-trivial multiplicative char-






∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2λ|A| 2λ−12λ (|B|p n4λ + |B| 12 p n2λ ).
The above theorem can be equivalently restated as a result on 2-source extractors.
Theorem 2.5.5. Let p be any prime. Let χ be a non-trivial multiplicative character of F∗pn. For






n log p and k2 ≥ (4 log n log p)/δ, we have
Ex∼X|Ey∼Y[χ(x+ y)]| ≤ 2−δk2 .
Proof. Let X,Y be flat sources on sets A and B respectively. Thus |A| = 2k1 and |B| = 2k2 .
Setting λ = n log pδk2 in Theorem 2.5.4 (so that |B| = 2
k2 = p
n
λ ), we have


















log(3n)− 3k2δn log p
2n log p < 2−δk2 .
2.6 Abelian XOR Lemmas
The following lemma is known as Vazirani’s XOR Lemma.
Lemma 2.6.1. Let D be a distribution over ZM such that for every nontrivial additive character
20
ψ of ZM , we have |E[ψ(D)]| ≤ ε. Then, we have
|D − UM | ≤ ε
√
M.
Let σM : ZN → ZM be defined as σM (x) = x (mod M). The following general version of
the above XOR lemma was proved in [Rao07].
Lemma 2.6.2 ([Rao07]). Let D be a distribution over ZN such that for every non-trivial additive
character ψ of ZN , we have |E[ψ(D)]| ≤ ε. Then, for any M < N , we have
|σM (D)− UM | ≤ O(ε logN
√
M) +O(M/N).
We also record a more generalized form of the XOR Lemma [DLWZ14].
Lemma 2.6.3 ([DLWZ14]). Let D1, D2 be distributions over ZN such that for arbitrary characters
ψ, φ of ZN , we have |E[ψ(D1)φ(D2)]| ≤ ε, whenever ψ is nontrivial. Then, for any M < N , we
have
|(σM (D1), σM (D2))− (UM , σM (D2))| = O(ε(logN)2M) +O(M/N).
2.7 Finding Primitive Elements in Finite fields
In some of our constructions, we need access to primitive elements in finite fields. There is no
known deterministic polynomial time algorithm to find any primitive element of a finite field Fpn .
However, there are efficient algorithms known for a weaker task, where the algorithm is only required
to output a small set of elements with the guarantee that one of the elements is primitive. The
following result is due to Shoup [Sho90].
Theorem 2.7.1 ([Sho90]). Let p > 0 be any prime. For all n > 0, there exists a deterministic
procedure which takes as input n, runs in time poly(n), and outputs a set S = {a1, . . . , al}, l =
poly(n), such that S contains a primitive element of Fpn.
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Chapter 3
Alternating Extraction and its
Applications to Breaking Correlations
1 On a very high level, many of the results in this thesis use explicit objects that break correlations
between random variables. In many of the scenarios we consider, the generic setting is the follow-
ing: Let X,X1, . . . ,Xt be correlated random variables, and let Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt be random variables
independent of {X,X1, . . . ,Xt}. The goal is to construct a function f such that
f(X,Y), f(X1,Y1), . . . , f(Xt,Yt) ≈ Um, f(X1,Y1), . . . , f(Xt,Yt).
Clearly this setting is too general, and such an f does not exist. The various objects that we
construct make more assumptions on the correlated random variables, and typically Y is either an
independent seed or a weak source with enough min-entropy. In some of the constructions even
this is not enough, and we assume access to some kind of ‘advice’.
Before we present our actual constructions, we first discuss a toy example to show that
seeded extractors are very useful tools in solving problems of this flavour. Let X,X′ be correlated
r.v’s, each on n bits, such that H̃∞(X|X′) ≥ k. In such a setting, it is easy to break the correlations
1parts of this chapter have been previously published [CGL16,CL16b,CL16a]
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between X and X′ using an independent uniform seed Y. Let Y′ be the tampered version of Y.
We use any (k− log(1/ε), ε)-strong seeded extractor Ext and define Z = Ext(X,Y) (and similarly,
let Z′ = Ext(X′,Y′)). We prove the correctness of this construction as follows. Fix the r.v X′,
and X still has average conditional min-entropy at least k. Thus, Ext(X,Y) is 2ε-close to uniform
after this fixing, and we can also fix Y since Ext is a strong extractor. Thus, at this point Z′ is a
deterministic function of Y′, and Z is a deterministic function of X. Thus, we can fix Z′ without
affecting the distribution of Z, and hence f = Ext is a valid construction in this case.
However, in most applications we generally have much weaker guarantees on the correlated
r.v’s and hence they do not admit such simple solutions. We now introduce the technique of
alternating extraction, which informally is a protocol consisting of multiple rounds of extraction
using seeded extractors. All our explicit constructions in this chapter are based on some form of
the basic alternating extraction method.
The results in this chapter are based on joint works with Vipul Goyal and Xin Li [CGL16,
CL16b,CL16a].
3.1 The Basic Alternating Extraction Method and a New Lemma
The method of alternating extraction was introduced by Dziembowski and Pietrzak as a tool to
build intrusion resilient secret sharing schemes [DP07]. Subsequently, Dodis and Wichs [DW09]
used this method to construct objects known as “look-ahead extractors” and used this to give
improved privacy amplification protocols. Since then, this method has an been extremely useful
tool in constructing a variety of pseudorandom objects [DW09,Li13a,Li15e,Coh15b,CGL16,Li15c,
CL16b,Coh16a,Coh16b].
Alternating Extraction Assume that there are two parties, Quentin with a source Q and
a seed S0, and Wendy with a source W. The alternating extraction protocol is an interactive
process between Quentin and Wendy, and starts off with Quentin sending the seed S0 to Wendy.
Wendy uses S0 and a strong-seeded extractor Extw to extract a seed R0 = Extw(W,S0) using W,
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and sends R0 back to Quentin. This constitutes a round of the alternating extraction protocol. In
the next round, Quentin uses a strong extractor Extq to extract a seed S1 = Extq(Q,R0) from Q
using R0, and sends it to Wendy and so on. The protocol is run for h + 1 steps, where h is an
input parameter. Thus, the following sequence of r.v’s is generated: S0,R0 = Extw(W,S0),S1 =
Extq(Q,R0), . . . ,Sh = Extq(Q,Rh−1),Rh = Extw(W,Sh). Define a look-ahead extractor
laExt(W, (Q,S)) = R1, . . . ,Rh.
We establish a useful property satisfied by the alternating extraction protocol. This strength-
ens known results on alternating extraction protocol from previous work [Li13a]. Since stating the
result technically involves a lot of parameters, we first informally describe a slightly less general
version of the result. Suppose X,X′ are correlated r.v’s, each on n bits, such that X is an (n, k)-
source. Further suppose we have access to r.v’s Y = (Q,S1),Y
′ = (Q′,S′1) with both Q,Q
′ on
n bits and both S1,S
′
1 on d bits, s.t {Y,Y′} is independent of {X,X′}. Further let Q be an
(n, k)-source. Using X and Y in an alternating extraction protocol for h rounds, let the output
of the look-ahead extractor be R1, . . . ,Rh. Similarly, let R
′
1, . . . ,R
′
h be the r.v’s output when the
alternating extraction protocol is played between X′ and Y′. Then, for any h < k/10d, Rh is close
to uniform even conditioned on {Ri : i ∈ [h− 1]}, {R′i : i ∈ [h− 1]} (with high probability).
We now state and prove this result in full generality. For clarity of presentation, we use the
notation: Z[a,b] to denote the random variable Za, . . . ,Zb.
Lemma 3.1.1. Let X be a (nw, kw)-source and let X
(1), . . . ,X(t) be random variables on {0, 1}nw
that are arbitrarily correlated with X. Let Y = (Q,S1),Y
(1) = (Q(1),S
(1)




be arbitrarily correlated random variables that are independent of (X,X(1),X(2), . . . ,X(t)). Sup-
pose that Q is an (nq, kq)-source, S1 is an (m,m − λ)-source, Q(1), . . . ,Q(t) are each on nq bits,
and S(1), . . . ,S(t) are each on m bits. Let Extq,Extw be strong seeded extractors that extract m
bits at min-entropy k with error ε and seed length m. Let laExt be the look-ahead extractor for
an alternating extraction protocol with parameters u,m, with Extq,Extw being the strong seeded
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extractors used by Quentin and Wendy respectively. Let laExt(X,Y) = R1, . . . ,Ru and for j ∈ [t],
laExt(X(j),Y(j)) = R
(j)
1 , . . . ,R
(j)
u . If kw, kq ≥ k + u(t + 1)m + 2 log(1ε ), then the following holds
for each i ∈ [u]:
Ri,R[1,i−1],R
(1)
[1.i−1], . . . ,R
(t)
[1,i−1],Q,Q
(1), . . . ,Q(t) ≈εi Um,R[1,i−1],R
(1)
[1.i−1], . . . ,R
(t)
[1,i−1],Q,Q
(1), . . . ,Q(t)
where εi = O(uε+ 2
λε).
Proof. We in fact prove the following stronger claim.
Claim 3.1.2. For each i ∈ [u] the following hold:
Ri,R[1,i−1],R
(1)




[1,i], . . . ,S
(t)
[1,i],Q,Q
(1), . . . ,Q(t)
≈εi Um,R[1,i−1],R
(1)




[1,i], . . . ,S
(t)
[1,i],Q,Q








[1,i], . . . ,R
(t)
[1,i],X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t)
≈εi+2ε Um,S[1,i],S
(1)




[1,i], . . . ,R
(t)
[1,i],X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t)
where εi = 4(i−1)ε+2λε. Further, conditioned on R[1,i−1],R
(1)




[1,i], . . . ,S
(t)
[1,i],
(a) (X,X(1), . . . ,X(t)) is independent from (Y,Y(1), . . . ,Y(t)), (b) X,Q each have average condi-







i , . . . ,R
(t)
i are deterministic
functions of (X,X(1), . . . ,X(t)).
Proof. We prove this claim by induction on i. Let i = 1. Since R1 = Extw(X,S1), and Extw
is a strong-seeded extractor, it follows by Lemma 2.1.7 that Extw(X,S1),S1 ≈ε1 Um,S1, where
ε1 = 2
λε. Thus we can fix S1, and R1 is still ε1-close to uniform on average. We note that R1
is a deterministic function of X. Since the random variables S
(1)
1 , . . . ,S
(t)
1 ,Q,Q
(1), . . . ,Q(t) are
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deterministic functions of Y,Y(1), . . . ,Y(t) and thus uncorrelated with X, we have
R1,S1,S
(1)
1 , . . . ,S
(t)
1 ,Q,Q
(1), . . . ,Q(t) ≈ε1 Um,S1,S
(1)
1 , . . . ,S
(t)
1 ,Q,Q
(1), . . . ,Q(t).
We fix the random variables S1,S
(1)
1 , . . . ,S
(t)
1 . By Lemma 2.2.3, the source Q has average condi-





after this fixing. Using





, 2ε) strong average case extractor. We also note
that R1,R
(1)
1 , . . . ,R
(t)
1 are now deterministic functions of X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t). Thus recalling that
S2 = Extq(Q,R1), we have S2,R1 ≈(2ε+ε1) Um,R1, since R1 is ε1-close to uniform and using the





, 2ε) strong average case extractor. Thus on fixing
R1, S2 is (2ε+ ε1)-close to Um on average and is a deterministic function of Y. since the random
variables R
(1)
1 , . . . ,R
(t)
1 are deterministic functions of X,X







1 , . . . ,R
(t)
1 ,X,X







1 , . . . ,R
(t)
1 ,X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t)
Further, it still holds that (X,X(1), . . . ,X(t)) is independent from (Y,Y(1), . . . ,Y(t)). This
proves the base case of our induction.
Now suppose that the claim is true for i and we will prove it for i+1. Fix the random variables
R[1,i−1],R
(1)




[1,i], . . . ,S
(t)
[1,i]. By induction hypothesis, it follows that X,Q





after this fixing. We
now fix the random variables Ri,R
(1)
i , . . . ,R
(t)
i (these random variables are deterministic functions
of X,X(1), . . . ,X(t) by induction hypothesis). Thus by Lemma 2.2.3, the source X has conditional











Since Si+1 = Extq(Q,Ri) is now independent of X and (εi + 2ε)-close to Um on average (by
induction hypothesis), it follows that Extw(X,Si+1),Si+1 ≈εi+4ε Um,Si+1. Thus on fixing Si+1, the
random variable Ri+1 = Extw(X,Si+1) is (εi + 4ε)-close to Um on average, and is a deterministic
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function of X. We also fix the random variables S
(1)
i+1, . . . ,S
(t)
i+1. Since we have fixed the random
variables R
(1)
i , . . . ,R
(t)
i , thus S
(1)
i+1, . . . ,S
(t)
i+1 are deterministic functions of Y,Y
(1), . . . ,Y(t). Hence








[1,i+1], . . . ,S
(t)
[1,i+1],Q,Q
(1), . . . ,Q(t)
≈εi+1 Um,R[1,i],R
(1)




[1,i+1], . . . ,S
(t)
[1,i+1],Q,Q
(1), . . . ,Q(t).

















, 2ε) strong average case ex-
tractor, it follows that Extq(Q,Ri+1),Ri+1 ≈εi+2+2ε Um. since the random variables R
(1)
i+1, . . . ,R
(t)
i+1
are deterministic functions of X,X(1), . . . ,X(t) (recall that we have fixed S
(1)










[1,i+1], . . . ,R
(t)
[1,i+1],X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t)
≈εi+1+2ε Um,S[1,i+1],S
(1)




[1,i+1], . . . ,R
(t)
[1,i+1],X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t).
Also, we maintain at each step that (X,X(1), . . . ,X(t)) is independent from (Y,Y(1), . . . ,Y(t)).
This completes the proof.
3.2 The Flip-Flop Primitive
The flip-flop primitive (Algorithm 1), introduced by Cohen [Coh15a], is a particularly elegant way
of using the alternating extraction protocol. In this section, we establish a property of the flip-flip
primitive that strengthens a result proved in [Coh15a]. Before presenting the flip-flop construction
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and our result, we first discuss a toy example which motivates this construction.
A Toy Problem Let X,X′ be correlated r.v’s such that X is an (n, k)-source. Further suppose
we have access to a uniform strong Y on d bits such that {X,X′} is independent of Y. Our goal
is to construct a deterministic function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m such that
f(X,Y), f(X′,Y) ≈ Um, f(X′,Y).
We adopt the following notation for convenience: For any r.v Z = g(X,Y), where g is a deter-
ministic function, let Z′ = g(X′,Y). As a starting point for our construction of f , we could play
an alternating extraction game, say for 2 rounds, between X and Y (and similarly, in the ‘tam-
pered game’ between X′ and Y′). Let R0,R1 be the output of the look-ahead extractor. As a
preliminary candidate for f , define f(X,Y) = R1. Thus, assuming k is large enough, we know by
results from the previous section that R1 is close to uniform on average conditioned on R0,R
′
0.
However, it is not clear if R1 is close to uniform given R
′
1 = f(X
′,Y). In fact it is not hard to
find counter-examples for this construction. Thus, maybe we could try to solve an easier problem.
Suppose we now we have access to an ‘advice’ bit b, and a tampered bit b′ 6= b, and we are aiming
to construct f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d × {0, 1} → {0, 1}m such that
f(X,Y, b), f(X′,Y, b′) ≈ Um, f(X′,Y′, b′).
We could now try to define f(X,Y, b) = Rb. Clearly, if b = 1 (and this b
′ = 0), this works since
R1 is close to uniform on average given R
′
0. However, the construction does not work if b = 0. We
give a rough idea of how to fix this approach and refer the reader to Algorithm 1 for the actual
cosntruction. The idea is play 2 more rounds of alternating extraction between X and Y, where
Y is a new source derived from Y (and hence is independent of X). Let R0,R1 be the output of
the look-ahead extractor. We now define f(X,Y) = R1−b. Thus, if b = 0, clearly f(X,Y) = R1 is
close to uniform on average given f(X′,Y) = R
′
0. Further, we can show that if b = 1, since we gain
independence in the first 2 rounds of alternating extraction (i.e, R1 is close to uniform on average
28
given R′0), this carries on to the next two rounds of alternating extraction as well.
We now present the flip-flop construction, and then establish our result (Lemma 3.2.1)
which informally states that the correlations are broken even allowing multiple tamperings on both
X and Y.
Algorithm 1: flip-flop(x, y, qi, b)
Input: Bit strings x, y, qi of length nw, ny, nq respectively, and a bit b.
Output: A bit string of length nq.
Subroutine: Let Extq : {0, 1}nq × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m be a strong seeded extrac-
tor set to extract from min-entropy k with error ε and seed length m. Let Extw :
{0, 1}nw × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m be a strong seeded extractor set to extract from min-
entropy k with error ε and seed length d.
Let laExt : {0, 1}nw × {0, 1}nq+m → {0, 1}2m be the look ahead extractors defined in
Section 3.1 for an alternating extraction protocol with parameters m,u = 2 (recall u is
the number of steps in the protocol, m is the length of each random variable that is com-
municated between the players), and using Extq,Extw as the strong seeded extractors.
Let Ext : {0, 1}ny × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}nq be a strong seeded extractor set to extract from
min-entropy k1 with error ε.
1 Let si,1 = Slice(qi,m)
2 Let laExt(x, (qi, si,1)) = ri,0, ri,1
3 Let qi = Ext(y, ri,b)
4 Let si,1 = Slice(qi,m).
5 Let laExt(x, (qi, si,1)) = ri,1, ri,2.
6 Let qi+1 = Ext(y, ri,1−b)
7 Ouput qi+1.
Lemma 3.2.1. Let b, {bh : h ∈ [j]} be j + 1 bits such that for all h ∈ [j], b 6= bh. Let X be a
(nw, kw)-source and let {Xh : h ∈ [j]} be random variables on {0, 1}nw that are arbitrarily correlated
with X. Let Y, {Yh : h ∈ [j]} be arbitrarily correlated random variables that are independent of
(X, {Xh : h ∈ [j]}). Suppose that Y is a (ny, ky)-source, ky = ny − λ, each random variable in
{Yh : h ∈ [j]} is on ny bits. Let Qi be some function of Y on nq bits with min-entropy at least
nq − λ, and for each h ∈ [j], let Qh be an an arbitrary function of Y, {Ya : a ∈ [j]} on nq bits.
Let flip-flop be the function computed by Algorithm 1. Let flip-flop(X,Y,Qi, b) = Qi+1, and
for h ∈ [j], let flip-flop(Xh,Yh,Qhi , bh) = Qhi+1. Suppose ky ≥ max{k, k1}+10
(














, and nq ≥ k + 10jm+ 2 log(1ε ) + λ.
Then, with probability at least 1− ε′, where ε′ = O(2λε), over the fixing of the random vari-
ables Qi, {Qhi : h ∈ [j]},Ri,0,Ri,1, {Rhi,0,Rhi,1 : h ∈ [j]},Qi, {Q
h





h ∈ [j]}, {Qhi+1 : h ∈ [j]}:
• Qi+1 is ε′-close to Unq and is a deterministic function of Y
• The random variables (X, {Xh : h ∈ [j]}) and (Y, {Yh : h ∈ [j]}) are independent







and Y has min-entropy at least ky −
10
(






Proof. Notation: For any determinitic function f , if V = f(X,Y), let Va denote the random
variable H(Xa,Ya).
We split the proof into two cases, depending on b.
Case 1: Suppose b = 1. By Lemma 3.1.1, it follows that
Ri,1, {Rhi,0 : h ∈ [j]},Qi, {Qhi : h ∈ [j]}
≈ε1 Um, {Rhi,0 : h ∈ [j]},Qi, {Qhi : h ∈ [j]},
where ε1 = c2
λε, for some constant c. Thus, we can fix {Rhi,0 : h ∈ [j]},Qi, {Qhi : h ∈ [j]}, and
with probability at least 1−O(ε1), Ri,1 is O(ε1)-close to Um. Note that Ri,1 is now a deterministic






probability at least 1− ε due to this fixing. Since on fixing Qi, {Qhi : h ∈ [j]}, the random variables






with probability at least 1− ε due to this fixing. We now note that the random
variables {Qhi : h ∈ [j]} are deterministic functions of Y, {Yh : h ∈ [j]}. Thus, we fix {Q
h
i : h ∈ [j]},





with probability at least 1− ε due
to this fixing. Since Ext extracts from min-entropy k1, and ky was chosen large enough, it follows
that the random variable Qi is (ε+ ε1)-close to Unq with probability at least 1− O(ε1) even after
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the fixing. Further, we fix Ri,1 since Ext is a strong seeded extractor, and by Lemma 2.3.7, X loses





with probability at least 1− ε due to this fixing. Thus Qi is now a
deterministic function of Y. We now fix the random variables {Rhi,2 : h ∈ [j]}, noting that they are
deterministic functions of X and hence does not affect the distribution of Qi. X loses min-entropy





with probability at least 1− ε due to this fixing.
We now note that the random variables {Rhi,0,R
h
i,1 : h ∈ [j]} are deterministic function of




i,1 : h ∈ [j]}





with probability at least 1− ε. Thus it follows by






using Lemma 2.3.7. Finally, we note that {Qhi+1 : h ∈ [j]} is now a deterministic
function of Y, {Yh : h ∈ [j]}. Thus, we can fix {Qhi+1 : h ∈ [j]} variables and Y loses min-entropy





with probability at least 1 − ε due to this fixing. Further, Ri,0 is now a
deterministic function of X. It follows that Qi+1 is O(ε1 + ε)-close to Unq since ky is chosen large






with probability at least 1− ε due to this fixing.
Case 2: Now suppose b = 0. We fix the random variables Qi, {Qhi : h ∈ [j]}. Conditioned on
this fixing, it follows by Lemma 3.1.1 that |Ri,0 − Um| < ε1, ε1 = O(2λε), with probability at least
1 − ε. Since Ext is a strong seeded extractor (and ky is large enough) and Ri,0 is a deterministic
function of X, it follows that |Qi,Ri,0−Unq ,Ri,0| < ε+ ε1 with probability at least ε. We fix Ri,0,
and observe that Qi is now a deterministic function of Y. We can now fix {Rhi,0,Rhi,1 : h ∈ [j]}
since {Rhi,1 : h ∈ [j]} is a deterministic function of X, {Xh : h ∈ [j]}, and hence does not affect the
distribution of Qi. As a result of these fixings, it is clear that (X, {Xh : h ∈ [j]}) is independent of












at least 1 − 3ε. Note that now Qi, {Qhi : h ∈ [j]} are deterministic functions of Y, {Yh : h ∈ [j]},
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and Qi is O(ε1)-close to Unq . By Lemma 3.1.1, it follows that
Ri,1, {R
h
i,0 : h ∈ [j]},Qi, {Q
h
i : h ∈ [j]} ≈ε2 Um, {R
h
i,0 : h ∈ [j]},Qi, {Q
h
i : h ∈ [j]}
where ε2 = c(ε1 +ε+ε), for some constant c. Thus, we can fix {R
h
i,0 : h ∈ [j]},Qi, {Q
h
i : h ∈ [j]} and
with probability at least 1−O(ε2), Ri,1 is O(ε2)-close to Um. Note that Ri,1 is now a deterministic






probability at least 1− ε due to this fixing. Since on fixing Qi, {Q
h
i : h ∈ [j]}, the random variables
{Rhi,1 : h ∈ [j]} are deterministic functions of X, {X(h) : h ∈ [j]}, the source X loses min-entropy





with probability at least 1 − ε due to this fixing. We now note that the
random variables {Qhi+1 : h ∈ [j]} are deterministic functions of Y, {Yh : h ∈ [j]}. Thus, we






probability at least 1−ε due to this fixing. Since Ext extracts from min-entropy k1, (and ky is large
enough) it follows that random variable Qi+1 is O(ε2)-close to Unq even after the fixing. Further, we





with probability at least 1 − ε due to this fixing. Further Qi+1 is now a deterministic function of
Y. Thus we can fix the random variables {R(h)i,2 : h ∈ [j]} since they are deterministic function






probability at least 1− ε due to this fixing. This completes the proof.
3.3 Correlation Breakers with Advice
In this section, we construct a primitive that breaks correlations under a weaker guarantee compared
to the flip-flop function. Informally, as motivated in the previous section, the bit b can be thought
of as advice to the flip-flop function, with the guarantee that b 6= bi for any i. Instead, now suppose
we only have access to a short string w, with the guarantee that w 6= wi. We show that it is
possible to break correlations with this weaker guarantee by chaining together a bunch of flip-
flop functions. This generalizes an object introduced by Cohen [Coh15a], which he called a local
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correlation breaker, with our twist being that we now allow access to an advice string w. We now
describe the construction in more detail.
Algorithm 2: ACB(x, y, z)
Input: Bit strings x, y, z of length nw, ny, ` respectively.
Output: A bit string of length nq.
1 Let q1 = Slice(y, nq)
2 for h = 1 to ` do
3 qh+1 = 2laExt(x, y, qh, zh)
4 end
5 Ouput q`+1.
Lemma 3.3.1. Let z, z1, . . . , zt each be ` bit strings such that for all i ∈ [t], z 6= zi. Let
X be a (nw, kw)-source and let X
1, . . . ,Xt be random variables on {0, 1}nw that are arbitrarily
correlated with X. Let Y,Y1, , . . . ,Yt be random variables on ny bits that are independent of
(X,X1,X2, . . . ,Xt). Suppose that Y is a (ny, ky)-source, ky = ny − λ.
Let ACB be the function computed by Algorithm 2. Let ACB(X,Y, z) = Q`+1, and for
h ∈ [t], let ACB(Xh,Yh, zh) = Qh`+1. Suppose ky ≥ max{k, k1} + 20`
(













and nq ≥ k + 10tm+ 2 log(1ε ) + λ. Then, we have
Q`+1,Q
1
`+1, . . . ,Q
t
`+1 ≈ε′ Unq ,Q1`+1, . . . ,Qt`+1
where ε′` = O((2
λ + `)ε).
Proof. Notation: For any function f , if V = f(X,Y), let V a denote the random variable
f(X(a),Y(a)).
For h ∈ [`], define the sets
Indh = {i ∈ [t] : zh 6= zih, Indh = [t] \ Indh,
Ind[h] = ∪hi=1Indh, Ind[h] = [t] \ Ind[h].
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We record a simple claim.
Claim 3.3.2. For each i ∈ [t], there exists h ∈ [`] such that i ∈ Indh.
Proof. Recall that we have fixed Z,Z1, . . . ,Zt such that Z 6= Zi for any i ∈ [t]. Thus it follows that
for each i ∈ [t], there exists some h ∈ [`] such that Zh 6= Zih, and hence i ∈ Indh.
We now prove our main claim, which combined with Lemma 3.2.1 and a simple inductive
argument proves Lemma 3.3.1.
Claim 3.3.3. For any h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , `}, suppose the following holds:
With probability at least 1− εh over the fixing of the random variables {Qi : i ∈ [h]}, {Qji :
i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]}, {Ri,1,Ri,2 : i ∈ [h]}, {Rji,1,R
j
i,2 : i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]}, {Qi : i ∈ [h]}, {Q
j
i : i ∈ [h], j ∈




i,1 : i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]}, {Q
j
i+1 : j ∈ Ind[h]}: (a) Qh+1 is εh-close to a
source with min-entropy at least nq−λ and is a deterministic function of Y (b) {Qjh+1 : j ∈ Ind[h]}
is a deterministic function of Y, {Yj : j ∈ [t]} (c) The random variables (X, {Xj : j ∈ [t]}) and















and Y has min-entropy at least ky−10h
(














Then, the following holds:
Let εh+1 = εh+c2
λε for some constant c. With probability at least 1− εh+1 over the fixing of





i ∈ [h + 1], j ∈ [t]}, {Qi : i ∈ [h + 1]}, {Q
j





i ∈ [h + 1], j ∈ [t]}, {Qji+1 : j ∈ Ind[h+1]}: (a) Qh+2 is εh+1-close to Unq and is a deterministic
function of Y (b) {Qjh+2 : j ∈ Ind[h+1]} is a deterministic function of Y, {Y
j : j ∈ [t]} (c) The
















Proof. We fix the random variables {Qi : i ∈ [h]}, {Qji : i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]}, {Ri,0,Ri,1 : i ∈
[h]}, {Rji,0,R
j
i,1 : i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]}, {Qi : i ∈ [h]}, {Q
j






i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]}, {Qji+1 : j ∈ Ind[h]} such that (a), (b), (c), (d) holds (this happens with probability




: j ∈ Ind[h]}, noting that they are de-












with probability at least 1− ε. Further, Q has min-entropy at least ky − 10h
(






The claim now follows directly from Lemma 3.2.1.
To complete the proof of Lemma 3.3.1, we now note that the hypothesis of Claim 3.3.3 is
indeed satisfied when h = 0. Thus, by ` applications of Claim 3.3.3, it follows that the Q`+1 is
ε′`-close to Unq , where ε
′
` = O(2
λε+ `ε). This follows since for all applications of Claim 3.3.3 except
the first time, Qh is εh-close to uniform, and hence the parameter λ = 0. This concludes the proof
of Lemma 3.3.1.
3.4 Handling Linear Correlations
In the above sections, we crucially use the fact that X,X1, . . . ,Xt is independent of Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt.
In this section, we show that in fact this can be relaxed and we can handle some amount of ‘linear
correlation’ among these r.v’s. We now describe the setting in more details. Let Y1, . . . ,Yt be
correlated random variables. We show that it is possible to break the correlations by just using an
additional correlated source of the form X + Z, assuming X is independent of Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt (and
Z is allowed to have arbitrary correlations with Y1, . . . ,Yt).
The main idea is to adapt the methods from the previous section with an important change.
We now use linear seeded extractors in the alternating extraction steps to exploit the linearity of
the correlations between the source and the seed in various steps of the protocol. The proofs of the
results in this section are similar to that of the Section 3.2. However, to carry out the arguments
requires more careful conditioning and a slightly subtler inductive hypothesis in some of the proofs.
We begin by proving a result similar to Lemma 3.1.1 when an alternating extraction protocol
is run between the sources W = X + Z and Q = Y, where Y and Z are arbitrarily correlated and
X is independent of (Y,Z).
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Lemma 3.4.1. For any ε > 0 and any integers n1, n2, k, k1, t, d, h satisfying k1 ≥ k+ 2(t+ 1)d(h+
1) + log(1/ε) and n2 ≥ k + 2(t+ 1)d(h+ 1) + log(1/ε), let
• X be an (n1, k1)-source, Y = Un2 and Z be a random variable on n1 bits.
• Y1, . . . ,Yt be random variables on n2 bits each, such that X is independent of {Y,Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}.
• S0 = Slice(Y, d) and for i ∈ [t], Si0 = Slice(Yi, d).
• LExt1 : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d and LExt2 : {0, 1}n2 × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d be (k, ε)-strong
linear seeded extractors.
• laExt(X + Z, (Y,S0)) = R1, . . . ,Rh, and for i ∈ [t], laExt(X + Z, (Yi,Si0)) = Ri1, . . . ,Rih,
where laExt is executed with the linear seeded extractors LExt1,LExt2 for h rounds.
• Rj,X = LExt1(X,Sj) and Rj,Z = LExt1(Z,Sj), j ∈ [0, h].
Then,
1. for any j ≥ 0,
Sj , {Sg : g ∈ [0, j − 1]}, {Sig : g ∈ [0, j − 1], i ∈ [t]}, {Rg : g ∈ [0, j − 1]},
{Rig : g ∈ [0, j − 1], i ∈ [t]}
≈(4j+2)ε Ud, {Sg : g ∈ [0, j − 1]}, {Sig : g ∈ [0, j − 1], i ∈ [t]}, {Rg : g ∈ [0, j − 1]},
{Rig : g ∈ [0, j − 1], i ∈ [t]}.
2. for any j ≥ 0, conditioned on {Sg : g ∈ [0, j − 1]}, {Sig : g ∈ [0, j − 1], i ∈ [t]}, {Rg : g ∈
[0, j − 1]}, {Rig : g ∈ [0, j − 1], i ∈ [t]},
• X is independent of {Y,Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}.
• Sj and {Sij : i ∈ [t]} are deterministic functions of Y.
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• X has conditional min-entropy at least k + (t + 1)d(h + 1 − j) + log(1/ε) and Y has
conditional min-entropy at least k + 2(t+ 1)d(h+ 1− j) + log(1/ε).
3. for any j ≥ 0,
Rj ,Rj,Z, {Rg : g ∈ [0, j − 1]}, {Rij,Z : i ∈ [t]}, {Rig : g ∈ [0, j − 1], i ∈ [t]},
{Sg : g ∈ [0, j]}, {Sig : g ∈ [0, j], i ∈ [t]},Y, {Yi : i ∈ [t]},Z
≈4(j+1)ε Ud,Rj,Z, {Rg : g ∈ [0, j − 1]}, {Rij,Z : i ∈ [t]}, {Rig : g ∈ [0, j − 1], i ∈ [t]},
{Sg : g ∈ [0, j]}, {Sig : g ∈ [0, j], i ∈ [t]},Y, {Yi : i ∈ [t]},Z.
4. for any j ≥ 0, conditioned on Rj,Z, {Rg : g ∈ [0, j−1]}, {Rij,Z : i ∈ [t]}, {Rig : g ∈ [0, j−1], i ∈
[t]}, {Sg : g ∈ [0, j]}, {Sig : g ∈ [0, j], i ∈ [t]},
• X is independent of {Y,Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}.
• Rj and {Rij : i ∈ [t]} are deterministic function of X.
• X has conditional min-entropy at least k + (t + 1)d(h + 1 − j) + log(1/ε) and Y has
conditional min-entropy at least k + 2(t+ 1)d(h− j) + log(1/ε).
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on j. The validity of the lemma when j = 0 is direct.
Thus, suppose that the lemma holds for j − 1 for some j ∈ [h] and we prove it for j.
Fix the following random variables:
Rj−1,Z, {Rg : g ∈ [0, j − 2]}, {Rij−1,Z : i ∈ [t]}, {Rig : g ∈ [0, j − 2], i ∈ [t]},
{Sg : g ∈ [0, j − 1]}, {Sig : g ∈ [0, j − 1], i ∈ [t]}.
By induction hypothesis, it follows that
• Rj−1 is 4jε-close to Ud on average and is a deterministic function of X.
• Y has conditional min-entropy k + 2(t+ 1)d(h+ 1− j) + log(1/ε) and is independent of X.
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• X has conditional min-entropy k + (t+ 1)d(h+ 2− j) + log(1/ε).
since Sj = LExt2(Y,Rj−1), it follows by Lemma 2.2.5 that Sj is (4j + 2)ε-close to Ud on average
conditioned on Rj−1. Thus we fix Rj−1 and observe that Sj is now a deterministic function of
Y. Next we fix {Rij−1 : i ∈ [t]} observing that, by induction hypothesis, they are deterministic
functions of X and hence does not affect Sj . As a result of this fixing, {Sij : i ∈ [t]} is now
a deterministic function of Y, and further X remains independent of {Y,Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}. We
note that all the random variables fixed in this step are deterministic functions of X. Thus after
these fixings, by Lemma 2.2.3 and induction hypothesis, the conditional entropy of X is at least
k + (t + 1)d(h + 2 − j) − (t + 1)d + log(1/ε) = k + (t + 1)d(h + 1 − j) + log(1/ε). This concludes
the proof of (1) and (2).
We now prove (3) and (4). We continue to condition on the random variables that we have
fixed so far in our proof. We have,
• Sj is (4j + 2)ε-close to Ud on average and is a deterministic function of Y,
• X has average conditional min-entropy at least k + (t + 1)(h + 1 − j) + log(1/ε) and is
independent of Y,
• Y has conditional min-entropy k + 2(t+ 1)d(h+ 1− j) + log(1/ε).
Thus, it follows by Lemma 2.2.5 that Rj,X = LExt1(X,Sj) is 4(j + 1)ε-close to Ud on average
conditioned on Sj . We fix Sj and note that Rj,X is now a deterministic function of X. Next,
we fix Rj,Z which is now a deterministic function of Z and hence does not affect Rj,X. Since






j,Z. Thus Rj is
εj-close to Ud on average and is a deterministic function of X. We now fix {Sij : i ∈ [t]} which
is a deterministic function of Y, and next fix {Rij,Z : i ∈ [t]} which is a deterministic function of
Z. Thus, these additional fixings do not affect Rj . Finally observe that X remains independent
of {Y,Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}. We note that all the random variables fixed in this step are deterministic
functions of {Y,Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}. Thus after these fixings, by Lemma 2.2.3, the conditional entropy
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of Y is at least k + 2(t + 1)d(h + 1 − j) − 2(t + 1)d + log(1/ε) = k + 2(t + 1)d(h − j) + log(1/ε).
This concludes the proof of induction and hence the lemma follows.
We now instantiate the flip-flop and Advice-Correlation Breaker functions with linear seeded
extractors.
Algorithm 3: flip-flop(yi, yij , w, b)
Input: Bit strings yi, yij , w = x+ z of length n1, n2, n1 respectively, and a bit b.
Output: Bit string yij+1 of length n2.
Subroutines: Let LExt1 : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d, LExt2 : {0, 1}n2 × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}d be (k, ε)-strong linear seeded extractors. Let LExt3 : {0, 1}n1×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}n2
be a (k2, ε)-strong linear seeded extractor.
Let laExt : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2+d → {0, 1}2d be a look-ahead extractor for an alternating
extraction protocol run for 2 rounds using LExt1,LExt2 as the seeded extractors.
1 Let si0,j = Slice(y
i









2 Let yi1,j = LExt3(y
i, rib,j)
3 Let si0,j = Slice(y
i









4 Output yij+1 = LExt3(y
i, ri1−b,j)
Algorithm 4: ACB(yi, w, id)
Input: Bit strings yi, w = x+ z, id of length n1, n1, h respectively.
Output: Bit string yh+1 of length n2.
1 Let yi1 = Slice(y, n2)
2 for j = 1 to h do
3 yij+1 = flip-flop(y
i, yij , w, id[j])
4 end
5 Output yih+1.
Theorem 3.4.2. For any ε > 0 and any integers n1, n2, k, k1, t, d, h satisfying k1 ≥ k + 8tdh +
log(1/ε), n2 ≥ k + 3td+ log(1/ε), n1 ≥ k + 10tdh+ (4ht+ 1)n2 + log(1/ε), let
• X be an (n1, k1)-source, Y1 = Un1 and Z,Y2, . . . ,Yt be random variables on n1 bits each,
such that X is independent of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}.
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• id1, . . . , idt be bit strings of length h such that for each i ∈ [t], id1 6= idi.




h+1, . . . ,Y
t
h+1 ≈O(hε) Un2 ,Y2h+1, . . . ,Yth+1.
Proof. Define the following sets for j ∈ [h]:
Indj = {i ∈ [2, h] : idi[j] 6= id1[j]}, Ind≤j = ∪jg=1Indg, Ind≤j = [t] \ Ind≤j .
We prove the following lemma from which Theorem 3.4.2 is direct by observing that Ind≤h = [2, t].
Lemma 3.4.3. For each j ∈ [h],
Y1j+1, {Yij+1 : i ∈ Ind≤j} ≈O(jε) Un2 , {Yij+1 : i ∈ Ind≤j}.
Proof. Recall that Rc,j = LExt(X + Z,Sc,j) (for any c ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ [h]). Define Rc,j,X =
LExt(X,Sc,j) and Rc,j,Z = LExt(Z,Sc,j). Since LExt is linear seeded, it follows that Rc,j =
Rc,j,X + Rc,j,Z. Similarly, define Rc,j,X = LExt(X,Sc,j) and Rc,j,Z = LExt(Z,Sc,j).
We prove the lemma by induction on j. In fact, we prove the following stronger statement:
For every j ∈ [0, h], conditioned on the random variables: {Yij+1 : i ∈ Ind≤j}, {Yig : g ∈
[j], i ∈ [t]}, {Ri0,j+1,Z : i ∈ Indj}, {Y
i
g : g ∈ [j], i ∈ [t]}, {Si0,g : g ∈ [j], i ∈ [t]}, {Si1,g : g ∈ [j], i ∈
[t]}, {Ri0,g : g ∈ [j], i ∈ [t]}, {Ri1,g : g ∈ [j], i ∈ [t]}, {Si0,g : g ∈ [j], i ∈ [t]}, {Si1,g : g ∈ [j], i ∈
[t]}, {Ri0,g : g ∈ [j], i ∈ [t]}, {Ri1,g : g ∈ [j], i ∈ [t]}
• Y1j+1 is 6jε-close to Un2 on average
• X is independent of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}.
• {Yij+1 : i ∈ [t]} is a deterministic function of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}.
40
• X has conditional min-entropy at least kj,X = k+8td(h−j)+log(1/ε) and Y1 has conditional
min-entropy at least kj,Y = k + 10td(h− j) + 4tn2(h− j + 1) + log(1/ε).
The base case of the induction when j = 0 is direct. Now suppose the above holds for some
j − 1 ≥ 0, and we prove it for j.
We fix the following random variables: {Yij : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, {Yig : g ∈ [j − 1], i ∈ [t]}, {Y
i
g :
g ∈ [j−1], i ∈ [t]}, {Ri0,j,Z : i ∈ Indj−1}, {Si0,g : g ∈ [j−1], i ∈ [t]}, {Si1,g : g ∈ [j−1], i ∈ [t]}, {Ri0,g :
g ∈ [j − 1], i ∈ [t]}, {Ri1,g : g ∈ [j − 1], i ∈ [t]}, {Si0,g : g ∈ [j − 1], i ∈ [t]}, {Si1,g : g ∈ [j − 1], i ∈
[t]}, {Ri0,g : g ∈ [j − 1], i ∈ [t]}, {Ri1,g : g ∈ [j − 1], i ∈ [t]}. By induction hypothesis, we have
• Y1j is 6(j − 1)ε-close to Un2 on average.
• X is independent of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}.
• {Yij : i ∈ [t]} is a deterministic function of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}.
• X has conditional min-entropy at least kj−1,X = kj,X + 8td and Y1 has conditional min-
entropy at least kj−1,Y = kj,Y + 10td+ 4tn2.
We repeatedly use Lemma 2.2.5 when we argue about the remaining conditional min-entropy
in a random variable and do not explicitly mention this. Further, any random variable that we fix
is either a deterministic function of X or a deterministic function of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}. Thus, we
always maintain that X is independent of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt} and again do not explicitly mention this.
We split the proof into two cases depending on the bit id1[j].
Case 1: Suppose id1[j] = 1 and hence Y
1
j = LExt3(Y
1,R11,j). It follows that for all
i ∈ Indj , idi[j] = 0 and Y
i
j = LExt3(Y
i,Ri0,j). Since {Yij : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} is fixed, it follows that
for all i ∈ Ind≤(j−1), Ri0,j,X = LExt1(X,Si0,j) is a deterministic function of X. We fix the random
variables {Ri0,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, and X has conditional min-entropy at least kj,X + 7td. We now
fix S10,j , {Si0,j : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, {Ri0,j,Z : i ∈ [t]} and by Lemma 3.4.1, it follows that (a) R10,j is
(6j − 5)ε-close to uniform on average and is a deterministic function of X, (b) X has conditional
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min-entropy at least kj,X + 7td and Y
1
j has conditional min-entropy at least k + td+ log(1/ε). We
also note that for each i ∈ Ind≤(j−1), Ri0,j = Ri0,j,X + Ri0,j,Z is fixed.
Next we fix {Si1,j : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, observing that it is now a deterministic function of
{Yi : i ∈ [t]} and hence does not affect the distribution of R10,j . The conditional min-entropy of
Y1j after this fixing is at least k+ log(1/ε). We now fix R
1
0,j , {Ri0,j : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} and by Lemma
3.4.1, (a) S11,j is (6j − 4)ε-close to uniform on average and is a deterministic function of Y1, (b)
X has conditional min-entropy at least kj,X + 6td and Y
1
j has conditional min-entropy at least
k + log(1/ε) .
Continuing in a similar fashion as above, we first fix {Ri1,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, which is a
deterministic function of X. The conditional min-entropy of X after this fixing is at least kj,X+5td.
We now fix the random variables S11,j , {Si1,j : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, {Ri1,j,Z : i ∈ [t]}, {Yij : i ∈ [t]} and
by Lemma 3.4.1, we have (a) R11,j is (6j − 3)ε-close to uniform on average and is a deterministic
function of X, (b) X has conditional min-entropy at least kj,X + 5td.
We fix {Yij : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} which is deterministic function of {Yi : i ∈ [t]}, and R11,j
continues to remain close to Ud on average. We also fix {Y
i
j : i ∈ Indj} observing that it is a
deterministic function of {Yi : i ∈ [t]} (since we have fixed {Ri0,j : i ∈ [t]} and for i ∈ Indj ,
Yij = LExt3(Y
i,Ri0,j)). It follows that {S
i
0,j : i ∈ Ind≤j} is fixed and hence {R
i
0,j,Z : i ∈ Ind≤j} is
a deterministic function of Z. Thus, we fix {Ri0,j,Z : i ∈ Ind≤j} without affecting the distribution
of R11,j .




1,R11,j) is (6j−2)ε-close to Un2 on average conditioned on R11,j . We fix R11,j and thus
Y
1
j is now a deterministic function of Y
1. We now fix {Ri1,j,X : i ∈ Indj} which is a deterministic
function of X and note that this fixes {Ri1,j : j ∈ Indj}. Further, since {Y
i
j : i ∈ Ind≤j} is fixed, it
follows that for all i ∈ Ind≤j , R
i
0,j,X is a deterministic function of X. We fix the random variables
{Ri0,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤j} and note that {S
i
1,j : i ∈ Ind≤j} is now fixed. Thus {R
i
1,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤j} is now
a deterministic of X. We fix {Ri1,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤j} and Y
1
j continues to remain close to uniform on
average and X has conditional min-entropy at least kj,X + 2td.
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0,j : i ∈ Ind≤j}, {R
i
0,j,Z : i ∈ Ind≤j}, {Y
i
j : i ∈ Ind≤j} and by Lemma
3.4.1, it follows that (a) R
1
0,j is (6j−1)ε-close to uniform on average and is a deterministic function
of X, (b) X has conditional min-entropy at least kj,X + 3td. Next we fix {R
i
1,j,Z : i ∈ Ind≤j}
which a deterministic function of Z and {Yij+1 : i ∈ Ind≤j} is now a deterministic function of
{Yi : i ∈ Ind≤j}. Thus, we fix {Yij+1 : i ∈ Ind≤j} and R
1
0,j continues to remain uniform on
average. It now follows that {Ri0,j+1,Z : i ∈ Ind≤(j)} is a deterministic function of Z, and we fix it.






0,j) is 6jε-close to Un2 on average conditioned on R
1
0,j . We fix R
1
0,j which is a deter-
ministic function of X and thus Y1j+1 is now a deterministic function of Y
1. Now consider any








0,j,Z, it follows that R
i
0,j,X is a deter-
ministic function of X. Thus, we fix {Ri0,j : i ∈ Ind≤j} without affecting the distribution of Y1j+1.
X has conditional min-entropy at least kj,X + td after this fixing. Now, since Y
i
j is fixed, it follows
that S
1




1,j) is a determin-
istic function of X. We fix {Ri1,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤j}, and observe that Y1j+1 remains close to uniform
on average and X has conditional min-entropy at least kj,X. Thus, {R
i
1,j : i ∈ Ind≤j} is now a
deterministic function of Z and {Yij+1 : i ∈ Ind≤j} is a deterministic function of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}.
This concludes the proof of this case.
Case 2: Suppose id1[j] = 0 and hence Y
1
j = LExt3(Y
1,R10,j). Since {Yij : j ∈ Indj−1} is
fixed, it follows that {Ri0,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} and {Ri1,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} are deterministic functions
of X and we fix them without affecting the distribution of Y1j . X has conditional min-entropy at
least kj−1,X + 6td after this fixing.
We now fix S10,j , {Si0,j : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, R10,j,Z, {Ri0,j,Z : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} and by Lemma
3.4.1, R10,j is (6j − 5)ε-close to Ud on average and is a deterministic function of X. We next fix
{Ri1,j,Z : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, {Yij : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, and {Y
i
j : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} observing that they are
deterministic functions of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt} and does not affect the distribution of R10,j . Further,
{Ri0,j,Z : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} is now a deterministic function of Z, and we fix it.




j is (6j − 4)ε-close to Un2 on average conditioned on R10,j . We fix R10,j and Y
1
j is now a
deterministic function of Y1. We now fix {Ri0,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} which is a deterministic function
of X and note that this fixes {Si0,j : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}. Thus {Ri1,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} is now a
deterministic function of X and we fix it without affecting the distribution of Y
i
j . As a result of
this fixing {Ri1,j : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} is a deterministic function of Z and hence {Y
i
j : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}
is a deterministic function of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}. Next, we fix {Ri0,j : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} and {R
i
1,j : i ∈
Ind≤(j−1)}, noting that they are deterministic functions of X. X has conditional min-entropy at
least kj−1,X + 2td after these fixings.








0,j,Zi ∈ Ind≤(h−1)} and invoking Lemma
3.4.1, it follows that R
1
0,j is (6j− 3)ε-close to uniform on average and is a deterministic function of
X. We now fix {Ri1,j,Z : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)} which a deterministic function of Z and note that this fixes
{Ri1,j : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}. Further Y
1
j has conditional min-entropy at least k + td+ log(1/ε). We now
fix {Ri0,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, {S
i
1,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, {R
i
1,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤(j−1)}, and by Lemma 3.4.1,
it follows that R
i
1,j is (6j − 1)ε-close to Ud on average and is deterministic function of X.
We now observe that {Yij+1 : i ∈ Ind≤j} is a deterministic function of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt} and
fix it without affecting the distribution of R
1
1,j . Next we fix {Ri0,j,Z : i ∈ Ind≤j} which is now a
deterministic function of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}. The conditional min-entropy of Y1 is at least kj,Y and
hence Yij+1 is 6jε-close to Un2 on average conditioned on R
1
1,j . We fix R
1
1,j and thus Y
1
j+1 is now
a deterministic function of Y1. Thus we fix {Ri1,j,X : i ∈ Ind≤j} and as a result {Yij+1 : i ∈ Ind≤j}
is now a deterministic function of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}. Further X has conditional min-entropy at least
kj,X as a result of these fixings. This completes the proof of induction and the theorem follows.
3.5 Non-Malleable Independence Preserving Mergers
In this section, we construct a primitive to break correlations in an even more general setting. To
motivate the general problem, consider the following simpler setting: Let X be a 2× n matrix r.v
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with rows X1 and X2, and let X
′ be a correlated 2×nmatrix with rows X′1 and X′2. Further, suppose
we know that either (a) X1,X
′
1 ≈ Un,X′1 or (b) X2,X′2 ≈ Un,X′1 holds. Our goal is to break the
correlations between these matrices using access to an independent seed Y (the seed is tampered
as well to Y′). More specifically, we want to construct a function f : {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
such that
f(X,Y), f(X′,Y′) ≈ Um, f(X′,Y′).
Informally, we call a function that satisfies the above guarantee to be a non-malleable independence
preserving merger (NIPM). More formally, we define an NIPM in the following way.
Definition 3.5.1. A (L, t, d′, ε, ε′)-NIPM : {0, 1}Lm × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m1 satisfies the following
property. Suppose
• X,X1, . . . ,Xt are r.v’s, each supported on boolean L×m matrices s.t for any i ∈ [L], |Xi −
Um| ≤ ε,
• {Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt} is independent of {X,X1, . . . ,Xt}, s.t Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt are each supported on
{0, 1}d and H∞(Y) ≥ d− d′,
• there exists an h ∈ [L] such that |(Xh,X1h, . . . ,Xth)− (Um,X1h, . . . ,Xth)| ≤ ε,
then
|(L, t, d′, ε, ε′)-NIPM((X,Y), (L, t, d′, ε, ε′)-NIPM(X1,Y1), . . . , (L, t, d′, ε, ε′)-NIPM(Xt,Yt)
−Um1 , (L, t, d′, ε, ε′)-NIPM(X1,Y1), . . . , (L, t, d′, ε, ε′)-NIPM(Xt,Yt)| ≤ ε′.
Using our NIPM, we construct a standard IPM introduced in the work of Cohen and Schul-
man [CS16].
Definition 3.5.2. A (L,C, k, t, ε, ε′)-IPM : {0, 1}Lm × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m1 satisfies the following
property. Suppose
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• X,X1, . . . ,Xt are r.v’s, each supported on boolean L×m matrices s.t for any i ∈ [L], |Xi −
Um| ≤ ε,
• Y1, . . . ,YC is an (n, k)-source, independent of {X,X1, . . . ,Xt}.
• there exists an h ∈ [L] such that |(Xh,X1h, . . . ,Xth)− (Um,X1h, . . . ,Xth)| ≤ ε,
then
|(L,C, k, t, ε, ε′)-IPM(X,Y), (L,C, k, t, ε, ε′)-IPM(X1,Y), . . . , (L,C, k, t, ε, ε′)-NIPM(Xt,Y)
−Um1 , (L,C, k, t, ε, ε′)-IPM(X1,Y), . . . , (L,C, k, t, ε, ε′)-IPM(Xt,Y)| ≤ ε′
The key differences between an NIPM and IPM are the following: The function IPM is
allowed to have access to multiple independent sources instead of a seed Y to break the correlation
between X and X′. Further, these independent sources are not subject to any tampering.
3.5.1 `-Non-Malleable Independence Preserving Merger
The following result presents our basic construction of an NIPM. The construction is based on
extending the technique of alternating extraction in a new (but simple) way. We refer the reader
to Chapter 4 for improved constructions of NIPM which uses the basic NIPM from this section in
a black-box way. Further using these explicit NIPM constructions, we also give improved construc-
tions of IPM (see Chapter 7).
Theorem 3.5.3. There exist constants c3.5.3, c
′
3.5.3 > 0 such that for all integers m, d, k1, ` > 0
and any ε > 0, with m ≥ d ≥ k1 > c3.5.3` log(n/ε), there exists an explicit function `-NIPM :
({0, 1}m)`×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m1, m1 = 0.9(m−c3.5.3` log(m/ε)), such that if the following conditions
hold:
• X1, . . . ,X` are r.v’s s.t for all i ∈ [`], |Xi−Um| ≤ ε1, and X′1, . . . ,X′` are r.v’s with each X′i
supported on {0, 1}m.
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• {Y,Y′} is independent of {X1, . . . ,Xt,X′1, . . . ,X′t}, s.t the r.v’s Y,Y′ are both supported on
{0, 1}d and H∞(Y) ≥ k1.
• there exists an h ∈ [t] such that |(Xh,X′h)− (Um,X′h)| ≤ ε,
then
|`-NIPM((X1, . . . ,X`),Y), `-NIPM((X′1, . . . ,X′`),Y′),Y,Y′
−Um1 , `-NIPM((X′1, . . . ,X′`),Y′),Y,Y′| ≤ c′3.5.3`ε
Our construction of NIPM is based on extending the method of alternating extraction in a
new way.
`-Alternating Extraction We extend the above technique by letting Quentin have access
to ` sources Q1, . . . ,Q` (instead of just Q) and ` strong-seeded extractors {Extq,i : i ∈ [`]} such
that in the i’th round of the protocol, he uses Qi to produce the r.v Si = Extq,i(Qi,Ri). More
formally, the following sequence of r.v’s is generated: S1 = Slice(Q1, d),R1 = Extw(W,S1),S2 =
Extq,2(Q2,R1), . . . ,R`−1 = Extw(Q`−1,S`−1),S` = Extq,`(Q`,R`). Define the look-ahead extrac-
tor
`-laExt((Q1, . . . ,Q`),W) = S`.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.5.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.3. We instantiate the `-look-ahead extractor described above with the follow-
ing strong seeded extractors: Let Ext1 : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}d1 , Ext2 : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}d1 →
{0, 1}d1 and Ext3 : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}m1 be explicit strong-seeded from Theorem 2.1.2
designed to extract from min-entropy m/2, k1/4,m − c3.5.3` log(m/ε) respectively, each with error
ε. Thus d1 = c2.1.2 log(m/ε).
We think of each Xi being uniform, and add back an error ε1` in the end.
For each i ∈ [`− 1], let Extq,i = Ext1, Extq,` = Ext3 and Extw = Ext2.
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Define
NIPM((X1, . . . ,X`),Y) = laExt((X1, . . . ,X`),Y).
For any random variable V = f((X1, . . . ,X`),Y) (where f is an arbitrary deterministic function),




We first prove the following claim.
Claim 3.5.4. For any j ∈ [h− 1], conditioned on the r.v’s {Si : i ∈ [j− 1]}, {S′i : i ∈ [j− 1]}, {Ri :
i ∈ [j − 1]}, {R′i : i ∈ [j − 1]} the following hold:
• Sj is 2(j − 1)ε-close to Ud1,
• Sj ,S′j are deterministic functions of {Xj ,X′j},
• for each i ∈ [t], Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− 2(j − 1)d1 − log(1/ε),
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least k1 − 2(j − 1)d1 − log(1/ε),
• {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} is independent of {Y,Y′}.
Further, conditioned on the r.v’s {Si : i ∈ [j]}, {S′i : i ∈ [j]}, {Ri : i ∈ [j − 1]}, {R′i : i ∈ [j − 1]} the
following hold:
• Rj is (2j − 1)ε-close to Ud,
• Rj ,R′j are deterministic functions of {Y,Y′},
• for any i ∈ [`], Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− 2jd1 − log(1/ε),
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least k1 − 2(j − 1)d1 − log(1/ε),
• {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} is independent of {Y,Y′}.
Proof. We prove the above by induction on j. The base case when j = 1 is direct. Thus suppose
j > 1. Fix the r.v’s {Si : i ∈ [j − 1]}, {S′i : i ∈ [j − 1]}, {Ri : i ∈ [j − 2]}, {R′i : i ∈ [j − 2]}. Using
inductive hypothesis, it follows that
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• Rj−1 is (2j − 3)ε-close to Ud,
• Rj−1,R′j−1 are deterministic functions of {Y,Y′},
• for any i ∈ [t], Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− 2(j − 1)d1 − log(1/ε),
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least k1 − 2(j − 2)d1 − log(1/ε),
• {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} is independent of {Y,Y′}.
Now since Sj = Ext1(Xj ,Rj−1), it follows that Sj is 2(j − 1)ε-close to Ud1 on average
conditioned on Rj−1. We thus fix Rj−1. Further, we also fix R
′
j−1 without affecting the distribution
of Sj . Thus Sj ,S
′
j are now a deterministic function of Xj ,X
′
j . It follows that after these fixings,
the average conditional min-entropy of Y is at least k1 − 2(j − 2)d1 − log(1/ε)− 2d1 = k1 − 2(j −
1)d1 − log(1/ε).
Next, we have Rj = Ext2(Y,Sj), and thus fixing Sj , it follows that Rj is (2j − 1)ε-close
to uniform on average. Further, since Rj is now a deterministic function of Y, we fix S
′
j . As a
result of these fixings, each Xi loses conditional min-entropy at most 2d1 on average. Since at
each point, we either fix a r.v that is a deterministic function of either {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X`} or
{Y,Y′} it follows that {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} remain independent of {Y,Y′}. This completes
the inductive step, and hence the proof follows.
We now proceed to prove the following claim.
Claim 3.5.5. Conditioned on the r.v’s {Si : i ∈ [h− 1]}, {S′i : i ∈ [h]}, {Ri : i ∈ [h− 1]}, {R′i : i ∈
[h]} the following hold:
• Sh is 2(h− 1)ε-close to Ud,
• Sh is a deterministic function of Xh,
• for each i ∈ [t], Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− 2hd1 − log(1/ε),
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least k1 − 2hd1 − log(1/ε),
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• {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} is independent of {Y,Y′}.
Proof. We fix the r.v’s {Si : i ∈ [h− 1]}, {S′i : i ∈ [h− 1]}, {Ri : i ∈ [h− 2]}, {R′i : i ∈ [h− 2]}, and
using Claim 3.5.4 the following hold:
• Rh−1 is (2h− 3)ε-close to Ud,
• Rh−1,R′h−1 are deterministic functions of {Y,Y′},
• for any i ∈ [t], Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− 2(h− 1)d1 − log(1/ε),
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least k1 − 2(h− 2)d1 − log(1/ε),
• {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} is independent of {Y,Y′}.
Next we claim that Xh has average conditional min-entropy at least m−2(h−1)d1− log(1/ε) even
after fixing X′h. We know that before fixings any other r.v, we have Xh|X′h is ε-close to uniform on
average. Since while computing the average conditional min-entropy, the order of fixing does not
matter, we can as well think of first fixing of X′h and then fixing the r.v’s {Si : i ∈ [h − 1]}, {S′i :
i ∈ [h − 1]}, {Ri : i ∈ [h − 2]}, {R′i : i ∈ [h − 2]}. Thus, it follows that the average conditional
min-entropy of Xh is at least m− 2(h− 1)d1 − log(1/ε).
We now show that even after fixing the r.v’s X′h,Rh−1,R
′
h−1, the r.v Sh is 2(h−1)ε-close to
uniform on average. Fix X′h and by the above argument Xh has average conditional min-entropy
at least m− 2(h− 1)d1− log(1/ε). Since Sh = Ext1(Xh,Rh−1), it follows that Sh is 2(h− 1)ε-close
to uniform on average even conditioned on Rh−1. We fix Rh−1, and thus Sh is a deterministic






h−1) is now a deterministic function of R
′
h (and thus
Y′). Thus, we can fix R′h (which also fixes S
′
h) without affecting the distribution of Sh.
Observe that after the r.v’s Rh−1,R
′
h−1 are fixed, S
′
h is a deterministic function of X
′
h. We
only fix S′h and do not fix X
′
h, and note that Sh is still 2(h − 1)ε-close to uniform. Further after
these fixings, each Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− 2hd1− log(1/ε), and Y has
average conditional min-entropy at least k1 − 2hd1 − log(1/ε).
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By our construction of NIPM, Theorem 3.5.3 is direct from the following claim.
Claim 3.5.6. For any j ∈ [h, `], conditioned on the r.v’s {Si : i ∈ [j − 1]}, {S′i : i ∈ [j]}, {Ri : i ∈
[j − 1]}, {R′i : i ∈ [j]} the following hold:
• Sj is 2(j − 1)ε-close to Ud,
• Sj is a deterministic function of Xj
• for each i ∈ [`], Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− 2jd1 − log(1/ε),
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least k1 − 2jd1 − log(1/ε),
• {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} is independent of {Y,Y′}.
Further, conditioned on the r.v’s {Si : i ∈ [j]}, {S′i : i ∈ [j + 1]}, {Ri : i ∈ [j − 1]}, {R′i : i ∈ [j]} the
following hold:
• Rj is (2j − 1)ε-close to Ud,
• Rj is a deterministic function of Y,
• for any i ∈ [`], Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− 2(j + 1)d1 − log(1/ε),
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least k1 − 2(j + 1)d1 − log(1/ε),
• {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} is independent of {Y,Y′}.
Proof. We prove this by induction on j. For the base case, when j = h, fix the r.v’s {Si : i ∈
[h− 1]}, {S′i : i ∈ [h]}, {Ri : i ∈ [h− 1]}, {R′i : i ∈ [h]}. Using Claim 3.5.5, it follows that
• Sh is 2(h− 1)ε-close to Ud,
• Sh is a deterministic function of Xh,
• for each i ∈ [`], Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− 2hd1 − log(1/ε),
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• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least k1 − 2hd1 − log(1/ε),
• {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} is independent of {Y,Y′}.
Noting that Rh = Ext2(Y,Sh), we fix Sh and Rh is 2hε-uniform on average after this fixing. We
note that Rh is now a deterministic function of Y. Since R
′
h is fixed, S
′
h+1 is a deterministic
function of X′h+1, and we fix it without affecting the distribution of Rh. The average conditional
min-entropy of each Xi after these fixings is at least m − 2(h + 1)d1 − log(1/ε). Further, we note
that our fixings preserve the independence between {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} and {Y,Y′}. This
completes the proof of the base case.
Now suppose j > h. Fix the r.v’s {Si : i ∈ [j − 1]}, {S′i : i ∈ [j]}, {Ri : i ∈ [j − 2]}, {R′i : i ∈
[j − 1]}. Using inductive hypothesis, it follows that
• Rj−1 is (2j − 3)ε-close to Ud,
• Rj−1 is a deterministic function of Y,
• for any i ∈ [t], Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− 2jd1 − log(1/ε),
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least k1 − 2jd1 − log(1/ε),
• {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} is independent of {Y,Y′}.
Using the fact that Sj = Ext1(Xj ,Rj−1), we fix Rj−1 and Sj is (2j−2)ε-close to uniform on average
after this fixing. Further, Sj is a deterministic function of Xj . Since S
′
j is fixed, it follows that
R′j is a deterministic function of Y and we fix it without affecting the distribution of Sj . We note
that after these fixings, Y has average conditional min-entropy at least k1 − 2(j + 1)d1 − log(1/ε).
Further, we note that our fixings preserve the independence between {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} and
{Y,Y′}.
Now, we fix Sj and it follows that Rj is a deterministic function of Y and is (2j − 1)ε-close
to uniform on average. Further, since R′j is fixed, it follows that S
′
j+1 is a deterministic function of
Xj+1 and we fix it without affecting the distribution of Rj . The average conditional min-entropy
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of each Xi after these fixings is at least m− 2(j+ 1)d1− log(1/ε). Further, we note that our fixings
preserve the independence between {X1, . . . ,X`,X′1, . . . ,X′`} and {Y,Y′}.
This completes the proof of inductive step, and hence the claim follows.
3.5.2 (`, t)-Non-Malleable Independence Preserving Merger
In this section, we generalize the construction of NIPM from Section 3.5 to handle multiple adver-
saries.
We first introduce some notation. For a random variable V supported on a × b matrices,
we use Vi to denote the random variable corresponding to the i’th row of V. Our main result in
this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5.7. There exists constant c3.5.7, c
′
3.5.7 > 0 such that for all integers m, d, k1, `, t > 0
and any ε > 0, with m ≥ d ≥ k1 > c3.5.7(t + 1)` log(m/ε), there exists an explicit function t-
NIPM : {0, 1}m` × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m1, m1 = 0.9t (m − c3.5.7(t + 1)` log(m/ε)) such that if the
following conditions hold:
• X,X1, . . . ,Xt are r.v’s, each supported on boolean ` ×m matrices s.t for any i ∈ [`], |Xi −
Um| ≤ ε,
• {Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt} is independent of {X,X1, . . . ,Xt}, s.t Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt are each supported on
{0, 1}d and H∞(Y) ≥ k1.
• there exists an h ∈ [`] such that |(Xh,X1h, . . . ,Xth)− (Um,X1h, . . . ,Xth)| ≤ ε,
then
|(`, t)-NIPM((X,Y), (`, t)-NIPM(X1,Y1), . . . , (`, t)-NIPM(Xt,Yt),Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt
−Um1 , (`, t)-NIPM(X1,Y1), . . . , (`, t)-NIPM(Xt,Yt),Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt| ≤ c′3.5.7`ε.
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Proof. We instantiate the `-look-ahead extractor described in Section 3.5.1 with the following
strong-seeded extractors: Let Ext1 : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}d1 , Ext2 : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}d1 →
{0, 1}d1 and Ext3 : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}m1 be explicit strong-seeded from Theorem 2.1.2 de-
signed to extract from min-entropy k1 = m/2, k2 = d/2, k3 = m− c3.5.7(t+ 1) log(m/ε) respectively
with error ε. Thus d1 = c2.1.2 log(m/ε).




Seeded Non-Malleable Extractors and
Privacy Amplification
1 Seeded non-malleable extractors were introduced by Dodis and Wichs [DW09] as a generalization
of strong-seeded extractors. Recall that a (k, ε)-strong seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m satisfies the property that for any (n, k)-source X and a typical seed s, we have Ext(X, s) ≈
Um. Informally, a non-malleable extractor nmExt satisfies the property that for a typical pair of
distinct seeds (s1, s2), we have nmExt(X, s1), nmExt(X, s2) ≈ U2m. Another way of viewing this
property is the following: Fix a tampering function A : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d such that A has no fixed
points, i.e., A(y) 6= y for all y. Then, a non-malleable extractor satisfies the property that for a
typical seed s, the r.v nmExt(X, s) is close to uniform even conditioned on nmExt(X,A(s)). We
now present a formal definition.
Definition 4.0.1 (Non-malleable extractor). A function nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is
a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor if the following holds: For any (n, k)-source X, an independent
1parts of this chapter have been previously published [CGL16,CL16a]
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uniform seed Y on d bits and any function A : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d with no fixed points,
|(nmExt(X,Y), nmExt(X,A(Y)),Y)− (Um,nmExt(X,A(Y)),Y)| ≤ ε.
This generalization of a seeded extractor to satisfy this ‘pairwise independence’ property is
non-trivial. For example, it is easy to prove that the innner product function IP : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1} is not a non-malleable extractor even for min-entropy n− 1. Recall that IP(x, y) =
∑
i xiyi
(where the sum is mod 2). By Lemma 2.5.3, it follows that IP is a 2-source extractor for min-
entropy > n/2. Now suppose X is a source with its first bit fixed to 1 and each of the other n− 1
bits are uniform and independent. Clearly X is an (n, n − 1)-source. Let Y be an independent
uniform seed. It is easy to see that if A(y) is the string obtained by just inverting the first bit
of y (and not changing the remaining bits), then for any y, we have IP(X, y) + IP(X,A(y)) = 1,
implying that IP(X, y) fixes the value of IP(X,A(y)).
Applications to Privacy Amplification The initial motivation for non-malleable extractors
comes from the problem of privacy amplification with an active adversary [BBR88,Mau92,BBCM95].
As a basic problem in information theoretic cryptography, privacy amplification deals with the case
where two parties want to communicate with each other to convert their shared secret weak random
source X into shared secret nearly uniform random bits. On the other hand, the communication
channel is watched by an adversary Eve, who has unlimited computational power. To make this
task possible, we assume two parties have local (non-shared) uniform random bits.
If Eve is passive (i.e., can only see the messages but cannot change them), this problem
can be solved easily by applying using strong seeded extractors. However, in the case where Eve
is active (i.e., can arbitrarily change, delete and reorder messages), the problem becomes much
more complicated. The major challenge here is to design a protocol that uses as few number of
interactions as possible, and outputs a uniform random string R that has length as close to H∞(X)
as possible (the difference is called entropy loss). A bit more formally, we pick a security parameter
s, and if the adversary Eve remains passive during the protocol then the two parties should achieve
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shared secret random bits that are 2−s-close to uniform. On the other hand, if Eve is active, then
the probability that Eve can successfully make the two parties output two different strings without
being detected should be at most 2−s.
The results in this chapter are based on joint works with Vipul Goyal and Xin Li [CGL16,
CL16a].
4.1 Prior Work and Our Results in [CGL16]
There has been a long line of work on the problem of privacy amplification [MW97, DKRS06,
DW09, RW03, KR09, CKOR10, DLWZ14, CRS14, Li12a, Li12b, Li15d, ADJ+14]. When the entropy
rate of X is large, i.e., bigger than 1/2, there are known protocols that take only one round (e.g.,
[MW97,DKRS06]). However these protocols all have very large entropy loss. When the entropy rate
of X is smaller than 1/2, Dodis and Wichs showed that no one round protocol exists; furthermore
the length of R has to be at least O(s) smaller than H∞(X). Thus, the natural goal is to design
a two-round protocol with such optimal entropy loss. However, all protocols before the work of
[DLWZ14] either need to use O(s) rounds, or need to incur an entropy loss of O(s2). In [DW09],
Dodis and Wichs showed that explicit constructions of the non-malleable extractors can be used to
give two-round privacy amplification protocols with optimal entropy loss. Using the probabilistic
method, they also showed that non-malleable extractors exist when k > 2m+ 2 log(1/ε) + log d+ 6
and d > log(n− k+ 1) + 2 log(1/ε) + 5. However, they were not able to give explicit constructions
even for min-entropy k = n−1. The first explicit construction of non-malleable extractors appeared
in [DLWZ14], with subsequent improvements in [CRS14, Li12a, DY13, Li12b, ADJ+14]. All these
constructions require the min-entropy of the weak source to be bigger than 0.49n, and thus only give
two-round privacy amplification protocols with optimal entropy loss for such min-entropy. Together
with some other ideas, Dodis et al. also gives poly(1/δ) round protocols with optimal entropy loss
for min-entropy k ≥ δn, any constant δ > 0. This was subsequently improved by Li [Li12b] to
obtain a two-round protocol with optimal entropy loss for min-entropy k ≥ δn, any constant δ > 0.
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In the general case, using a relaxation of non-malleable extractors called non-malleable condensers,
one of the authors [Li15d] also obtained a two-round protocol with optimal entropy loss for min-
entropy k ≥ C log2 n, some constant C > 1, as long as the security parameter s satisfies k ≥ Cs2.




In joint work with Goyal and Li [CGL16], we construct explicit non-malleable extractors
with error ε, for min-entropy k = Ω(log2 (n/ε)) and seed-length d = O(log2(n/ε)). In fact our
construction is more general and gives explicit t-non-malleable extractors (introduced in [CRS14]),
which are defined as follows.
Definition 4.1.1 (t-Non-malleable Extractor). A function t-nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
is a seeded t-non-malleable extractor for min-entropy k and error ε if the following holds : If X is
an (n, k)-source on and A1 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, . . . ,At : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n are arbitrary tampering
function with no fixed points, then
|t-nmExt(X,Ud), t-nmExt(X,A1(Ud)), . . . , t− -nmExt(X,At(Ud)),Ud
−Um ◦ t-nmExt(X,A1(Ud)), . . . , t− -nmExt(X,At(Ud)), Ud| < ε
We will see in Chapter 6 that these t-non-malleable extractors are a crucial component in
constructing 2-source extractors.






exists an explicit construction of a seeded t-non-malleable extractor snmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m, with m = Ω(k/t) and d = O(t2 log2(n/ε)).
Combining the above theorem (with t = 1) with the protocol developed in [DW09], this
immediately gives the following result about privacy amplification, which matches the best known
result in [Li15d] but has a simpler protocol.
Theorem 2. There exists a constant C such that for any ε > 0 with k ≥ C(log n + log(1/ε))2,
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there exists an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol with an active adversary for (n, k)
sources, with security parameter log(1/ε) and entropy loss O(log n+ log(1/ε)).
4.2 Subsequent Work and Our Results in [CL16a]
Subsequently, Cohen [Coh16a] improved our result, and constructed non-malleable extractors with
seed length d = O(log(n/ε) log((log n)/ε)) and min-entropy k = Ω(log(n/ε) log((log n)/ε)). In
this work, he also gave another construction that worked for k = n/(log n)O(1) with seed-length
O(log n). In a follow up, Cohen [Coh16b] constructed non-malleable extractors with seed length
d = O(log n + log3(1/ε)) and min-entropy k = Ω(d). However, in terms of the general error
parameter ε, all of these results require min-entropy and seed length at least log2(1/ε), thus none
of them can be used to improve the privacy amplification protocols in [Li15d]. A recent work
by Aggarwal, Hosseini and Lovett [AHL15] obtained some conditional results. In particular, they
used a weaker variant of non-malleable extractors to construct privacy amplification protocols with
optimal entropy loss for k = Ω(log(1/ε) log n) assuming a conjecture in additive combinatorics.
Our first result is a new construction of non-malleable extractors that breaks the log2(1/ε)
barrier for min-entropy and seed length. Specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. There exists a constant C > 0 s.t for all n, k ∈ N and any ε > 0, with k ≥
log(n/ε)2C
√
log log(n/ε), there exists an explicit (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, where d = log(n/ε)2C
√
log log(n/ε) and m = k/2
√
log log(n/ε).
We also construct a non-malleable extractor with seed-length O(log n) for min-entropy k =
Ω(log n) and ε ≥ 2− log1−β(n) for any β > 0. Prior to this, explicit non-malleable extractors with
seed-length O(log n) either requires min-entropy at least n/poly(log n) [Coh16a] or requires ε ≥
2− log
1/3(n) [Coh16b].
Theorem 4. There exists a constant C > 0 s.t for and all n, k ∈ N with k ≥ C log n, any
constant 0 < β < 1, and any ε ≥ 2− log1−β(n), there exists an explicit (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor
nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, where d = O(log n) and m = Ω(log(1/ε)).
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Remark 4.2.1. A careful examination reveals that our seed length and min-entropy requirement
are better than those of [Coh16a, Coh16b] in all cases except the case that ε is large enough (e.g.,
ε ≥ 2− log1/3(n)), where both [Coh16b] and our results require seed length and min-entropy O(log n).
Note that given any error parameter ε, our non-malleable extractor in Theorem 3 only
requires min-entropy and seed length log1+o(1)(n/ε).
We also show how to further lower the min-entropy requirement of the non-malleable extrac-
tor in Theorem 3 at the expense of using a larger seed. We complement this result by constructing
another non-malleable extractor with shorter seed-length than in Theorem 3 at the expense of
larger entropy. We now state these results more formally.








Theorem 6. For all n, k ∈ N and any ε > 0, with k ≥ (log(n/ε))32(log log log(n/ε))O(1), there ex-








Privacy Amplification Using Theorem 3 and the protocol in [DW09], we immediately obtain a
two-round privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss, for almost all possible security
parameters.
Theorem 7. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for any security parameter s with k ≥
(s + log n)2C
√
log(s+logn), there exists an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol for (n, k)-
sources with entropy loss O(log n+ s) and communication complexity (s+ log n)2O(
√
log(s+logn)), in
the presence of an active adversary.
In particular, this gives us two-round privacy amplification protocols with optimal entropy
loss for security parameter s ≤ k1−α for any constant α > 0.
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Reference Min-Entropy Seed Length
[DW09] (non-constructive) > 2m+ 2 log(1/ε) + log d+ 6 > log(n−k+1)+2 log(1/ε)+5
[DLWZ14] > n/2 n
[CRS14,Li12a,DY13] > n/2 O(log(n/ε))
[Li12b] 0.49n n
Theorem 1 Ω((log(n/ε))2) O((log(n/ε))2)
[Coh16a] Ω(log(n/ε) log((log n)/ε)) O(log(n/ε) log((log n)/ε))









log log log(n/ε)) (log(n/ε))3+o(1)




Table 4.1: A summary of results on non-malleable extractors
Instead if we use the non-malleable extractor from Theorem 5, we obtain a two-round privacy
amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss, for even smaller min-entropy (at the expense of
larger communication complexity). More formally, we have the following theorem.





, there exists an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol for (n, k)-
sources with entropy loss O(log n+s) and communication complexity (s+log n)32(log log(s+logn))
O(1)
,
in the presence of an active adversary.
4.3 A Non-Malleable Extractor for log2(n/ε) min-entropy
In section, we present the construction of a seeded t-non-malleable extractor that works for min-
entropy k = Ω(t log2(n/ε)) and requires seed-length d = O(t2 log2(n/ε)). A key ingredient in this
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construction is an explicit correlation breaker with advice constructed in Chapter 3. We first set
up the various ingredients in the construction with appropriate parameters.
Subroutines and Parameters
1. Let t be a parameter.





. Let Exts : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n1 be the strong seeded extractor
from Theorem 2.1.2 set to extract from min-entropy 2n1 and error 2
−Ω(n1).
3. Let C be an explicit [ dα , d,
1




α . Such explicit codes are known, for example from the work of Alon et al. [ABN+92].
4. Let ExtSamp : {0, 1}n1×{0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}n2 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 2.1.4
set to extract from min-entropy n12 with error
1
20 and output length n2, such that N2D1 =
d
α ,
where N2 = 2
n2 and D1 = 2
d1 . Let {0, 1}d1 = {s1, . . . , sD1}. Define Samp : {0, 1}n1 → [ dα ]
D1
as: Samp(x) = (Ext(x, s1) ◦ s1, . . . ,Ext(x, sD1) ◦ sD1). By Theorem 2.1.4, we haveD1 = c1n1,
for some constant c1.
5. Let ` = n1 +D1 = (c1 + 1)n1.
6. We set up the parameters for the components used by flip-flop (computed by Algorithm 1)
as follows.
(a) Let n3 = c3t`, n4 = 10`, for some large enough constant c3.
Let Extq : {0, 1}n3 × {0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n4 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem
2.1.2 set to extract from min-entropy kq =
n3
4 with error ε = 2
−Ω(n4).
Let Extw : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n4 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem
2.1.2 set to extract from min-entropy k2 with error ε = 2
−Ω(n4).
(b) Let laExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n3+n4 → {0, 1}2n4 be the look ahead extractor used by 2laExt.
Recall that the parameters in the alternating extraction protocol are set as m = n4, u =
2 where u is the number of steps in the protocol, m is the length of each random
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variable that is communicated between the players, and Extq,Extw are the strong seeded
extractors used in the protocol.
(c) Let Ext : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n3 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem
2.1.2 set to extract from min-entropy d2 with seed length n4 and error 2
−Ω(n4).
7. Let nmExt1 be the function computed by Algorithm 2, which uses the function 2laExt set up
as above.
8. Let n5 =
k
100t . Let Ext1 : {0, 1}
n × {0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n5 be the strong seeded extractor from
Theorem 2.1.2 set to extract from min-entropy k4 with seed length n4, error 2
−Ω(n4).
Algorithm 5: snmExt(x,y)
Input: Bit strings x, y, of length n, d respectively.
Output: A bit string of length n4.
1 y1 = Slice(y, n1). Compute v = Exts(x, y1).
2 Compute T = Samp(v) ⊂ [nα ].
3 Let z = y1 ◦ y2 where y2 = (E(y)){T}.
4 Output Ext1(x,nmExt1(x, y, z)).
We now state our main theorem.
Theorem 4.3.1. Let snmExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}n5 be the function computed by Algorithm











), if X is a (n, k)-source, and Y is an independent and uniform distribution on {0, 1}d,
and A1 . . . ,At are arbitrary tampering functions, such that for each i ∈ [t], Ai has no fixed points,
then the following holds:
|snmExt(X,Y), snmExt(X,A1(Y)), . . . , snmExt(X,At(Y)),Y−
Un5 , snmExt(X,A1(Y)), . . . , snmExt(X,At(Y)),Y| ≤ O(ε),
Notation: For any function H, if V = H(X,Y), let Vi denote the random variable
H(X,Ai(Y)).
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Proof. We first prove the following claim.
Claim 4.3.2. With probability at least 1− ε, Z 6= Zi for each i ∈ [t].
Proof. Pick an arbitrary i ∈ [t]. If Y1 6= Yi1, then we have Z 6= Zi. Now suppose Y1 = Yi1. We fix
Y1, and note that since Exts is a strong extractor (Theorem 2.5.3), B is 2
−Ω(n1)-close to Un1 .
Since Ai has no fixed points, it follows that since E is an encoder of a code with relative
distance distance 110 , ∆(E(Y), E(Y





: E(Y){j} 6= E(Yi){j}}. Thus
|D| ≥ d10α . Using Theorem 2.4.2, it follows that with probability at least 1− ε, |D ∩Samp(V)| ≥ 1,
and thus Y2 6= Y(i)2 (since Samp(V) = Samp(Vi)). The claim now follows by a simple union
bound.
We fix Z,Z1, . . . ,Zt such that Z 6= Zi for any i ∈ [t] (from the lemma above, this occurs
with probability 1 − ε). We note that by the Lemma 4.3.2 and Lemma 2.3.7, the source X has
min-entropy at least k − 2n1 and the source Y has min-entropy at least d− 2` with probability at
least 1− ε.
Lemma 4.3.1 now follows directly from Lemma 3.3.1 by noting that the following hold by
our choice of parameters:
• d2 > 20`(t(n3 + n4) + log(
1
ε ))
• k − 2n1 ≥ n34 + 20`(tn4 + log(
1
ε ))
• n3 − 2n1 ≥ 43(10tn4 + 2 log(
1
ε ))
This concludes the proof.
4.4 Near Optimal Non-Malleable Extractors
We present an explicit construction of a non-malleable extractor with min-entropy requirement
k = (log(n/ε))1+o(1) and seed-length d = (log(n/ε))1+o(1). We also show a way of setting parameters
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that allows for O(log n) seed-length for large enough error. The following are the main results of
this section.
Theorem 4.4.1. There exist a constant C4.4.1 > 0 s.t for all n, k ∈ N and any ε > 0, with k ≥
log(n/ε)2C4.4.1
√
log log(n/ε), there exists an explicit (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, where d = log(n/ε)2C4.4.1
√
log log(n/ε) and m = k/2
√
log log(n/ε).
Theorem 4.4.2. There exist a constant C4.4.2 > 0 s.t for constant β > 0 and all n, k ∈ N and
any ε > 2− log
1−β(n), with k ≥ C4.4.2 log n, there exists an explicit (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor
nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, where d = O(log n) and m = Ω(log(1/ε)).
We derive both the above theorems from the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4.3. There exist constants δ4.4.3, C4.4.3 > 0 s.t for all n, k ∈ N and any error parameter
ε1 > 0, with k ≥ log(k/ε1)2C4.4.3
√
log log(n/ε1) + C4.4.3 log(n/ε1), there exists an explicit (k, ε
′)-non-
malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, where d = log(k/ε)2C4.4.3
√
log log(n/ε1) +
C4.4.3 log(n/ε1),m = δ4.4.3k/2
√
log log(n/ε1) and ε′ = C4.4.3ε1 log(n/ε1).
We first show how to derive Theorem 4.4.1 and Theorem 4.4.2 from Theorem 4.4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.1. Let nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be the function from Theorem
4.4.3 set to extract from min-entropy k, where we set the parameter ε1 = ε/2C4.4.3n . It follows




(log n+ log(2C4.4.3n) + log(1/ε)) < ε.




C4.4.1 log(n/ε), for some constant C4.4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.2. Let nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be the function from Theo-
rem 4.4.3 set to extract from min-entropy 2C4.4.3 log(n/ε1), where we set the parameter ε1 =
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(log n+ log(1/ε) + log(2C4.4.3 log n)) < ε.
For this setting of parameters, we note that the seed-length required by nmExt is bounded by
log((log2 n)/ε)2C4.4.3
√
log log(n logn/ε) + C4.4.3 log(n log n/ε) = O(log n).
We spend the rest of the section proving Theorem 4.4.3. A key ingredient in our construction
in an explicit non-malleable independence preserving merger with strong parameters.
4.4.1 A Recursive Non-Malleable Independence Preserving Merger
In this section, we show a recursive way of applying the (`, t)-NIPM constructed in the previous
section in order to achieve better trade-off between parameters. This object is crucial in obtaining
our near optimal non-malleable extractor construction.
Notation: For an a× b matrix V, and any S ⊆ [a], let VS denote the matrix obtained by
restricting V to the rows indexed by S.
Our main result in this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4.4. For all integers m, `, L, t > 0, any ε > 0, r = d logLlog ` e and any d = (c3.5.7` log(m/ε)+
d′)(t + 2)r+1, there exists an explicit function (L, `, t)-NIPM : {0, 1}mL × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m′,
m′ = (0.9/t)r(m− c3.5.7`(t+ 1)r log(m/ε)), such that if the following conditions hold:
• X,X1, . . . ,Xt are r.v’s, each supported on boolean L×m matrices s.t for any i ∈ [L], |Xi −
Um| ≤ ε,
• {Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt} is independent of {X,X1, . . . ,Xt}, s.t Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt are each supported on
{0, 1}d and H∞(Y) ≥ d− d′,
• there exists an h ∈ [`] such that |(Xh,X1h, . . . ,Xth)− (Um,X1h, . . . ,Xth)| ≤ ε,
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then
|(L, `, t)-NIPM((X,Y), (L, `, t)-NIPM(X1,Y1), . . . , (L, `, t)-NIPM(Xt,Yt),Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt
−Um1 , (L, `, t)-NIPM(X1,Y1), . . . , (L, `, t)-NIPM(Xt,Yt),Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt| ≤ 2c′3.5.7Lε.
Proof. We set up parameters and ingredients required in our construction.
• For i ∈ [r], let Li = dL`i e.
• Let d1 = d′ + log(1/ε) + c3.5.7(t+ 1)` log(m/ε). For i ∈ [r], let di = (t+ 2)di−1.
• Let m0 = m. For i ∈ [r], define mi = 0.9i(m− ic3.5.7(t+ 1)` log(m/ε))
• For each i ∈ [r], let (`, t)-NIPMi : {0, 1}`mi × {0, 1}di → {0, 1}mi+1 be an instantiation of the
function from Theorem 3.5.7 with error parameter ε.
Algorithm 6: (L, `, t)-NIPM(x, y)
Input: x is a boolean L×m matrix, and y is a bit string of length d.
Output: A bit string of length mr.
1 Let x[0] = x.
2 for i = 1 to r do
3 Let y[i] = Slice(y, di)
4 Let x[i] be a Li ×mi matrix, whose j’th row
x[i]j = (`, t)-NIPMi(x[i− 1][(j−1)`+1,j`], y[i])
5 end
6 Ouput x[r].
We prove the following claim from which it is direct that the function (L, `, t)-NIPM computed




Claim 4.4.5. For all i ∈ [r], conditioned on the r.v’s {Y[j] : j ∈ [i]}, {Yg[j] : j ∈ [i], g ∈ [t]}, the
following hold:
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• X[i],X1[i], . . . ,Xt[i] are r.v’s, each supported on boolean Li×mi matrices s.t for any j ∈ [Li],
|X[i]j −Umi | ≤ (c′3.5.7`)iε,
• {Y,Y1, . . . ,Yt} is independent of {X[i],X[i]1, . . . ,X[i]t}.
• there exists an hi ∈ [Li] such that X[i]h|{X[i]1h, . . . ,X[i]th} is εi-close to Umi on average,
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least d− di+1 + c3.5.7(t+ 1)` log(m/ε).
Proof. We prove this claim by an induction on i. The base case, when i = 0, is direct. Thus suppose
i ≥ 1. Fix the r.v’s {Y[j] : j ∈ [i − 1]}, {Yg[j] : j ∈ [i − 1], g ∈ [t]}. By inductive hypothesis, it
follows that
• X[i− 1],X1[i− 1], . . . ,Xt[i− 1] are r.v’s each supported on boolean Li−1×mi−1 matrices s.t
for any j ∈ [Li−1], |X[i− 1]j −Um−1| ≤ (c′3.5.7`)i−1ε,
• {Y[i− 1],Y1[i− 1], . . . ,Yt[i− 1]} is independent of {X[i− 1],X[i− 1]1, . . . ,X[i− 1]t}.
• hi ∈ [Li] such that X[i− 1]h|{X[i− 1]1h, . . . ,X[i− 1]th} is εi−1-close to Umi−1 on average,
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least d− di + c3.5.7(t+ 1)` log(m/ε).
Thus the r.v Y[i] = Slice(Y, di) has average conditional min-entropy at least c3.5.7(t+ 1)` log(n/ε).
Let hi ∈ [`(hi− 1) + 1, `hi], for some hi ∈ [Li]. It follows that conditioned on the r.v’s Y[i], {Yg[i] :
g ∈ [t]}, for any j ∈ [Li], |X[i]j −Um| ≤ `εi−1 + c′3.5.7`ε = εi.
Further, using Theorem 3.5.7, conditioned on Y[i], {Yg[i] : g ∈ [t]}, {Xg[i]hi : g ∈ [t]}, the
r.v X[i]hi is `εi−1 + c
′
3.5.7`ε-close to uniform on average.
Thus, we fix the r.v’s Y[i], {Yg[i] : g ∈ [t]}, and note that Y still has average conditional
min-entropy at least d− di + c3.5.7(t+ 1)` log(m/ε)− (t+ 1)di ≥ d− di+1 + c3.5.7(t+ 1)` log(m/ε).
This completes the proof of the inductive step, and the theorem follows.
68
4.4.2 The Non-Malleable Extractor Construction
The following function is implicit in the construction in Section 4.3. Informally, advGen takes
as input a source X and a seed Y and produces a short string such that for any r.v Y′ 6= Y,
advGen(X,Y) 6= advGen(X,Y). We record this property more formally.
Theorem 4.4.6. There exists a constant c4.4.6, C4.4.6 > 0 such that for all n > 0 and any ε > 0,
there exists an explicit function advGen : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}L, L = c4.4.6 log(n/ε) satisfying
the following: Let X be an (n, k)-source, and Y be an independent uniform seed on d bits. Let Y′
be a r.v on d bits independent of X, s.t Y′ 6= Y. If k, d ≥ C4.4.6 log(n/ε), then
• with probability at least 1− ε, advGen(X,Y) 6= advGen(X,Y′),
• there exists a function f such that conditioned on advGen(X,Y), advGen(X,Y′), f(X),
– X remains independent of Y,Y′,
– X has average conditional min-entropy at least k − C4.4.6 log(n/ε),
– Y has average conditional min-entropy at least d− C4.4.6 log(n/ε)
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.3. We set up parameters and ingredients required in our construction.
• Let advGen : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}L, L = c4.4.6 log(n/ε1), be the function from Theorem
4.4.6 with error parameter ε1.
• Let d1 = (C4.4.6 + C + 1) log(n/ε1), for some large enough constant C.
• Let flip-flop : {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}m′ , m′ = δk, be the function computed by Algorithm
1 with error parameter ε1.
• d2 = c2.1.2 log(d/ε1), d3 = c2.1.2 log(m′/ε1).
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• Let Ext1 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}d
′
, d′ = 0.9d − 2d1 − C4.4.6 log(n/ε1) be a (d − 2d1 −
C4.4.6 log(n/ε1), ε1)-strong-seeded extractor from Theorem 2.1.2.
• Let Ext2 : {0, 1}m
′ × {0, 1}d3 → {0, 1}m′′ , m′′ = 0.9m′ − 2d2, be a (m′ − 2d2 − log(1/ε1), ε1)-
strong-seeded extractor from Theorem 2.1.2.
• Let ` = 2
√
logL.
• Let (L, `, 1)-NIPM : {0, 1}Lm′′ × {0, 1}d′ → {0, 1}m be the function from Theorem 4.4.4,
m = 0.9rm′ − 2c3.5.7`(t+ 1)r log(m/ε1) with error parameter ε1.
Algorithm 7: nmExt(x, y)
Input: x, y are bit string of length n, d respectively.
Output: A bit string of length m.
1 Let w = advGen(x, y).
2 Let y = y1 ◦ y2, where y1 = Slice(y, d1).
3 Let v be a L×m′ matrix, whose i’th row vi = flip-flop(x, y1, wi) (wi is the i’th bit of
the string w).
4 Let v1 = Slice(v1, d2)
5 Let y = Ext1(y, v1) = y1 ◦ y2, where y1 = Slice(y, d3).
6 Let z be a L×m′′ matrix, whose i’th row zi = Ext2(vi, y1)
7 Output z = (L, `, 1)-NIPM(z, y).
We prove in the following claims that the function nmExt constructed in Algorithm 8 satisfies the
conclusion of Theorem 4.4.3. Let A be the adversarial function tampering the seed Y, and let
Y′ = A(Y). Since A has no fixed points, it follows that Y 6= Y′.
Notation: For any random variable H = g(X,Y) (where g is an arbitrary deterministic
function), let H′ = g(X,Y′).
Claim 4.4.7. With probability at least 1− ε, W 6= W′.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 4.4.6.
Let f be the function guaranteed by Theorem 4.4.6.
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Claim 4.4.8. Conditoned on the r.v’s W,W′,Y1,Y
′
1, f(X), the following hold:
• for each i ∈ [L], Vi is ε1-close to uniform,
• there exists an h ∈ [L] such that conditioned on V′h, the r.v Vh is ε1-close to uniform on
average,
• {V,V′} is independent of {Y,Y′}.
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least d− C4.4.6 log(n/ε1)− 2d1.
Proof. Fix the r.v’s W,W′, f(X) such that W 6= W′. It follows from Theorem 4.4.6 that after
this conditioning,
• X is independent of Y,Y′,
• X has average conditional min-entropy at least k − C4.4.6 log(n/ε1),
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least d− C4.4.6 log(n/ε1)
Thus Y1 = Slice(Y, d1) has average conditional min-entropy at least O(log(n/ε1)). The claim now
follows by applying Lemma 3.2.1.






, f(X), the following hold:
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least d′ − 2d3 − log(1/ε).
• for each i ∈ [L], Zi is 3ε1-close to uniform on average.
• there exists h ∈ [L] such that further conditioned on Z′i, Zi is 3ε1-close to uniform on average.
• {Y,Y′} is independent of {Z,Z′}.
Proof. Fix the r.v’s W,W′,Y1,Y
′
1, f(X). By Claim 4.4.8, we have
• for each i ∈ [L], Vi is ε1-close to uniform,
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• there exists an h ∈ [L] such that conditioned on V′h, the r.v Vh is ε1-close to uniform on
average,
• {V,V′} is independent of {Y,Y′}.
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least d− C4.4.6 log(n/ε1)− 2d1.
Using the fact that Ext1 is a strong extractor, it follows that we can fix V1, and Y is 2ε1-close to
uniform on average. Further, Y is a deterministic function of Y. Thus, we fix V1
′
without affecting
the distribution of Y. Now, using the fact that Ext2 is a strong extractor, we can fix Y1, and we




We prove that conditioned on Z′i, the r.v Zi is 3ε1-close to uniform on average in the following
way. For this argument, as above we fix all r.v’s but do not yet fix Y1,Y1
′
. Instead, we first fix
V′h, and Vh has average conditional min-entropy at least m
′ − 2d2. We now fix Y1, and as before
we have Zh is 3ε1-close. At this point, Z
′
h is a deterministic function of Y1
′
, and hence we can fix
it without affecting the distribution of Zh. This completes the proof.
Claim 4.4.10. Conditioned on Z
′
, the r.v Z is O(ε1 log(n/ε1))-close to uniform on average.






, f(X). By Claim 4.4.9, the following hold:
• Y has average conditional min-entropy at least d′ − 2d3 − log(1/ε1).
• for each i ∈ [L], Zi is 3ε1-close to uniform on average.
• there exists h ∈ [L] such that further conditioned on Z′i, the r.v Zi is 3ε1-close to uniform on
average.
• {Y,Y′} is independent of {Z,Z′}.
Let d′′ = 2d3+log(1/ε1), r = d logLlog ` e = d
√
logLe. Thus d′′ = O(log(k/ε1)), r = O(
√
log log(n/ε1)), ` =
2O(
√
log log(n/ε1)). In order to use Theorem 4.4.4, we observe that for a large enough constant C4.4.3
the following hold:
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• Y has conditional min-entropy at least d− d′′,
• d′ ≥ (c3.5.7` log(m′′/ε1) + d′′)3r+1,
• m < (0.9)r(m′′ − c3.5.7`(t+ 1)r log(m/ε1)).
Thus the conditions of Theorem 4.4.4 are met, and hence it follows that conditioned on Z
′
, the
r.v Z is 2c′3.5.7Lε1-close to uniform on average. Recall that L = O(log(n/ε1)), and hence the claim
follows.
4.4.3 A Trade-off Between Min-Entropy and Seed Length
We prove Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 in this section. Our main tool is a new NIPM construction
which uses an even shorter seed but requires matrices with larger rows.
The main idea is to use our previous NIPM to construct a more involved NIPM, which
can be used to give explicit non-malleable extractors with either a better seed length or a better
min-entropy requirement. For simplicity and clarity, we will just assume t = 1, i.e., there is only
one tampering adversary. This is also the most interesting case for standard privacy amplification
protocols.
Note that our previous NIPM construction implies the following theorem.
Theorem 9. For all integers m,L > 0, any ε > 0, there exists an explicit (L, 1, 0, ε, ε′)-NIPM :
{0, 1}mL × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m′, where d = 2O(
√








We start by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4.11. For all integers m,L > 0, any ε > 0, if there is an explicit (L, 1, 0, ε, ε1)-







1−1/q) log(m/ε) and ε1 ≤ g(L)εL, where g(L) is a monotonic non-decreasing function
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of L, and r, s, q are parameters, with q ∈ N, then there is an explicit (L, 1, 0, ε, ε2)-NIPM2 :











1−1/(q+1)) log(m/ε)) and ε2 ≤ 2ε1.
Proof. The idea is to use Algorithm 6, with (`, 1, 0, ε, ε′1)-NIPM1, ε
′
1 ≤ g(`)`ε as the simpler merger
for some parameter ` s.t. in each step, the merger acts on ` rows. Following the proof of Theorem





We now choose an ` to minimize this, which gives (log `)
q+1










































i < 2g(`)Lε < 2ε1.
Now, starting with the NIPM from Theorem 9, and using Lemma 4.4.11 an optimal number
of times, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 10. For all integers m,L > 0, any ε > 0, there exists an explicit (L, 1, 0, ε, ε′)-NIPM :
{0, 1}mL×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m′, where d = 2O(
√
log logL) log(m/ε),m′ = m
L2(log logL)
O(1) −O(L log(m/ε))




Proof. We start from the basic case with the (L, 1, 0, ε, ε′)−NIPM from Theorem 9. Thus q = 2, r =
O(1), s = 1. We now use Lemma 4.4.11, increasing q by one each time. Eventually, we stop at
q =
√
log logL, noticing that this minimize the seed length. It can be verified that the seed length
of the final NIPM is 2O(
√
log logL) log(m/ε), the output length is m
L2(log logL)
O(1) −O(L log(m/ε)) and
the error is bounded by ε ≤ 2O(
√
log logL)Lε.
Using the NIPM from Theorem 10 in Algorithm 7, we obtain the following non-malleable
extractor with a slightly shorter seed length than Theorem 4.4.3 at the expense of requiring larger
min-entropy.
Theorem 6 (restated). For all n, k ∈ N and any ε > 0, with k ≥ (log(n/ε))32(log log log(n/ε))O(1),








The proof of Theorem 6 is exactly similar to Theorem 4.4.3, and we skip it.
It is not hard to modify Algorithm 7 such that the the role of the source and the seed
are swapped, in the sense that the seed to NIPM is a deterministic function of the source to the
non-malleable extractor, and the matrix is a deterministic function of the seed to the non-malleable
extractor. By this modification. we can achieve a non-malleable extractor that works for lower
slightly min-entropy than Theorem 4.4.3 at the expense of using a larger seed.
4.5 Improved t-Non-Malleable Extractors
The framework to construct non-malleable extractors in Section 4.4 can be generalized directly to
construct non-malleable extractors that can handle multiple adversaries.
In particular, Theorem 4.4.6 generalizes to the case there are t tampered variables, and
further our NIPM construction in Theorem 3.5.7 handles t adversaries. By using these versions of
the components in the above construction, the following theorem is easy to obtain. Since the proof
is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.4.3, we omit the proof of the following theorem.
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Theorem 11. There exists a constant δ > 0 such that for all n, k, t, ` ∈ N and any ε > 0,
with r = (log log(n/ε))/(log `), k = Ω(t2r` log(n/ε)), there exists an explicit (t, k, ε)-non-malleable
extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, where d = O(t(1+δ)r` log(n/ε)) and m = (δk −
`tr log(n/ε))/(2t)(logL/ log `).
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Chapter 5
Resilient Functions and Extracting
from NOBF Sources
1 Ben-Or and Linial [BL85] first studied resilient functions when they introduced the perfect in-
formation model. In the simplest version of this model, there are n computationally unbounded
players that can each broadcast a bit once. At the end, some function is applied to the broadcast
bits. In the collective coin-flipping problem, the output of this function should be a nearly-random
bit. The catch is that some malicious coalition of players may wait to see what the honest players
broadcast before broadcasting their own bits. Thus, a resilient function is one where the bit is
unbiased even if the malicious coalition is relatively large (but not too large).
This model can be generalized to allow many rounds, and has been well studied [BL85,
KKL88,Sak89,AL93,AN93,BN96,RZ01,Fei99,RSZ02]; also see the survey by Dodis [Dod06]. Re-
silient functions correspond to 1-round protocols.
To formally define resilient functions, we introduce the notion of influence of sets on func-
tions.
Definition 5.0.1 (Influence of a set). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be any Boolean function on variables
1parts of this chapter have been previously published [CZ16a]
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x1, . . . , xn. The influence of a set Q ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn} on f , denoted by IQ(f), is defined to be the
probability that f is undetermined after fixing the variables outside Q uniformly at random. Further,
for any integer q define Iq(f) = maxQ⊆{x1,...,xn},|Q|=q IQ(f). More generally, let IQ,D(f) denote the
probability that f is undetermined when the variables outside Q are fixed by sampling from the
distribution D. We define IQ,t(f) = maxD∈Dt IQ,D(f), where Dt is the set of all t-wise independent
distributions. Similarly, IQ,t,γ(f) = maxD∈Dt,γ IQ,D(f) where Dt,γ is the set of all (t, γ)-wise inde-
pendent distributions. Finally, for any integer q define Iq,t(f) = maxQ⊆{x1,...,xn},|Q|=q IQ,t(f) and
Iq,t,γ(f) = maxQ⊆{x1,...,xn},|Q|=q IQ,t,γ(f).
Definition 5.0.2 (Resilient Function). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be any Boolean function on vari-
ables x1, . . . , xn and q any integer. We say f is (q, ε)-resilient if Iq(f) ≤ ε. More generally, we
say f is t-independent (q, ε)-resilient if Iq,t(f) ≤ ε and f is (t, γ)-independent (q, ε)-resilient if
Iq,t,γ(f) ≤ ε.
Resilient functions have applications in extracting from bit-fixing sources. Roughly, a bit-
fixing source is a source where some subset of the bits are fixed and the remaining ones chosen in
some random way. Usually these remaining bits are chosen uniformly at random, but in this chapter
we also consider the case when they are chosen t-wise independently. Extraction is easier if the
fixed bits cannot depend on the random bits. Such sources are called oblivious bit-fixing sources,
and have been investigated in a line of work [CGH+85, KZ07a, GRS06, Rao09b]. The best known
explicit extractors for oblivious sources work for min-entropy at least logC(n) with exponentially
small error [Rao09b], and from arbitrary min-entropy with polynomially small error [KZ07a]. They
have applications to cryptography [CGH+85,KZ07a].
Resilient functions immediately give an extractor for the more difficult family of non-
oblivious bit-fixing sources, where the fixed bits may depend on the random bits. We formally
record this connection.
Definition 5.0.3 (Non-Oblivious Bit-Fixing Sources). A source Z on {0, 1}n is called a (q, t, γ)-
non-oblivious bit-fixing source (NOBF source for short) if there exists a subset of coordinates Q ⊆ [n]
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of size at most q such that the joint distribution of the bits indexed by Q = [n] \ Q is (t, γ)-wise
independent. The bits in the coordinates indexed by Q are allowed to depend arbitrarily on the bits
in the coordinates indexed by Q.
Lemma 5.0.4. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function such that for any t-wise independent
distribution D, |Ex∼D[f(x)] − 12 | ≤ ε1. Suppose for some q > 0, Iq,t(f) ≤ ε2. Then, f is an
extractor for (q, t, γ)-NOBF sources on n bits with error ε1 + ε2 + γn
t.
The results in this chapter are based on joint work with David Zuckerman [CZ16a].
5.1 Our Results and Overview of Techniques
As discussed above, since resilient functions have applications in distributed computing and also
extracting from NOBF sources, it is important to have explicit constructions of such functions.
For t <
√
n, the only known function that is t-independent (q, ε1)-resilient function is the majority
function [DGJ+10,Vio14] for t = O(1) and q < n
1
2
−τ , τ > 0.
However, for larger t, there are better known resilient functions. In particular, the iterated
majority function of Ben-Or and Linial handles a larger q = O(nlog3 2) for t = n, but it is not
clear if it remains resilient for smaller t. Further, Ajtai and Linial [AL93] showed the existence of
functions that are resilient for q = O(n/ log2 n) and t = n. However, their functions are not explicit
and require time nO(n
2) to deterministically construct. We note here that by a result in [KKL88],
the largest q one can hope to handle is O(n/ log n).
Our main result on resilient functions is the following.
Theorem 12. There exists a constant c such that for any δ > 0 and every large enough integer
n ∈ N, there exists an efficiently computable monotone Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
satisfying: For any q > 0, t ≥ c(log n)18,
• f is a depth 4 circuit of size nO(1).





• Iq,t(f) ≤ q/n1−δ.
Our main result on extracting from bit-fixing sources is the following. We note that this
direct from Theorem 12 and Lemma 5.0.4.
Theorem 13. There exists a constant c such that for any constant δ > 0, and for all n ∈ N, there
exists an explicit extractor bitExt : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} for the class of (q, t, γ)-non-oblivious bit-fixing
sources with error n−Ω(1), where q ≤ n1−δ, t ≥ c log18(n) and γ ≤ 1/nt+1.
Subsequent Work: Meka [Mek15] built on our ideas to construct a resilient function matching
the probabilistic construction of Ajtai-Linial.
We now outline the main ideas in the proof of Theorem 12. We first show that if the
function f is monotone, in AC0 and almost unbiased, then it is enough to bound Iq(f) to show
that f satisfies the conclusions of Theorem 12. The key observation is the following simple fact:
for any set of variables Q, it is possible to check using another small AC0 circuit E if the function f
is undetermined for some setting of the variables outside Q. This crucially relies on the fact that f
is monotone. Next, using the result of Braverman [Bra10] that bounded independence fools small
AC0 circuits, we conclude that the bias of the circuit E is roughly the same when the variables
outside Q are drawn from a bounded-independence distribution, and when they are drawn from
the uniform distribution. The conclusion now follows using the bound on IQ(f).
Thus all that remains is to construct a small monotone AC0 circuit f , that is almost balanced
under the uniform distribution, and Iq(f) = o(1) for q < D
1−δ. The high level idea for this
construction is to derandomize the probabilistic construction of Ajtai-Linial using extractors. The
tribes function introduced by Ben-Or and Linial [BL85] is a disjunction taken over AND’s of equi-
sized blocks of variables. The Ajtai-Linial function is essentially a conjunction of non-monotone
tribes functions, with each tribes function using a different partition and the variables in each tribes
function being randomly negated with probability 1/2, and the partitions are chosen according to
the probabilistic method. We sketch informally our ideas to derandomize this construction. For
each i ∈ [R], let P i be a equi-partition of [n], n = MB, into blocks of size B. Let P ij denote the
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First, we abstract out properties that these partitions need to satisfy for f to be almost unbiased
and also (n1−δ, ε)-resilient. Informally, we show that
1. If for all i1, i2, j1, j2 with (i1, j1) 6= (i2, j2), |P i1j1 ∩ P
i2
j2
| ≤ 0.9B, then f is almost unbiased,
2. If for any set Q of size q < n1−δ, the number of partitions P i containing a block P ij such that
|P ij ∩Q| > δB/2 is o(R), then f is (n1−δ, ε)-resilient.
An ingredient in the proof of (1) is Janson’s inequality (see Theorem 5.3.22).
It is important that unlike in Ajtai-Linial and earlier modifications [RZ01], we don’t need
to negate variables, and thus f is monotone.
The second property seems related to the property of extractors captured in Theorem 2.4.1.
However, it is not obvious how to use such extractors to construct these partitions. We construct a
family of equi-partitions from a seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}r × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}m as follows. Each
Pw corresponds to some w ∈ {0, 1}r. One block of Pw is Pw~0 = {(y,Ext(x, y)) : y ∈ {0, 1}
b}. The
other block are shifts of this, i.e., for any s ∈ {0, 1}m, define Pws = {(y,Ext(x, y)⊕ s) : y ∈ {0, 1}b}.
This gives R = 2r partitions of [n] with n = 2m+b.
For any good enough extractor, we show that (2) is satisfied using a basic property of
extractors and an averaging argument. To show that the partitions satisfy (1), we need an additional
property of the extractor, which informally requires us to prove that the intersection of any two
arbitrary shifts of neighbors of any two distinct nodes w1, w2 ∈ {0, 1}r in GExt is bounded. This
essentially is a strong variant of a design extractor of Li [Li12a]. We show that Trevisan’s extractor
has this property. This completes the informal sketch of our resilient function construction. We
note that our actual construction is slightly more complicated and is a depth 4 circuit. The extra
layer enables us to simulate each of the bits x1, . . . , xn having Pr[x1 = 1] close to 1, which we need
to make f almost unbiased.
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5.2 Monotone Constant-Depth Resilient Functions are t-Independent
Resilient
We show if f is a constant depth monotone circuit, then in order to prove an upper bound for
Iq,t,γ(f), it is in fact enough to upper bound Iq(f), which is a simpler quantity to handle.
Theorem 5.2.1. There exists a constant b > 0 such that the following holds: Let C : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1} be a monotone circuit in AC0 of depth d and size m such that |Ex∼Un [C(x)]− 12 | ≤ ε1. Suppose
q > 0 is such that Iq(C) ≤ ε2. If t ≥ b(log(5m/ε3))3d+6, then Iq,t(C) ≤ ε2+ε3 and Iq,t,γ(C) ≤ ε2+ε3+
γnt. Further, for any distribution D that is (t, γ)-wise independent, |Ex∼D[C(x)]− 12 | ≤ ε1+ε3+γn
t.
An important ingredient in the our proof is a result Braverman [Bra10], which was recently
refined by Tal [Tal14].
Theorem 5.2.2 ([Bra10] [Tal14]). Let D be any t = t(m, d, ε)-wise independent distribution on
{0, 1}n. Then for any circuit C ∈ AC0 of depth d and size m,
|Ex∼Un [C(x)]−Ex∼D[C(x)]| ≤ ε
where t(m, d, ε) = O(log(m/ε))3d+3.
We also recall a result about almost t-wise independent distributions.
Theorem 5.2.3 ([AGM03]). Let D be a (t, γ)-wise independent distribution on {0, 1}n. Then there
exists a t-wise independent distribution that is ntγ-close to D.
Proof of Theorem 5.2.1. The bound on Ex∼D[C(x)] is direct from Theorem 5.2.2 and Theorem 7.3.4.
We now proceed to prove the influence property.
Consider any set Q of variables, |Q| = q. Let Q = [n] \ Q. We construct a function
EQ : {0, 1}n−q → {0, 1} such that EQ(y) = 1 if and only if C is undetermined when xQ is set to y.
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Thus, it follows that
Ey∼Un−q [EQ(y)] = Pry∼Un−q [EQ(y) = 1] = IQ(C) ≤ ε2.
Let D be any t-wise independent distribution. We have,
Ey∼D[EQ(y)] = Pry∼D[EQ(y) = 1] = IQ,D(C).
Thus to prove that IQ,D(C) ≤ ε2 + ε3, it is enough to prove that
|Ey∼Un−q [EQ(y)]−Ey∼D[EQ(y)]| ≤ ε3. (5.1)
We construct EQ as follows: Let C0 be the circuit obtained from C by setting all variables in Q to 0.
Let C1 be the circuit obtained from C by setting all variables in Q to 1. Define EQ := ¬(C0 = C1).
Since C is monotone, EQ satisfies the required property. Further EQ can be computed by a circuit
in AC0 of depth d+ 2 and size 4m+ 3. It can be checked that the depth of EQ can be reduced to
d+ 1 by combining two layers. Thus (5.1) now directly follows from Theorem 5.2.2. The bound on
IC,t,γ(q) follows from an application of Theorem 7.3.4.
5.3 Monotone Boolean Functions in AC0 Resilient to Coalitions
The main result in this section is an explicit construction of a constant depth monotone circuit f
which is resilient to coalitions and is almost balanced under the uniform distribution. This is the
final ingredient in our construction of a 2-source extractor.
Theorem 5.3.1. For any δ > 0, and every large enough integer n, there exists a polynomial time
computable monotone Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} satisfying:
• f is a depth 4 circuit in AC0 of size nO(1).
•
∣∣Ex∼Un [f(x)]− 12 ∣∣ ≤ 1nΩ(1) .
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• For any q > 0, Iq(f) ≤ q/n1−δ.
We first prove Theorem 12, which follows easily from the above theorem.
Proof of Theorem 12. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be the function from Theorem 5.3.1 such that for
any q > 0, Iq(f) ≤ q/n1−
δ
2 . Also we have that f is monotone and is a depth 4 AC0 circuit.
Fix ε3 = 1/n. Thus by Theorem 5.2.1, it follows that there exists a constant b such that for
any t ≥ b(log(5n/ε3))18, q > 0 ,








Further, using Theorem 5.2.1, for any t-wise independent distribution D, we have
∣∣∣∣Ex∼D[f(x)]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1n + 1nΩ(1) .
The remainder of this section is used to prove Theorem 5.3.1. Our starting point is the work
of Ajtai and Linial [AL93], who proved the existence of functions computable by linear sized depth
3 circuits in AC0 that are (Ω(n/ log2 n), ε)-resilient. However, this construction is probabilistic,
and deterministically finding such functions requires time nO(n
2). Further these functions are not
guaranteed to be monotone (or even unate). We provide some intuition of our construction in the
introduction.
We initially construct a depth 3 circuit which works, but then the inputs have to be chosen
from independent Bernoulli distributions where the probability p of 1 is very different from 1/2.
By observing that we can approximate this Bernoulli distribution with a CNF on uniform bits, we
obtain a depth 4 circuit which works for uniformly random inputs.
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5.3.1 Our Construction and Key Lemmas
Construction 1: Let Ext : {0, 1}r × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}m be a strong-seeded extractor set to extract
from min-entropy k = 2δr with error ε ≤ δ/4, b = δ1m, δ1 = δ/20, and output length m = δr.
Assume that Ext is such that ε > 1/M δ1 . Let R = 2r, B = 2b, M = 2m and K = 2k. Let s = BM .
Thus s = M1+δ1 .
Let {0, 1}r = {v1, . . . , vR}. We define a collection ofR equi-partitions of [s], P = {P v1 , . . . , P vR}
as follows: Let GExt be the bipartite graph corresponding to Ext and let N (x), for any x ∈ {0, 1}r,
denote the neighbours of x in GExt. For some v ∈ {0, 1}r, let N (v) = {z1, . . . , zB}. For each
w ∈ {0, 1}m, the set {(j, zj ⊕ w) : j ∈ {0, 1}b} is defined to be a block in P v, where ⊕ denotes the
bit-wise XOR of the two strings. Note that P v indeed forms an equi-partition of [s] with M blocks
of size B.











lnM − ln ln(R/ ln 2)
B
.
We prove the following lemmas from which the proof of Theorem 5.3.1 is straightforward.
We first introduce some definitions.
Definition 5.3.2 ((n, τ)-Bernoulli distribution). A distribution on n bits is an (n, τ)-Bernoulli
distribution, denoted by Ber(n, τ), if each bit is independently set to 1 with probability τ and set to
0 with probability 1− τ .
Lemma 5.3.3. Let Ext : {0, 1}r × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}m be the extractor used in Construction 1. For
any constant ε1 > 0, let (1 − B−ε1)γ ≤ p1 ≤ γ. Then there exists a constant δ > 0 such that for






The following generalizes the notion of a design extractor which was introduced by Li [Li12a].
Definition 5.3.4 (Shift-design extractor). Let Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a strong-seeded
extractor. Let n = 2d. If for any distinct x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n, and arbitrary y, y′ ∈ {0, 1}m
|{(h,Ext(x, h)⊕ y) : h ∈ {0, 1}d} ∩ {(h,Ext(x′, h)⊕ y′) : h ∈ {0, 1}d}| ≤ (1− η)n,
then Ext is called an η-shift-design extractor.
Lemma 5.3.5. Let Ext : {0, 1}r × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}m be the extractor used in Construction 1.
Suppose Ext is a 110 -shift-design extractor. For any constant ε1 > 0, let (1 − B
−ε1)γ ≤ p1 ≤ γ.
Then, the following holds:
∣∣∣∣Ey∼Ber(s,1−p1)[fExt(y)]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ B−Ω(1).
Lemma 5.3.6. Let TExt : {0, 1}r × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}m be the Trevisan extractor from Theorem
2.1.5 with parameters as in Construction 1. Then, TExt is a 110 -shift-design extractor.
Lemma 5.3.7. Suppose γ < 9/10. Then for any ν > 0, there exists an explicit size h monotone








, such that γ − ν ≤ Prx∼Uh [C(x) = 0] < γ.
We first show how to derive Theorem 5.3.1 from the above lemmas.
Proof of Theorem 5.3.1. Let TExt : {0, 1}r × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}m be the Trevisan extractor from














= λ(δ22r + log
2 r + 2δ2
√
r log r) = δ1δr = δ1m.
Thus, indeed M−δ1 < ε < δ/4.
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We now fix the parameter r as follows. Let the parameter ν in Lemma 5.3.7 be set to γ/Bε1 ,
where ε1 = δ/4 and let C be the size h monotone CNF circuit guaranteed by Lemma 5.3.7, where
h < B1+2ε1 . Thus, (1−B−ε1)γ ≤ Prx∼Uh [C(x) = 0] < γ.
Choose the largest integer r such that for m = δr, we have n′ = sh = BMh < n. It follows
that for this choice of r, n′ = Ω(n). We construct our function on n′ bits. The size of the coalition
is at most n1−δ = (n′)1−δ
′
, where δ′ = δ − o(1). Thus, we may assume n = n′ = BMh and δ = δ′.
Thus n = BMh < M1+δ1+(1+2ε1)δ1 and B = nΩ(1).
We now use Construction 1 and construct the function fTExt : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}, where we
instantiate Ext with extractor TExt as set up above. Let f be the function derived from fTExt
by replacing each variable yi by a copy of the monotone CNF C set up above. Since TExt is a
polynomial time function, fTExt can be constructed in polynomial time. Thus f is computable by











> (MB3)1−δ (since M δ/2 > B2)
≥ (MBh)1−δ = n1−δ.
This calculation and Lemma 5.3.7 yields that
In1−δ(f) ≤ Is1− δ2 ,Ber(s,1−p1)
(fTExt).











We now bound the bias of f . By Lemma 5.3.6, we have that TExt is a 110 -shift-design
extractor. Thus by Lemma 5.3.5, we have
∣∣∣∣Ey∼Ber(s,1−p1)[fTExt(y)]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ B−Ω(1) = n−Ω(1).




Proof of Lemma 5.3.6. To prove that TExt is a 110 -shift-design extractor, we first recall the con-
struction of the Trevisan extractor TExt : {0, 1}r × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}m.
For any input y ∈ {0, 1}r, we describe the construction of the Trevisan extractor [Tre01,
RRV02] to obtain the first bit of the output since this is enough for the purpose of this proof. Fix
an asymptotically good binary linear error correcting code C′ with constant relative rate α, block
length r = (r + 1)/α, and relative distance 12 − β, where β < ε. Further assume that C
′ contains
the all 1’s string ~1. Let {v1, . . . , vr+1} be a basis of C ′ with vr+1 = ~1. Let C be the binary linear
code generated by {v1, . . . , vr} i.e., C = span{v1, . . . , vr}. It follows that C does not contain ~1,
has relative rate α(1 − 1r ) > 0.9α and relative distance
1
2 − β. Let Enc : {0, 1}
r → {0, 1}r be the
encoding function of C.
Further fix a subset S1 ⊂ [b] of size log(r̄). Then the first bit of the output of TExt on input
y and seed z is the bit at the zS1 ’th coordinate of the string cy = Enc(y). Thus, as we cycle over
all seeds z, each bit of the string cy appears equally often.
For any x ∈ {0, 1}r, define
T 0x = {(h,TExt(x, h)[1]) : h ∈ {0, 1}b}, T 1x = {(h,TExt(x, h)[1] ⊕ 1) : h ∈ {0, 1}b}.
Let x, x′ be any two distinct r bit strings. It follows by our argument above, and the fact that C ′
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x′ | ≤ (
1
2 + β)B < 0.9B for any two
bits b1 and b2.
Let y, y′ ∈ {0, 1}m. Let the first bit of y be b1 and the first bit of y′ be b2. Thus,
|{(h,TExt(x, h)⊕ y) : h ∈ {0, 1}b} ∩ {(h,TExt(x′, h)⊕ y′) : h ∈ {0, 1}b}| ≤ |T b1x ∩ T
b2
x′ | ≤ 0.9B.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.7. Let h2 = dlog (2/ν)e, and let h1 be the largest integer such that (1 −
2−h2)h1 ≥ 1− γ. Thus,
(1− γ) ≤ (1− 2−h2)h1 ≤ (1− γ)/(1− 2−h2)
< (1− γ)(1 + 21−h2)
≤ (1− γ)(1 + ν)
< 1− γ + ν



















Thus Prx∼Uh [C(x) = 0] = 1− (1− 2−h2)h1 , and hence
γ − ν ≤ Prx∼Uh [C(x) = 0] ≤ γ.









where i ∈ {0, 1}r. Further, let
p2 = (1− p1)B, p3 = (1− p2)M .
We record two easy claims.
Claim 5.3.8. For any i ∈ {0, 1}r, j ∈ {0, 1}m, Pry∼Ber(s,1−p1)[
∧
`∈P ij
y` = 1] = (1− p1)B = p2.
Claim 5.3.9. For any i ∈ {0, 1}r, Pry∼Ber(s,1−p1)[f iExt(y) = 0] = (1− p2)M = p3.
We frequently use the following inequality.













We also frequently use the following bounds.
Claim 5.3.11. The following inequalities hold: Let ε2 = ε1/2. Then,

























p2 = (1− p1)B ≥ (1− γ)B ≥ e−γB(1− γ2B) (by Claim 5.3.10)







(since γ < (lnM)/B < r/B)
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We now upper bound p2. We have,
p2 ≤ (1− γ(1−B−ε1))B ≤ e−γB(1−B
−ε1 ) (by Claim 5.3.10)
<
(



































since ε2 = ε1/2.
Estimating similarly as above, we have




















































































































5.3.2 Proof of Lemma 5.3.3 : Bound on Influence of Coalitions on fExt
We now proceed to bound the influence of coalitions of variables on fExt.
Claim 5.3.12. For any i ∈ {0, 1}r and q ≤ s1−δ, Iq,Ber(s,1−p1)(f iExt) ≤
1
R .
Proof. Let Q be any set of variables of size q, q ≤ s1−δ. There are at most q blocks of P i which
contain a variable from Q. By Claim 5.3.8, it follows that the probability that for a y sampled from
Ber(s, 1− p1), there is no ANn gate at depth 1 in f iExt which outputs 1 is at most







M (since p3 > 1/(2R) by Claim 5.3.11)
≤ p3er/M
δ/2






(since p3 < 0.9/R by Claim 5.3.11)
Thus the influence of Q is bounded by 1R .
Definition 5.3.13. For any i ∈ {0, 1}r and j ∈ {0, 1}m, define a block P ij to be bad with respect
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to a subset of variables Q if |P ij ∩Q| ≥ 2εB. Further call a partition P i bad with respect to Q if it
has a block which is bad. Otherwise, P i is good.
Claim 5.3.14. Consider any subset of variables Q of size q. If q ≤ s1−δ, then there are less than
KM bad partitions with respect to Q.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there are at leastKM bad partitions. It follows by an averaging
argument that there exists j ∈ {0, 1}m such that the number of bad blocks among the {P ij : i ∈
{0, 1}r} is at least K. Define the function Extj(x, y) = Ext(x, y)⊕ j. Observe that Extj is a seeded
extractor for min-entropy k with error ε.
Let Nj(x) denote the set of neighbours of x in the graph corresponding to Extj . It follows
that |{|Nj(x) ∩ Q| ≥ 2εB|}| ≥ K. We note that q/M = s1−δ/M = (MB)1−δ/M < 1/M δ/19 < ε,
since ε > 1/M δ1 = 1/M δ/20 > 1/M δ/19. Thus, we have
|{|Nj(x) ∩Q| ≥ (ε+ µQ)B}| ≥ K,
where µQ = q/M . However this contradicts Theorem 2.4.1. Thus the number of bad blocks is
bounded by KM .
Claim 5.3.15. Let P i be a partition that is good with respect to a subset of variables Q, |Q| = q.




Proof. We note that there are at least M − q blocks in P i that do not have any variables from Q.
Each of the remaining blocks have at most 2εB variables from Q. An assignment of x leaves f iExt
undetermined only if: (a) there is no ANn gate at depth 1 in f iExt which outputs 1 and (b) There
is at least one block with a variable from Q such that the non-Q variables are all set to 1. These
two events are independent. Further, by Claim 5.3.12, the probability of (a) is bounded by 1/R.
We now bound the probability of (b). If there are h variables of Q in P ij , the probability that the
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non-Q variables are all 1’s is exactly (1− p1)B−h. Thus the probability of event (b) is bounded by
q(1− p1)B(1−2ε) = qp1−2ε2
≤ qr
M1−2ε
















(since s = M1+δ1 < M1+
δ
4 ).

















5.3.3 Proof of Lemma 5.3.5: Bound on the Bias of fExt
We now proceed to show that fExt is almost balanced. For ease of presentation, we slightly abuse
notation and relabel the partitions in Construction 1 as P 1, . . . , PR, where for any i ∈ [R], P i
corresponds to the partition P vi with vi being the r bit string for the integer i− 1.
Claim 5.3.16. There exists a small constant ε3 > 0 such that for any i ∈ {0, 1}r, Pry∼Ber(s,1−p1)[f iExt(y) =




ln 2 ≤ 1 +
1
Bε3 .
Proof. nirectly follows from Claim 5.3.11.
We now estimate the probability Pry∼Ber(s,1−p1)[fExt(y) = 0]. This is not direct since the
f iExt’s are on the same set of variables, and can be correlated in general. Towards estimating this,
we introduce some definitions.
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Definition 5.3.17. Let P i, P j be two equi-partitions of [s] with blocks of size B. Then (P i, P j) is
said to be pairwise-good if the size of the intersection of any block of P i and any block of P j is at
most 0.9B.
Definition 5.3.18. Let P 1, . . . , PR be equi-partitions of [s] with blocks of size B. A collection of
partitions P = {P 1, . . . , PR} is pairwise-good if for any distinct i, j ∈ {0, 1}r, (P i, P j) is pairwise-
good.






Lemma 5.3.20. The set of partitions P = {P 1, . . . , PR} in Construction 1 is pairwise-good.






Proof of Lemma 5.3.20. Let P i1j1 and P
i2
j2
be any two blocks such that i1 6= i2. We need to prove
that |P i1j1 ∩ P
i2
j2
| ≤ 0.9B. Recall that P i1j1 = {(z,Ext(i1, z) ⊕ j1) : z ∈ {0, 1}
b}, and similarly
P i2j2 = {(z,Ext(i2, z) ⊕ j2) : z ∈ {0, 1}
b}. The bound on |P i1j1 ∩ P
i2
j2
| now directly follows from the
fact that Ext is a 110 -shift-design extractor.








Let y be sampled from Ber(s, 1− p1). Let Ei be the event f iExt(y) = 0. We have,















Using the Bonferroni inequalities, it follows that for any even a ∈ [R],
a∑
c=1




Towards proving a tight bound on p using (5.2), we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3.21. There exist constants β1, β2 > 0 such that for any c ≤ sβ1, and arbitrary 1 ≤ i1 <
















To prove the above lemma, we recall Janson’s inequality [Jan90, BS89]. We follow the
presentation in [AS92].
Theorem 5.3.22 (Janson’s Inequality [Jan90,BS89,AS92]). Let Ω be a finite universal set and let
O be a random subset of Ω constructed by picking each h ∈ Ω independently with probability ph.




















Proof of Lemma 5.3.21. We set β1 = 1/90 with foresight. Without loss of generality suppose ig = g
for g ∈ [c]. We use Janson’s inequality with Ω = [s], and O constructed by picking each h ∈ [s]
with probability 1 − p1. Further let Ei,j be the event that P ij ⊆ O. Intuitively, O denotes the set
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of coordinates in y that are set to 1 for a sample y from Ber(s, 1− p1). With this interpretation,
the event f iExt(y) = 0 exactly corresponds to the event
∧










We now estimate n,∆, γ to apply Janson’s inequality. For any i ∈ [c], j ∈ {0, 1}m, we have




















Pr[Ei1,j1 ∧ Ei2,j2 ]
We observe that any P ij can intersect at most B blocks of another partition P
i′ . Thus, the total
number of blocks that intersect between two partitions P i and P j is bounded by MB = s. Further,
recall that P is pairwise-good. Thus it follows that for any distinct i1, i2 ∈ [c], and j1, j2 ∈ {0, 1}m,
|P i1j1 ∩ P
i2
j2
| ≤ 0.9B. Thus, |P i1j1 ∪ P
i2
j2
| ≥ 1.1B and hence for any i1 < i2 ∈ [c], j1, j2 ∈ {0, 1}m,

















































where β′ = 1/70 .





















This concludes the proof.
Fix a = sβ3 (assume that a is even), β3 = min{β1/2, β2/1000}, where β1, β2 are the constants
in Lemma 5.3.21.
The following lemma combined with (5.2) proves a tight bound on p (recall that p =
Pry∼Ber(s,1−p1)[fExt(y) = 0]).









































































by our choice of a.
Thus, for any c ≤ a, we have
∣∣∣∣Sc − αcc!
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1Mβ2 (5.3)











using a = sβ3 .






∣∣∣∣∣ < 1a! < 1Mβ2 . (5.5)
Claim 5.3.23 is now direct from the inequalities (5.3), (5.4), (5.5) and the fact that aM−β2 ≤
M−β2/2.
The next claim is a restatement of Lemma 5.3.19.
Claim 5.3.24. |p− 12 | ≤ B
−Ω(1), where p = Pry∼Ber(s,1−p1)[fExt(y) = 0].
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Proof. Using (5.2) and Claim 5.3.23, we have
|p− e−α| ≤ 1
Mβ2/2
.













Thus, ∣∣∣∣e−α − 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2Bε3
and hence, we have ∣∣∣∣p− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3Bε3 .
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Chapter 6
Two-Source Extractors and Ramsey
Graphs
1 An extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a deterministic function that takes input from a weak
source with sufficient min-entropy and produces nearly uniform bits. Unfortunately, it is impossible
to extract even 1 bit for sources with min-entropy n− 1. To circumvent this difficulty, Santha and
Vazirani [SV86], and Chor and Goldreich [CG88] suggested the problem of designing extractors for
two or more independent sources, each with sufficient min-entropy. When the extractor has access
to just two sources, it is called a two-source extractor. An efficient two-source extractor could be
quite useful in practice, if just two independent sources of entropy can be found.
Definition 6.0.1 (Two-source extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is called a
(k, ε)-two-source extractor if for any independent (n, k)-sources X and Y, we have
|Ext(X,Y)−Um| ≤ ε.
Note that for m = 1, this corresponds to an N ×N matrix with entries in {0, 1} such that
1parts of this chapter have been previously published [CZ16a,CL16a]
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every K ×K submatrix has 1/2± ε fraction of 1’s, where N = 2n and K = 2k.
6.1 Prior Work and Our results
Chor and Goldreich [CG88] used Lindsey’s Lemma to show that the inner-product function is
a 2-source extractor for min-entropy more than n/2. However, no further progress was made for
around 20 years, when Bourgain [Bou05b] broke the “half-barrier” for min-entropy, and constructed
a 2-source extractor for min-entropy 0.499n. This remains the best known result prior to this work.
Bourgain’s extractor was based on breakthroughs made in the area of additive combinatorics.
Raz [Raz05] obtained an improvement in terms of total min-entropy, and constructed 2-
source extractors requiring one source with min-entropy more than n/2 and the other source with
min-entropy O(log n). A different line of work investigated a weaker problem of designing dispersers
for two independent sources due to its connection with Ramsey graphs. We discuss this in Section
6.2.
The lack of progress on constructing two-source extractors motivated researchers to use more
than two sources with the best known result due to Li [Li13a], where he showed how to extract
from 3 sources, each with polylogarithmic min-entropy. We discuss this line of work in more detail
in Chapter 7. Thus, in summary, despite much attention and progress over the last 30 years,
it remained open to explicitly construct two-source extractors for min-entropy rate significantly
smaller than 1/2.
In joint work with Zuckerman [CZ16a], we construct an explicit two-source extractor for
polylogarithmic min-entropy.
Theorem 14. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all n ∈ N, there exists a polynomial time
computable construction of a 2-source extractor 2Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} for min-entropy
at least logC(n) and error n−Ω(1).
The constant C in the above theorem can be taken to be 75. This was improved to C = 19
by Meka [Mek15]. Subsequently in joint work with Li [CL16a], we improve this to 14 (see Section
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6.5 for more details). By an argument of Barak [Rao09b], every 2-source extractor is also a strong
2-source extractor with similar parameters. Thus the extractor 2Ext in Theorem 14 is also a strong
2-source extractor.
An open problem here is to improve the error to negligible since this is important useful
for applications in cryptography and distributed computing. For example, several researchers have
studied whether cryptographic or distributed computing protocols can be implemented if the play-
ers’ randomness is defective [DO03,GSV05,KLRZ08,KLR09]. Kalai et al. [KLRZ08] used C-source
extractors to build network extractor protocols, which allow players to extract private randomness
in a network with Byzantine faults. A better 2-source extractor with negligible error would im-
prove some of those constructions. Kalai, Li, and Rao [KLR09] showed how to construct a 2-source
extractor under computational assumptions, and used it to improve earlier network extractors in
the computational setting; however, their protocols rely on computational assumptions beyond the
2-source extractor, so it would not be clear how to match their results without assumptions.
If we allow the 2-source extractor to run in time poly(n, 1/ε), then our technique in fact
generalizes to obtain arbitrary error ε. In particular, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 15. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all n ∈ N and any ε > 0, there exists a
2-source extractor 2Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1} computable in time poly(n, 1/ε) for min-entropy
at least logC(n/ε) and error ε.
Recently, Li [Li15a] extended the construction in [CZ16a] to achieve an explicit strong
2-extractor with output length kα bits, for some small constant α. By our observation above,
this immediately implies a 2-source extractor for min-entropy k ≥ logC′ n, for some large enough
constant C ′, with output length Ω(k); in fact, the output can be k bits.
6.2 Ramsey Graphs
Definition 6.2.1 (Ramsey graphs). A graph on N vertices is called a K-Ramsey graph if does not
contain any independent set or clique of size K.
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It was shown by Erdös in one of the first applications of the probabilistic method that
there exists K-Ramsey graphs for K = 2 logN . By explicit, we mean a polynomial-time algorithm
that determines whether there is an edge between two nodes, i.e., the running time should be
polylogarithmic in the number of nodes.
Frankl and Wilson [FW81] used intersection theorems to construct K-Ramsey graphs on
N vertices, with K = 2O(
√
logN log logN). This remained the best known construction for a long
time, with many other constructions [Alo98, Gro00, Bar06] achieving the same bound. Gopalan
[Gop14] explained why approaches were stuck at this bound, showing that apart from [Bar06],
all other constructions can be seen as derived from low-degree symmetric representations of the
OR function. Finally, subsequent works by Barak et al. [BKS+10,BRSW12] obtained a significant




We also define a harder variant of Ramsey graphs.
Definition 6.2.2 (Bipartite Ramsey graph). A bipartite graph with N left vertices and N right
vertices is called a bipartite K-Ramsey graph if it does not contain any complete K ×K-bipartite
sub-graph or empty K ×K sub-graph.
Explicit bipartite K-Ramsey graphs were known for K =
√
N based on the Hadamard
matrix. This was slightly improved to o(
√
N) by Pudlak and Rődl [PR04], and the results of
[BKS+10,BRSW12] in fact constructed bipartite K-Ramsey graphs, and hence achieved the bounds
as mentioned above.
The following lemma is easy to obtain (see e.g.,[BRSW12]).
Lemma 6.2.3. Suppose that for all n ∈ N there exists a polynomial time computable 2-source
extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} for min-entropy k and error ε < 1/2. Let N = 2n and
K = 2k. Then there exists an explicit construction of a bipartite K-Ramsey on N vertices.
Thus, Theorem 14 implies the following.
104
Theorem 16. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all large enough n ∈ N, there exists




The constant C in [CZ16a] can be taken to be 75. This was improved to C = 11 by Meka
[Mek15], and subsequently improved in [CL16a] to 8 (see Section 6.5).
Given any bipartite K-Ramsey graph, a simple reduction gives a K/2-Ramsey graph on N
vertices [BKS+10]. As an immediate corollary, we have explicit constructions of Ramsey graphs
with the same bound.
Corollary 6.2.4. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all large enough n ∈ N, there exists
an explicit construction of a K-Ramsey graph on N vertices, where N = 2n and K = 2(log logN)
C
.
Independent work: In independent work2, Cohen [Coh16c] used the challenge-response mech-
anism introduced in [BKS+10] with new advances in constructions of extractors to obtain a two-
source disperser for polylogarithmic min-entropy. Using this, he obtained explicit constructions of
bipartite-Ramsey graphs with K = 2(log logN)
O(1)
, which matches our result and thus provides an
alternate construction.
6.3 An Outline of Our 2-Source Extractor Construction
To motivate our construction, first, let’s try to build a 1-source extractor (even though we know
it is impossible). Let X be an (n, k)-source, where k = polylog(n). Let Ext be a strong seeded
extractor designed to extract 1 bit from min-entropy k with error ε. Since, for (1−ε)-fraction of the
seeds, the extractor output is close to uniform, a natural idea is to do the following: cycle over all
the seeds of Ext and concatenate the outputs to obtain a D-bit string Z where most individual bits
are close to uniform. Note that since the seed length of Ext is O(log n), D = poly(n). At this point,
we might hope to take majority of these D bits of Z to obtain a bit is close to uniform. However,
2Cohen’s work appeared before our work on 2-source exttractors [CZ16a]. When his paper appeared, we had an
outline of the proof but had not filled in the details.
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the output of Ext with different seeds may be correlated in arbitrary ways (even if individually the
bits are close to uniform), so this approach doesn’t work.
We try to fix this approach by introducing some independence among the uniform bits. For
example, if we obtain a source Z such that D − D0.49 bits are uniform, and further these bits
are (almost) constant-wise independent, then it is known that the majority function can extract
an almost-uniform bit (see Lemma 7.3.3). In an attempt to obtain such a source, we use explicit
t-non-malleable extractors from Chapter 4. Let nmExt be a (t, k, ε)-non-malleable extractor that
outputs 1 bit with seed-length d, and let D = 2d. We show in Lemma 6.4.3, that there exists a
large subset of seeds S ⊂ {0, 1}d, |S| ≥ (1−O(
√
ε))D, such that for any t distinct seeds s1, . . . , st
in S, |nmExt(X, s1), . . . ,nmExt(X, st) − Ut| ≤ O(t
√
ε). Thus, we could use our earlier idea of
cycling through all seeds, but now using an explicit non-malleable extractor instead of a strong-
seeded extractor. We use the explicit t-non-malleable extractor constructed in Chapter 4 (see
Theorem 1)). This construction requires min-entropy k = Ω(t log2(n/ε)) and seed-length d =
O(t2 log2(n/ε)). Thus, we could cycle over all the seeds of nmExt, and produce a string Z of length
D = 2O(t
2 log2(n/ε)), such that the i’th bit of Z, Zi = nmExt(X, i). Further, except for at most
O(
√
εD) bits in Z, the remaining bits in Z follow a (t, O(t
√
ε))-wise independent distribution. We
could now try to set parameters such that the majority function extracts a bit from Z. However, it
is easy to check that
√
εD > D1−δ, for any constant δ > 0. Since the majority function can handle
at most
√
D bad bits, this idea fails.
Our next idea is to look for functions that can handle larger number of “bad bits” to extract
from Z. This exactly corresponds to the notion of resilient functions studied in Chapter 5 and we
note that Z is non-oblivious bit-fixing sources. Thus, our idea is to use the explicit (log(D))O(1)-
independent (D1−δ, D−Ω(1))-resilient functions from Theorem 12 in Chapter 5.
Recall that Z = nmExt(X, 1) ◦ . . . ◦ nmExt(X, D) is a (q, t, γ)-NOBF source on D bits,
where q =
√
εD, γ = O(
√
εt) and D = 2O(t
2 log2(n/ε)). We set t = logO(1)(D), and thus we require
H∞(X) = log
(O(1))(n/ε). As we observed before, q > D1−δ for any δ > 0. Thus, we cannot directly
apply the resilient function f from Theorem 12 on Z to extract an almost bit. (A more important
106
issue in directly applying f to Z is that while using Lemma 5.2.1, we have to bound the term γDt
in the error, which is clearly greater than 1 for the current parameters.) We note that it is not
surprising that f cannot extract from Z since we just used 1 source up to this point.
We now use the second independent source Y to sample a pseudorandom subset T of
coordinates from [D], |T | = D′ = nO(1), such that the fraction of bad bits ZT (the projection
of Z to the coordinates in T ) remains almost the same as that of Z (with high probability). A well
known way of using a weak source to sample a pseudorandom subset was discovered by Zuckerman
[Zuc97], and uses a seeded extractor, with the size of the sample being the total number of seeds and
fraction of bad bits increases at most by the error of the extractor (with high probability). Thus
using known optimal constructions of seeded extractors with seed-length d′ = O(log(n/ε′)), we have
D′ = (n/ε′)O(1). Thus Zt is (q, t, γ)-NOBF source on D
′ bits, where q = (
√
ε + ε′)D′, γ = O(
√
εt).
Further, the incurred error on applying f (from Theorem 12) on Zt is (D
′)−Ω(1) + γ(D′)t (using
Lemma 5.2.1). By choosing δ to be a small enough constant, the term ε′D′ can be made smaller than
(D′)1−δ/2. Further, by choosing ε small enough (n−(logn)
O(1)
), we can ensure that
√
εD′ < (D′)1−δ/2
and γD′ = (D′)−Ω(1). This completes the description of our 2-source extractor.
6.4 Reduction to an NOBF Source
The main result in this section is a reduction from the problem of extracting from two independent
(n, k)-sources to the task of extracting from a single (q, t, γ)-NOBF source on nO(1) bits. We
formally state the reduction in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4.1. There exist constants δ, c′ > 0 such that for every n, t > 0 there exists a polynomial
time computable function reduce : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}D, D = nO(1), satisfying the following
property: if X,Y are independent (n, k)-sources with k ≥ c′t4 log2 n, then
Pry∼Y[reduce(X, y) is a (q, t, γ)-NOBF source] ≥ 1− n−ω(1)
where q = D1−δ and γ = 1/Dt+1.
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Li had earlier proved a similar theorem with q = D/3, and his methods would extend to
achieve a similar bound as we achieve.
The δ we obtain in Theorem 6.4.1 is a small constant. Further, it can be shown that for our
reduction method, it is not possible to achieve δ > 1/2. Thus, we cannot use the majority function
as the extractor for the resulting (q, t, γ)-NOBF source.
The reduction in Theorem 6.4.1 is based on explicit constructions of non-malleable extractors
from Chapter 4.
In the following lemma, we reduce extracting from two independent sources to extracting
from a (q, t, γ)-NOBF source using non-malleable extractors and seeded extractors in a black-box
way. Theorem 6.4.1 then follows by plugging in explicit constructions of these components.
Lemma 6.4.2. Let nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1} be a (t, k, ε1)-non-malleable extractor and
let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}d1 be a seeded extractor for min-entropy k/2 with error ε2. Let
{0, 1}d2 = {s1, . . . , sD2}, D2 = 2d2. Suppose that Ext satisfies the property that for all y ∈ {0, 1}n,
Ext(y, s) 6= Ext(y, s′) whenever s 6= s′. Define the function:
reduce(x, y) = nmExt(x,Ext(y, s1)) ◦ . . . ◦ nmExt(x,Ext(y, sD2)).
If X and Y are independent (n, k)-sources, then
Pry∼Y[reduce(X, y) is a (q, t, γ)-NOBF source] ≥ 1− n−ω(1),
where q = (
√
ε1 + ε2)D2 and γ = 5t
√
ε1.
We prove a lemma about t-non-malleable extractors from which Lemma 6.4.2 is easy to
obtain.
Lemma 6.4.3. Let nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} be a (t, k, ε)-non-malleable extractor. Let




ε)D such that for any distinct r1, . . . , rt ∈ R,
(nmExt(X, r1), . . . ,nmExt(X, rt)) ≈5t√ε Ut.
Proof. Let
BAD = {r ∈ {0, 1}d : ∃ distinct r1, . . . , rt ∈ {0, 1}d,
∀i ∈ [t] ri 6= r, s.t |(nmExt(X, r), nmExt(X, r1), . . . ,nmExt(X, rt))−
(U1,nmExt(X, r1), . . . ,nmExt(X, rt))| >
√
ε}
We define adversarial functions f1, . . . , ft as follows. For each r ∈ BAD, set fi(r) = ri, i = 1, . . . , t
(the fi’s are defined arbitrarily for r /∈ BAD, only ensuring that there are no fixed points). Let Y
be uniform on {0, 1}d. It follows that
|(nmExt(X,Y),nmExt(X, f1(Y)), . . . ,nmExt(X, ft(Y)))−







ε2d using the property that nmExt is a (k, t, ε)-non-malleable extractor. Define
R = {0, 1}d \BAD. Using Lemma 2.3.11, it follows that R satisfies the required property.
Proof of Lemma 6.4.2. Let R ⊆ {0, 1}d1 be such that for any distinct r1, . . . , rt ∈ R,
(nmExt(X, r1), . . . ,nmExt(X, rt)) ≈5t√ε1 Ut.
It follows by Lemma 6.4.3 that |R| ≥ (1−√ε1)D1.
Define Samp(y) = {Ext(y, s1), . . . ,Ext(y, sD2)} ⊂ {0, 1}d1 . Using Theorem 2.4.2, we have
Pr
y∼Y
[|Samp(y) ∩R| ≤ (1−
√
ε1 − ε2)D2] ≤ 2−k/2. (6.1)
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Consider any y such that |Samp(y) ∩R| ≥ (1−√ε1 − ε2)D2, and let Zy = reduce(X, y). Since the
output bits of nmExt corresponding to seeds in Samp(y) ∩ R are (t, 5t√ε1)-wise independent, we
have that Zy is a ((
√
ε1 + ε2)D2, t, 5t
√
ε1)-NOBF source on D2 bits.
Thus using (6.1), it follows that with probability at least 1−2−k/2 over y ∼ Y, reduce(X, y)
is a ((
√
ε1 + ε2)D2, t, 5t
√
ε1)-NOBF source on D2 bits.
Proof of Theorem 6.4.1. We derive Theorem 6.4.1 from Lemma 6.4.2 by plugging in explicit non-
malleable extractors and seeded extractors as follows:
1. Let nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1} be an explicit (t, k, ε1)-non-malleable extractor from
Theorem 1. Thus d1 = c1t
2 log2(n/ε1), for some constant c1. Such an extractor exists as long
as k ≥ λ1t log2(n/ε1) for some constant λ1.
2. Let Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}d1 be the extractor from Corollary 2.1.3 set to extract from
min-entropy k/2 with error ε2. Thus d = c2 log(n/ε2) for some constant c2. Let D = 2
d =
(n/ε2)
c2 . Such an extractor exists as long as k ≥ 3d1.
3. We choose ε1, ε2, δ such that the following hold:
• (√ε1 + ε2)D ≤ D1−δ.
• √ε1 ≤ 1/(5tDt+1).
• δ′ = δc2 < 9/10.
To satisfy the above requirements, we pick ε1, ε2 as follows: Let ε2 = 1/n
C2 where C2 is fixed
such that ε2D ≤ D1−δ/2. Thus, we need to ensure that
ε2 ≤ 1/(2Dδ). Substituting D = (n/ε2)c2 and simplifying, we have
ε2 ≤ εc2δ2 /2n
c2δ
i.e., ε1−c2δ2 ≤ 1/2n
c2δ
i.e., ε2 ≤ 1/(2n)δ
′/(1−δ′).
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We note that 1− δ′ > 1/10. Thus, we can choose C2 = 10.
We now set ε1 = 1/n














Thus, we can choose C1 = 24c2.
4. We note that for the above choice of parameters, nmExt and Ext indeed work for min-entropy
k ≥ c′t4 log2 n, for some large constant c′.
5. Let {0, 1}d = {s1, . . . , sD}.
Define the function:
reduce(x, y) = nmExt(x,Ext(y, s1)) ◦ . . . ◦ nmExt(x,Ext(y, sD)).
Let X and Y be independent (n, k)-sources. By Lemma 6.4.2, it follows that
Pry∼Y[reduce(X, y) is a (q, t, γ)-NOBF source] ≥ 1− n−ω(1),
where q = (
√
ε1 +ε2)D and γ = 5t
√
ε1. Theorem 6.4.1 now follows by our choice of parameters.
6.5 Wrapping Up the Proofs of Theorem 13 and Theorem 14
Proof of Theorem 13. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be the explicit function constructed in Theorem 12
satisfying: For any q > 0, t ≥ c(log n)18 (c is the constant from Theorem 12) and γ ≤ 1/nt+1,
• Iq(f) ≤ q/n1−
δ
2
• For any (t, γ)-wise independent distribution D,
∣∣Ex∼D[f(x)]− 12 ∣∣ ≤ 1nΩ(1) .
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Using Lemma 5.0.4, it follows that f is an extractor for (n1−δ, t, γ)-non-oblivious bit-fixing sources
with error 1/nΩ(1).
Proof of Theorem 14. Let reduce : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}D be the function from Theorem 6.4.1
with t = c(log n)18, where c is the constant from Theorem 13. Set the constant C = 74 and C1 = c
′,
where c′ is the constant from Theorem 6.4.1. We note that D = nO(1).
Let bitExt : {0, 1}D → {0, 1} be the explicit extractor from Theorem 13 set to extract from
(q, t, γ)-non-oblivious bit-fixing source on D bits with error 1
nΩ(1)
, where q = D1−δ and γ ≤ 1/Dt+1.
Define
2Ext(x, y) = bitExt(reduce(x, y)).





Let Z = reduce(X,Y). Theorem 6.4.1 implies that with probability at least 1−n−ω(1) (over y ∼ Y),
the conditional distribution Z|Y = y is a (q, t, γ)-non-oblivious bit-fixing source on M bits. Thus,













6.6 Achieving Smaller Error
We show that it is indeed possible to achieve an extractor with smaller error at the expense of
increasing the running time of the extractor. We achieve this by slightly modifying the construction
in Theorem 14.
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Informally, we now use the sources X and Y to generate a much longer string Z with the
property that most of the bits are t-wise independent. This allows us to achieve smaller error in
the reduction, and now applying the extractor for (q, t, γ)-sources developed in Theorem 13, the
result follows.
Theorem 6.6.1 (Theorem 15 restated). There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all n ∈ N and
any ε > 0, there exists a 2-source extractor 2Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} computable in time
poly(n, 1/ε) for min-entropy at least logC(n/ε) and error ε.
Proof sketch. We provide the details of the construction and omit the proof since it is very similar
to the proof of Theorem 14.
We set up the required ingredients as follows:
• Let t = b(log(5D/ε))18, where b is the constant from Theorem 5.2.1.
• Let nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1} be a (t, k, ε1)-non-malleable extractor from Theorem
1. Thus d1 = c1t
2 log2(n/ε1), for some constant c1. For such an extractor to exists, we require
k ≥ λ1t log2(n/ε1).
• Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d1 be the seeded extractor from Theorem 2.1.3 set to
extract from min-entropy k/2 with error ε2. Thus, d = c2 log(n/ε2), for some constant c2.
Let D = 2d = (n/ε2)
c2 . Such an extractor exists for k ≥ 3d1.
• Choose δ > 0, such that δ′ = δc2 < 9/10.




∣∣Ev∼UD [f(v)]− 12 ∣∣ ≤ D−β for some small constant β.
• Pick ε1, ε2 such that the following inequalities are satisfied:
– D = (n/ε2)
c2 ≥ max{1/ε1/β, 1/ε2/δ},






ε1 ≤ 15tDt+1 .





′/(1−δ′)} and ε1 = 1/(5tDt+1).
• With this setting of parameters, we require k ≥ (log(n/ε))c′ , where c′ is a large enough
constant, for nmExt and Ext to work.
Let {0, 1}d2 = {r1, . . . , rD2}. Define
reduce(x, y) = nmExt(x,Ext(y, r1)) ◦ . . . ◦ nmExt(x,Ext(y, rD2))
and
2Ext(x, y) = f(reduce(x, y)).
Using arguments similar to the proof of Theorem 14, it can be shown that 2Ext is an extractor for
min-entropy k with error O(ε). Further, the extractor runs in time poly(n, 1/ε).
6.7 Towards Optimal Ramsey Graphs
Since one of the motivations to study 2-source extractors is the connection to Ramsey graphs
and to meet Erdős’ challenge to explicitly construct O(logN)-Ramsey graphs on N vertices, it
is interesting to see if the above framework can be pushed to meet this goal. After our work in
[CZ16a], Meka [Mek15] improved one of the components in the above construction. In joint work
with Xin Li [CL16a], we construct an improved t-non-malleable extractor (see Theorem 11, Chapter
4). Using these components in the framework developed, the following results are easy to obtain
by suitably optimizing parameters.
Theorem 17. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for any δ > 0 and for all n, k ∈ N
with k ≥ C(log n)2
√
6(1+δ)+3 and any constant ε < 12 , there exists an efficient polynomial time
computable 2-source extractor min-entropy k with error ε that outputs 1 bit.
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Theorem 18. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for any δ > 0 and for all n, k ∈ N with
k ≥ C(log(n))4
√
5(1+δ)+5, there exists an efficient polynomial time computable 2-source extractor
min-entropy k with error n−Ω(1) and output length Ω(k).
Thus Theorem 17 implies K-Ramsey graphs on N = 2n vertices, with K = 2(log logn)
7.899
.




1 In Chapter 6 we studied the problem of extracting from 2 independent sources. As we saw, the
best known 2-source extractor requires min-entropy roughy log8 n (for constant error). Recall that
any explicit (k, ε)-2-source extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} (for any ε < 1/2) implies a
2k-Ramsey graph on N = 2n vertices. Thus achieving min-entropy k = log n + O(1) immediately
implies an explicit O(logN)-Ramsey graph matching Erdős’ challenge from the 1940’s. However
based on the current methods to construct 2-source extractors (see Chapter 6), it looks like a
challenging task to even achieve min-entropy O(log n).
In this chapter we study a relaxed version of the problem, and allow the extractor access to
multiple independent source. We formally define a multi-source extractor.
Definition 7.0.1. A function iExt : ({0, 1}n)C → {0, 1}m is an extractor for C independent sources
with min-entropy k and error ε if for any independent (n, k)-sources X1, . . . ,XC , we have
|iExt(X1, . . . ,XC) = Um| ≤ ε.
An impressive line of work studied this problem and constructed extractors with excellent
parameters [BIW06,BKS+10,Rao09a,BRSW12,RZ08,Li11a,Li13b,Li13a,Li15e,Coh15a]. However,
1parts of this chapter have been previously published [CL16a]
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the smallest entropy these constructions can achieve is (log n)2+δ for any constant δ > 0 [Li13a],
which uses O(1/δ) +O(1) sources. In a very recent work, Cohen and Schulman [CS16] managed to
break this “quadratic” barrier, and constructed extractors for O(1/δ) +O(1) sources, each having
min-entropy at least (log n)1+δ.
The results in this chapter are based on joint work with Xin Li [CL16a].
7.1 Our Result and Overview of techniques
Our main result in this section is the following.
Theorem 7.1.1. There exists a constant C > 0 s.t for all n, k ∈ N and any constant ε > 0, with
k ≥ 2C
√
log log(n) log n, there exists an explicit function Ext : ({0, 1}n)C → {0, 1}, such that
|Ext(X1, . . . ,XC)−U1| ≤ ε.
On a high level, we follow a framework introduced by Cohen and Schulman [CS16], and
improve a key component of their construction which allows us to achieve the improved result. The
first step in [CS16] is to use O(1) (an absolute constant) independent sources and transform it into
a collection of r matrices such that at least r−r0.49 of these matrices are ‘good’ and follow a certain
independence property. In particular, for any good matrix X and any distinct t of the other good
matrices X1, . . . ,Xt, there exists a row index h such that (Xh,X
1
h, . . . ,X
t
h) ≈ (Um,X1h, . . . ,Xth),
where t = O(1) is some parameter. The next idea is to use an independence preserving merger
(IPM), which by definition, uses a few additional sources and transforms these matrices into a r.v
Z on r bits such that at least r − r0.49 bits of Z are almost t-wise independence. By using our
explicit non-malleable independence preserving merger construction (NIPM) from Chapter 3, we
show how to construct an improved IPM which uses just 1 additional source (this is the step where
[CS16] uses an additional O(1/δ) sources). It is known that the majority function [DGJ+10,Vio14]
is an extractor for Z (see Lemma 7.3.3), which completes the construction. Therefore, we obtain
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a multi-source extractor for an absolute constant number of (n, log1+o(1) n)-sources, which outputs
one bit with constant (or slightly sub-constant) error.
We first present our IPM construction in the next section, and use this to improve upon the
results on multi-source extractors obtained in [CS16] in Section 7.3.
7.2 An Independence Preserving Merger Using a Weak Source
An important ingredient in our construction is an explicit construction of an independence pre-
serving merger. We use the (L, `, t)-NIPM constructed in the Section 4.4.1 to merge the r.v’s
X,X1, . . . ,Xt, each supported on boolean L ×m matrices, with the guarantee that there is some
h ∈ [L] s.t Xh is uniform on average conditioned on {Xgh : g ∈ [t]} using an independent (n, k)-
source Y (instead of a seed as in the previous section). Our construction improves the construction
of an IPM by Cohen and Schulman [CS16], and further uses just 1 independent source.
Recall that for any a × b matrix V, and any S ⊆ [a], we use VS to denote the matrix
obtained by restricting V to the rows indexed by S.
Our main result in this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 7.2.1. For all integers m, `, L, t > 0, any ε > 0, r = d logLlog ` e and any k ≥ 2c3.5.7` log(m/ε)(t+
2)r+2, there exists an explicit function (L, `, t)-IPM : {0, 1}mL × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m′′, m′′ =
(0.9/t)r+1(m − c3.5.7`(t + 1)r log(m/ε) − c2.1.2(t + 2) log(n/ε))), such that if the following condi-
tions hold:
• X,X1, . . . ,Xt are r.v’s, each supported on boolean L×m matrices s.t for any i ∈ [L], |Xi −
Um| ≤ ε,
• Y is an (n, k)-source, independent of {X,X1, . . . ,Xt}.
• there exists an h ∈ [`] such that |(Xh,X1h, . . . ,Xth)− (Um,X1h, . . . ,Xth)| ≤ ε,
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then
|(L, `, t)-IPM(X,Y), (L, `, t)-IPM(X1,Y), . . . , (L, `, t)-NIPM(Xt,Y)
−Um′′ , (L, `, t)-IPM(X1,Y), . . . , (L, `, t)-IPM(Xt,Y)| ≤ 3c′3.5.7Lε.
Proof. We set up parameters and ingredients required in our construction.
• Let d = 0.8k, d′ = c2.1.2 log(m/ε), d1 = c2.1.2 log(n/ε).
• Let Ext1 : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}d be a (k, ε)-strong-seeded extractor from Theorem 2.1.2.
• Let Ext2 : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d
′ → {0, 1}m′ , m′ = 0.9(m − c2.1.2(t + 1) log(n/ε)), be a (m −
c2.1.2(t+ 1) log(n/ε), ε)-strong-seeded extractor from Theorem 2.1.2.
• Let (L, `, t)-NIPM : {0, 1}Lm′ × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m′′ be the function from Theorem 4.4.4 with
error parameter ε.
Algorithm 8: (L, `, t)-IPM(x, y)
Input: x is a boolean L×m matrix, and y is a bit string of length n.
Output: A bit string of length m′′.
1 Let w = Slice(x1, d1)
2 Let z = Ext1(y, w).
3 Let v = Slice(z, d′).
4 Let v be a L×m′-matrix, whose i’th row is given by vi = Ext2(xi, v).
5 Output z = (L, `, t)-NIPM(v, z).
We begin by proving the following claim.
Claim 7.2.2. Conditioned on W, {Wg : g ∈ [t]}, the following hold:
• Z is ε-close to Ud,
• Z, {Zg : g ∈ [t]} is independent of X, {Xg : g ∈ [t]},
• For each i ∈ [L], Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− (t+ 2) log(n/ε),
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• Xh|{Xgh : g ∈ [t]} has average conditional min-entropy at least m− (t+ 2)d1 log(n/ε).
Proof. Since Ext1 is a strong extractor, we can fix W, and Z is ε-close to Ud on average. Further,
Z is now a deterministic function of X1. Thus, we can fix {W1, . . . ,Wt}, without affecting the
distribution of Z. Since Wi is on d1 bits, and without any prior conditioning since X|{Xgh : g ∈ [t]}
is ε-close to uniform on average, it follows that conditioned on {Xgh : g ∈ [t]},W, {W
g : g ∈ [t]},
the r.v Xh has average conditional min-entropy m− (t+ 1)d1 log(n/ε)− log(1/ε).
Claim 7.2.3. Conditioned on W, {Wg : g ∈ [t]},V, {Vg : g ∈ [t]}, the following hold:
• {Z,Z1, . . . ,Zt} is independent of {X,X1, . . . ,Xt},
• {V,V1, . . . ,Vt} is a deterministic function of {X,X1, . . . ,Xt},
• For each i ∈ [L], Vi is 2ε-close to uniform,
• Vh|{V
g
h : g ∈ [t]} is 2ε-close to uniform on average.
• Z has average conditional min-entropy at least d− (t+ 2) log(m/ε).
Proof. Fix W, {Wg : g ∈ [t]}. Thus, by Claim 7.2.2, we have
• Z is ε-close to Ud,
• Z, {Zg : g ∈ [t]} is independent of X, {Xg : g ∈ [t]},
• For each i ∈ [L], Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m− (t+ 2) log(n/ε),
• Xh|{Xgh : g ∈ [t]} has average conditional min-entropy at least m− (t+ 2) log(n/ε).
Since each Xi has average conditional min-entropy at least m − (t + 2) log(n/ε), it follows
that each Vi is 2ε-close to uniform and Ext2 is a strong extractor, it follows that Vi is 2ε-close to
Ud on average even conditioned on {V,V1, . . . ,Vt}. After this fixing, Z has average conditional
min-entropy at least d− (t+ 2) log(n/ε).
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We now prove that Vh|{V
g
h : g ∈ [t]} is 2ε-close to uniform on average. First, we fix the
r.v’s W, {Wg : g ∈ [t]} (at this point no other r.v’s are fixed). As before, we have Xh|{Xgh : g ∈ [t]}
has average conditional min-entropy kx ≥ m − (t + 2) log(n/ε). Thus, we fix {Xgh : g ∈ [t]}. Now
since Ext2 is a strong extractor, Vh is uniform on average even conditioned on V. We fix V, and
thus Vh is a deterministic function of Xh. Further, {V
g
h : g ∈ [t]} is a deterministic function of
{Vg : g ∈ [t]}, and hence a deterministic function of Z, {Zg : g ∈ [t]}. Thus, we can fix {Vgh : g ∈ [t]}
without affecting the distribution of Vh. This completes the proof of our claim.
The correctness of the function IPM is direct from the next claim.
Claim 7.2.4. Conditioned on {Zg : g ∈ [t]}}, the r.v Z is 3Lε-close to uniform on average.
Proof. Fix the r.v’s W, {Wg : g ∈ [t]},V, {Vg : g ∈ [y]}. We observe that the following hold:
• Z, {Zg : g ∈ [t]} is independent of Y, {Yg : g ∈ [t]},
• For each i ∈ [L], Vi is 2ε-close to uniform,
• Vh|{V
g
h : g ∈ [t]} is 2ε-close to uniform on average.
• Z has average conditional min-entropy at least d− (t+ 2) log(m/ε).
The claim is now direct from Theorem 4.4.4 by observing that by our choice of parameters, the
following hold:
• d ≥ (c3.5.7` log(m/ε) + d′′)(t+ 2)r+1, where d′′ = (t+ 2) log(m/ε),
• Z has average conditional min-entropy at least d− d′′,
• m′′ ≤ (0.9/t)r(m′ − c3.5.7`(t+ 1)r log(m/ε)).
This completes the proof of the claim, and hence Theorem 7.2.1 follows.
121
7.3 The Extractor Construction
We recall a reduction by Cohen and Schulman [CS16]. Informally, they used a constant number
of independent sources to transform into a sequence of matrices such that a large fraction of these
matrices follow a certain t-wise independence property. For our purposes, we need to slightly modify
this construction. The length of the rows (the parameter m in the following theorem) in the work of
[CS16] can be set to c log(n/ε), for any constant c. Using another additional source and extracting
from it using each row as seed (using any optimal strong-seeded extractor), the length of each row
can be made Ω(k).
We state the theorem from [CS16] with this modification.
Theorem 7.3.1 ([CS16]). There exist constants α > 0 and and c7.3.1 such that for all n, t ∈ N, and
for any ε, δ > 0, there exists an polynomial time computable function f : ({0, 1}n)C → ({0, 1}Lm)r,
where C = 7/α, L = O(t log n), r = n3/α,m = Ω(k), such that the following hold: Let X1, . . . ,XC
be independent (n, k) sources, k = c7.3.1t log(t) log(n log t/ε). Then there exists a subset S ⊂ [r],
|S| ≥ r − r
1
2
−α and a sequence of L×m matrices Y1, . . . ,Yr such that:
• f(X1, . . . ,XC) is 1/r-close to Y1, . . . ,Yr,
• for any i ∈ [L] and g ∈ S, Ygi is ε-close to Um,
• for any g ∈ S, and any distinct i1, . . . , it in S \ {g}, there exists an h ∈ [L] such that
Ygh|{Y
j
h : j ∈ [r] \ {g}} is ε-close to uniform.
We are now ready to present our extractor construction. By composing Theorem 7.3.1 with
our independence preserving merger from Section 7.2, we have the following result.
Theorem 7.3.2. There exists a constant α > 0 such that for all n, t ∈ N, and for any ε, δ > 0,
there exists an polynomial time computable function reduce : ({0, 1}n)C+1 → {0, 1}r, where C =
7
α + 1, r = n
3/α, such that the following hold: Let X1, . . . ,XC be independent (n, k) sources, k ≥
2
√
log t+log logn log(k/ε)(t+2)O(
√
log t+log logn)+c7.3.1t log(t) log(n log t/ε), and let Z = reduce(X1, . . . ,XC+1).
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Then there exists a subset S ⊂ [r], |S| ≥ r − r
1
2
−α such that ZS is n
−Ω(1)-close to a (t, γ7.3.2)-wise
independent distribution, where γ7.3.2 = O(εt log n).
Proof. Let f : ({0, 1}n)C → ({0, 1}Lm)r be the function from Theorem 7.3.1 with ε7.3.1 = ε,m = βk
for some constant β > 0. Thus L = O(t log n). Let (L, `, t)-IPM : ({0, 1}Lm)t×{0, 1} be the function




log t+log logn) and error parameter ε7.2.1 = ε. Define
reduce(x1, . . . , xC+1) = (L, `, t)-IPM(f(x1, . . . , xC), xC+1).
We note that k > c7.3.1t log(t) log(n log t/ε). Thus, using Theorem 7.3.1, it follows that there exists
a subset S ⊂ [r], |S| ≥ r − r
1
2
−α and a sequence of L×m matrices Y1, . . . ,Yr such that:
• f(X1, . . . ,XC) is 1/r-close to Y1, . . . ,Yr,
• for any i ∈ [L] and g ∈ S, Ygi is ε-close to Um,
• for any g ∈ S, and any distinct i1, . . . , it in S \ {g}, there exists an h ∈ [L] such that
Ygh|{Y
j
h : j ∈ [r] \ {g}} is ε-close to uniform.
We now work with the sources Y1, . . . ,Yr, and add an error of 1/r in the end. The theorem is now
direct using Theorem 7.2.1 and observing that the following hold by our setting of parameters:





• m = βk ≥ 2
√
logL(c3.5.7`(t+ 1)r log(m/ε) + c2.1.2(t+ 2) log(n/ε)).
Our multi-source extractor in Theorem 7.1.1 is now easy to obtain using a result on the
majority function.
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Theorem 7.3.3 ([DGJ+10,Vio14,CS16]). Let Z be a source on r bits such that there exists a subset
S ⊂ [r], |S| ≥ r − r
1
2
−α such that ZS is t-wise independent. Then,∣∣∣∣Pr[Majority(Z) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ O( log tt + r−α
)
.
We also recall a result about almost t-wise independent distributions.
Theorem 7.3.4 ([AGM03]). Let D be a (t, γ)-wise independent distribution on {0, 1}n. Then there
exists a t-wise independent distribution that is ntγ-close to D.
Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 7.3.5. There exists a constant c such that the following holds: Let Z be a source on r
bits such that there exists a subset S ⊂ [r], |S| ≥ r − r
1
2
−α such that ZS is (t, γ)-wise independent.
Then,






+ r−α + γrt
)
.
Proof of Theorem 7.1.1. Set t to a large enough constant such that c log tt < ε/2. Let α be the
constant from Theorem 7.3.2, r = n3/α and C = 7α + 1. Let reduce be the function from Theorem
7.3.2 with parameter t7.3.2 = t, r7.3.2 = r, and the error parameter ε7.3.2 set such that the parameter
γ7.3.2 ≤ 1rt+1 . This can be ensured by setting ε = n
−C′ for a large enough constant C ′.
Define
Ext(x1, . . . , xC) = Majority(f(x1, . . . , xC)).
Let Z = f(X1, . . . ,XC). We note that with this setting of parameters, there exists some
constant C ′′ such that any k ≥ 2C′′
√
log logn log(n) is sufficient for the conclusion of Theorem 7.3.2




which ZS is (t, γ)-wise independent. Theorem 7.1.1 is now direct from Corollary 7.3.5.
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Chapter 8
Extractors for Sumset Sources
1 This chapter is based on , we introduce and study a new model of weak sources which we call
sumset sources. Informally, this is the class of sources which are the sum (XOR) of independent
sources. This further reduces the assumptions made on weak sources, and provides a unified
framework for designing extractors for many well studied classes of sources. We then construct
explicit extractors for sumset sources and apply them to other classes of sources studied before.
In several cases we obtain substantial improvements over previous constructions. We now formally
define sumset sources.
Definition 8.0.1. For any two strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, define x + y to be the bit wise XOR of the
two strings.
Definition 8.0.2 ((n, k, C)-sumset source). A weak source X is called an (n, k, C)-sumset source
if X = X1 + . . .+ XC , where X1, . . . ,XC are independent (n, k)-sources.
A well known extractor for this class of sources is based on the Paley graph function (see
Theorem 2.5.4) and works for the sum of 2 independent sources, with one source having min-entropy
at least > n/2 and the other having min-entropy > log n. On the other extreme, the work of Kamp
et al. [KRVZ11] shows how to extract when X is a sum of exponentially many sources when the
1parts of this chapter have been previously published [CL16b]
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sum of the min-entropies of these sources is large enough. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no other known explicit construction for 2 ≤ C ≤ 2O(n).
The results in this chapter are based on joint work with Xin Li [CL16b].
Our main result is an explicit construction of an extractor for the sum of a constant number
of independent sources, each containing polylogarithmic min-entropy.
Theorem 19. There exist constants c, C > 0 and a small constant β > 0 such that for all n ∈ N
and k ≥ logc n, there exists a polynomial time computable extractor for (n, k, C)-sumset sources,
with error n−Ω(1) and output length kβ.
8.1 Relations and Applications to Other Sources
Independent Sources
The class of independent sources is clearly a special case of sumset sources. That is, if we view
the joint distribution of several independent sources as one source X, then X is also a sumset
source. Thus, our construction in Theorem 19 also gives an extractor for a constant number of
independent sources with polylogarithmic min-entropy. If we can improve the construction and
obtain an explicit extractor for (n, k, 2)-sumset sources with k ≥ logc n, then this will also match
the two source extractors in [CZ16a,Li15b].
Affine Sources
An affine source X on n bits with entropy k is the uniform distribution over some unknown affine
subspace of dimension k in {0, 1}n (viewing {0, 1}n as Fn2 2). This model generalizes oblivious bit-
fixing sources (where some of the bits are uniform and independent, while others are fixed) and thus
has received attention for its applications to cryptography. Affine extractors have also been used
by Viola [Vio14] to construct extractors for sources generated by NC0 and AC0 circuits. Further,
2In general, affine sources can be defined on any field Fq, but in this paper we focus on F2.
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good affine extractors imply the best known circuit lower bounds [DK11,FGHK15].
Using the probabilistic method, one can show that affine extractors exist for entropy k =
O(log n). However until recently, the best known explicit constructions for affine extractor was
due to Bourgain [Bou07], who using sophisticated techniques from additive combinatorics and
gave an explicit extractor for min-entropy at least δn, for any constant δ. This construction was
subsequently slightly improved to entropy n/
√
log logn by Yehudayoff [Yeh11] and Li [Li11b]. In
a very recent work, Li [Li15c] constructed the first explicit affine extractors for polylogarithmic
entropy.
We note that an affine source is also a special case of sumset source, since an affine subspace
of dimension k can be written as the sum of C affine subspaces of dimension k/C. Thus, as a
direct corollary of our extractor for sumset sources, we also obtain extractors for affine sources with
polylogarithmic min-entropy, matching the recent work of Li [Li15c].3
Corollary 8.1.1. There exists a constant c > 0 and a small constant β > 0 such that for all
n, k ∈ N with k ≥ logc n, there exists a polynomial time computable extractor for affine sources in
{0, 1}n with entropy k. The extractor has error n−Ω(1) and output length kβ.
Proof. Let X be an affine source with min-entropy k. Let v1, . . . , vk be a basis of X and b be the
shift vector. Let C be the constant in Theorem 19. For i ∈ [C], define the source Xi to be the
uniform distribution on the linear subspace spanned by v(i−1)k/C+1 . . . , vik/C for i = 2, · · · , C, and
define X1 to be the uniform distribution on the affine subspace spanned by v1 . . . , vk/C with shift
vector b. Thus X =
∑C
j=1 Xi, where each Xi has min-entropy k/C and the Xi’s are independent.
Thus X is a (n, k/C,C)-sumset source, and we can now apply Theorem 19.
Small-Space Sources
We study small-space sources in Chapter 9 and refer the reader to this chapter for more details.
3The extractor construction is essentially the same as in [Li15c], but the analysis is different.
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Interleaved Sources
We study interleaved sources in Chapter 10 and refer the reader to this chapter for more details.
Total Entropy Independent Sources and Somewhere Entropy Independent Sources
We study these sources in Chapter 9 and refer the reader to this chapter for more details.
8.2 Overview of Techniques
On a very high level, our extractor follows the same spirit of our 2-source extractor construction
in Chapter 6. That is, we first convert our sumset source into a (N δ, t, γ)-NOBF source on N bits
(see Chapter 5 for a definition of NOBF sources) , where N = nO(1), t = kα, γ < 1/N t+1, for some
constants 0 < δ, α < 1. We will then apply extractors for this source constructed in Chapter 5.
To obtain such a non-oblivious bit-fixing source, it suffices to use two independent sources
as shown in Chapter 6. More specifically, if we have a somewhere random source4 with N rows such
that N −N δ rows are uniform, then it is not hard to show that we can use an explicit correlation
breaker from Chapter 3 (Theorem 3.4.2), we obtain an NOBF source with at least N −N δ ‘good’
bits that are kα-wise independent.
Now the problem is how to obtain the somewhere random source. The standard way is to
use a seeded extractor with seed length O(log n) (so that to keep the running time polynomial in n)
and try all possible values of the seed. Each seed will give an output and we can then concatenate
the output to form a matrix. This does indeed give us a somewhere random source, however there
are now two problems. First, we cannot just use any seeded extractor with seed length O(log n).
This is because we need to apply the seeded extractor to the sum of several independent sources,
and we need to keep the “sum” structure carefully for the purpose of alternating extraction later.
If we just use any seeded extractor, then after applying the extractor the “sum” structure may not
4A somewhere random source is a matrix of random variables such that at least one row is uniform.
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be preserved. Therefore, here again we need to use a linear seeded extractor. Luckily, we do have
linear seeded extractors with seed length O(log n), due to a construction in [Li15c].
Second, just doing this is not enough, since the error of the somewhere random source is
not good enough for our purpose. Specifically, in order to apply the extractor for non-oblivious
bit-fixing source we need the error to be negligibly small, while the error we obtained from a seeded
extractor with seed length O(log n) is only polynomially small. Note this is different from the affine
extractor construction in [Li15c], as in the case of affine sources one can show that if we use a
linear seeded extractor, then most of the rows in the somewhere random source actually have error
0. However for general weak random sources the best error one can hope for (even with a linear
seeded extractor) is 1/poly(n) if the seed length is O(log n).
To get around this, we use a sampling method (similar to a technique seen in Chapter 6).
Specifically, they first used an extractor (or a non-malleable extractor) with large seed length to
achieve small error from one source, and then use another independent source to sample from the
rows of the somewhere random source to bring down the number of rows. The first idea would be
to try the same idea here in our construction. That is, if X is the sum of two independent sources,
then one can take two linear seeded extractors Ext1,Ext2 such that Ext1 has large seed length,
Ext2 has seed length O(log n) and output length the same as the seed length of Ext1, and compute
Ext1(X,Ext2(X, r)) for every possible choice r of Ext2’s seed. However, the problem now is that
the sampling procedure becomes correlated, and even with linear seeded extractors we do not know
how to analyze it.
We thus turn to another approach, used by Li in his multi-source extractor [Li13a]. The
idea is that, assume that X = X1 + · · ·+XC is the sum of some constant C number of independent
sources (instead of just two independent sources). Then if we apply a linear seeded extractor to
X, by the property of the extractor for every fixed seed the output will also be the XOR of C
independent outputs from each Xi. If every output is ε-close to uniform for some error ε, then
the error after the XOR will be reduced to roughly εC . Thus, if we take C to be a large enough
constant, this error will be much smaller than 1/N where N is the number of rows in the somewhere
129
random source. At this point we can use a union-bound type argument to show that the somewhere
random source is actually NεC = 1/poly(n)-close to another somewhere random source where a
large fraction of the rows are truly uniform. Thus we can switch to the new somewhere random
source and only introduce an error of 1/poly(n).
8.3 The Extractor Construction
In this section we construct explicit extractors for (n, k, C)-sumset sources where k = polylog(n)
and C is a large enough constant.
Theorem 8.3.1 (Theorem 19 restated). There exists constants c, C > 0 and a small constant
β1 > 0 such that for all n ∈ N, there exists a polynomial time computable extractor for (n, k, C+1)-
sumset sources, k ≥ logc(n), with error n−Ω(1) and output length kβ1.
We use the rest of the section to prove Theorem 8.3.1. We claim that the function computed
by Algorithm 9 is the required extractor. We first set up the parameters and ingredients used by
Algorithm 9.
• Let β = 1/20, t = kβ, ε = 1/n2.
• Let c = (λ+ 1)/β.
• Let LExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}n1 , n1 =
√
k, be the linear seeded extractor from Theorem
2.1.6 set extract from min-entropy k with error ε. Thus d = c1 log n, for some constant c1.
Let D = 2d = nc1 .
• Let C = c1 + 2, k′ = d2, ε1 = 1/D2t = 1/n2tc1 , n2 = k4β, k′′ = n22 = k8β, δ = (2c1 − 1)/2c1.
• Let LExt1 : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}d1 and LExt2 : {0, 1}n2 × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}d1 be
instantiations of the linear seeded extractor from Theorem 2.1.5, both set to extract from min-
entropy k′ with error ε1. Thus, d1 = O(log
2(k/ε1)) = O(t
2 log2 n) and d2 = O(log
2(k/ε1)) =
O(t2 log2 n). Finally let LExt3 : {0, 1}n1×{0, 1}d3 → {0, 1}n2 be an instantiation of the linear
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seeded extractor from Theorem 2.1.5 set to extract from min-entropy k′′ with error ε1. Thus,
d3 = O(log
2(n1/ε1)) = O(t
2 log2 n). Let ACB be the function computed by Algorithm 4 using
these linear seeded extractors.
• Let bitExt : {0, 1}D → {0, 1}m, m = tα, be the extractor from Theorem 13 set to extract
from (q, t, γ)-non-oblivious sources where q = Dδ and γ = 1/Dt+1.
Algorithm 9: SUMExt(x)
Input: A bit string x = x1 + . . .+ xC+1, where each xi is a bit string of length n.
Output: A bit string of length m.
1 Let w be the n1 ×D boolean matrix whose ith row wi is given by LExt(x, si).
2 Let v be the n2 ×D boolean matrix whose ith row vi is given by ACB(wi, x, si).
3 Let r be the first column of the matrix v. Output bitExt(r).
We prove the following claims about the random variables computed in Algorithm 9 from
which Theorem 8.3.1 is direct.
Claim 8.3.2. V is 1/nO(1)-close to a somewhere-random source V′ containing a subset R of rows,
|R| ≥ D −Dδ such that the joint distribution of any t distinct rows in R is γ-close to Utm.
Proof. Since LExt is a strong seeded extractor, it follows that for any j ∈ [C], there exists a subset
Sj ⊂ {0, 1}d, |Sj | ≥ (1−
√
ε)D, such that for any s ∈ Sj LExt(X, sj) is
√
ε-close to Un1 . Thus, by
a union bound, it follows that there exists a set S ⊂ {0, 1}d,
|S| ≥ (1− C
√
ε)D > D −Dδ,
(the inequality follows by our choice of parameters) such that for any si ∈ S, LExt(Xj , si) is
√
ε-close to Un1 for each j ∈ [C].
Since LExt is linear seeded, it follows that for any i ∈ [D], it follows that Wi = LExt(X, si) =(∑C
j=1 LExt(Xj , si)
)
+LExt(XC+1, si). Thus if si ∈ S, then by Lemma 2.3.8,
(∑C
j=1 LExt(Xj , si)
)
is εC/2-close to Un1 . Using a hybrid argument, it follows that W is Dε
C/2-close to a D×n1 matrix
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W, whose ith row W
i
is equal to Wi if si /∈ S, and otherwise is given by Yi + LExt(XC+1, si),
where Yi follows the distribution Un2 . We note that the Y
i’s can be arbitrarily correlated.
Thus, V is DεC/2-close to a D × n2-matrix V such that if si ∈ S, then the ith row V
i
is
given by ACB(Yi + LExt(XC+1, si),X, si).
Now consider any subset {si1 , . . . , sit} ⊂ S of size t. We claim that
(V
i1 , . . . ,V
it
) ≈O(tdε) Utm.
We fix the random variable {LExt(XC+1, si1), . . . ,LExt(XC+1, sit)}. As a result of this fixing,






i1 , . . . ,V
it
) = (ACB(Y1 + a1,XC+1 + Z, si1), . . . ,ACB(Y
t + at,XC+1 + Z, sit)),
where a1, . . . , at are some constants.
We now invoke Theorem 3.4.2 noting that the following conditions hold by our choice of
parameters:
• XC+1 is independent of {Z,Y1, . . . ,Yt}.
• Each sig is a distinct bit string of length d.
• k/2 ≥ k′ + 8td1d+ log(1/ε).
• n2 ≥ k′ + 3td1 + log(1/ε).
• n1 ≥ k′ + 10td1d+ (4td+ 1)n2 + log(1/ε).
Thus,
(ACB(Y1 + a1,XC+1 + Z, si1), . . . ,ACB(Y
t + at,XC+1 + Z, sit)) ≈O(dtε1) Utm.
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We note that by our choice of parameters, the following inequalities hold:
• dtε1 < 1/Dt+2.
• εC/2D ≤ 1/n2.
The claim now follows from the fact the above argument holds for any arbitrary size t subset of S
and the fact that V is εC/2D-close to V.
Claim 8.3.3. V′ is 1/nO(1)-close to Um.
Proof. Follows directly from Claim 8.3.2 and Theorem 13.
Remark 8.3.4. It is not hard to see that the results in this section generalize to sumset sources
over any field, i.e., sources of the form X =
∑C
i=1 Xi, where each Xi is a source on Fnq for some
prime power q, where for a, b ∈ Fnq , a+ b denotes the standard vector addition.
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Chapter 9
Extractors for Small-Space Sources
1 Trevisan and Vadhan [TV00] introduced the problem of constructing seedless extractors for
the class of samplable sources, where the weak random source is generated by a computation-
ally bounded algorithm. They constructed explicit extractors for such sources based on strong but
plausible complexity-theoretic assumptions. Subsequently, Kamp et al. [KRVZ11] studied the prob-
lem of constructing seedless extractors for small-space sources, where the weak source is generated
by a small width branching program. We define this model more formally below.
Definition 9.0.1. [KRVZ11] A space s source X is generated by taking a random walk on a
branching program of length n and width 2s, where each edge of the branching program is labelled
with a transition probability and a bit. Thus a bit of the source is generated for each step taken on
the branching program, and the source X is the concatenation of all the bits.
As observed in [KRVZ11], the model of small space sources generalizes many previously
studied sources, including von Neumann’s source of independent coin flips with unknown bias
[vN51], the finite Markov chain model studied by Blum [Blu86], a generalization of bit-fixing sources
known as symbol-fixing sources [KZ07b], and sources consisting of many independent sources.
However, the class of affine sources appears not to be related to small space sources.
1parts of this chapter have been previously published [CL16b]
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Using the probabilistic method, one can show that error ε extractors exist for space s
sources with min-entropy k ≥ 2s+log s+O(log(n/ε)). However, previously the best known explicit
extractor for space s sources is from the work of Kamp et al. [KRVZ11], which requires min-entropy
k ≥ γn and space s ≤ γ3n, where γ > n−δ for some small universal constant δ. In other words,
their extractor requires almost linear min-entropy even for sources with space as small as 1, while
we know from the probabilistic method that for space O(log n) sources one can hope to construct
extractors for min-entropy O(log n). In addition, the techniques used in [KRVZ11] start out by
reducing to the so called total-entropy independent sources, and it can be shown that this reduction
has a fundamental bottleneck and cannot possibly go below min-entropy
√
n.
9.1 Our Result and Overview of Techniques
The results in this chapter are based on joint work with Xin Li [CL16b].
We show how to extract from space s sources when k ≥ 2log0.5+α(n)s1+10α, for any constant
α > 0. Thus for s = no(1), we only need min-entropy no(1). This significantly improves previous
results in terms of min-entropy requirement, and in particular break the
√
n min-entropy barrier.
Theorem 20. For any constant α > 0 and for all n, k, s ∈ N with k ≥ 2log0.5+α(n)s1+10α, there
exists a polynomial time computable extractor for space s sources on n bits with min-entropy at
least k, with error n−Ω(1) and output length kα.
We obtain our result by showing a reduction from the task of extracting from small-space
sources to the problem of extracting from sumset sources. We briefly describe the reduction below
and refer the reader to Section 9.2 for more details. Our extractor follows immediately from the
reduction.
Note that as observed in [KRVZ11], if we partition a small space source into several blocks,
and condition on the event that the branching program generating the source reaches some specific
vertices at the end of each block, then the small space source becomes a convex combination
of independent sources. This conditioning reduces the min-entropy of the source, but since the
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branching program has small width we would expect that there is still much entropy left. However,
the problem is that the entropy could now be distributed in these blocks in some arbitrary way,
with the only guarantee being a lower bound on the total amount of entropy. This is referred to as
a total entropy source as in [KRVZ11]. The problem with the approach in [KRVZ11] is that one has
to use a fixed partition of the source, so that the blocks can be used as inputs to an extractor for
independent sources. This introduced a bottleneck of entropy
√
n, since if the block size is smaller
than
√
n then it could be the case that each block has entropy 1, while if the block size is larger
than
√
n then it could be the case that all entropy is concentrated in just one block.
We get around this obstacle by not relying on a fixed partition of the source. Instead, we
show that when the min-entropy satisfies k ≥ 2log0.5+α(n)s1+10α, the small space source is actually
2−k
Ω(1)
-close to a convex combination of (n, kα, C)-sumset sources. On a high level, we show this
reduction as follows. We first partition the small space source into some ` C blocks with `s k,
and we condition on the fixing of the states of the random walk at the end of each block. This
leaves us ` independent blocks such that their total min-entropy is roughly k− `s. Now if for some
particular fixing, there are at least C blocks with min-entropy at least kα, then under this fixing the
source is an (n, kα, C)-sumset source. If not, then our key observation is that most of the entropy
(indeed, k − `s− `kα = k − o(k) entropy) will be concentrated in at most C − 1 blocks. Therefore
at least one block has min-entropy (k − o(k))/(C − 1). Thus, for this block the entropy rate will
be increased by a factor of roughly `/C. We can then fix all other blocks and repeat the argument
for this block. Specifically, we further divide the block into ` blocks and condition on the fixing of
the intermediate states. Then for any particular fixing, either it is an (n, kα, C)-sumset source or
the entropy rate of one block gets increased again by a factor of `/C. We note that the entropy
rate cannot be larger than 1, so we know at some point it has to be an (n, kα, C)-sumset source.
Therefore the original source is a convex combination of sumset sources. Notice here the partitions
are not fixed, but rather can be different for different fixings of the states.
We also consider a generalization of small space sources, where the underlying branching
program produces bits of the source in an unkown (but oblivious) order. This is discussed in Section
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9.3. We also obtain new results on extracting from total-entropy sources and somewhere entropy
sources (see Section 9.4).
9.2 A Reduction from Small-Space Sources to Sumset Sources
In this section, we show that a small-space source is close to a convex combination of sumset sources.
The idea is argue that either partitioning the source leads to a sumset source or results in increase
in min-entropy rate of one of the partitions. Thus by repeating this argument, it must be that at
some point we reach a sumset source, since otherwise we end up with a source with min-entropy
rate more than 1.
Lemma 9.2.1. For any constant α > 0 and any constant integer C ≥ 2, any space s source on n
bits with min-entropy k ≥ 2log0.5+α(n)s1+10α is 2−kΩ(1)-close to a convex combination of (n, k′, C)-
sumset sources, where k′ = kα.
We note that Theorem 20 now directly follows from the explicit sumset extractor constructed
in Chapter 8 (Theorem 19) and Lemma 9.2.1.
Proof of Lemma 9.2.1. Let ` = kα/2, ε1 = 2
−kα , kth = k
α be fixed parameters that we set with
foresight. Let X be a space s source on n bits with min-entropy at least k. We partition X into `
equi-sized blocks of length n1 = n/`. Let Xi, denote the i’th block where i ∈ [`] (thus Xi is a source
on n/` bits). We now condition on the initial state of small-space branching program at each of
these blocks, and let ki denote the min-entropy in Xi after this conditioning. Observe that Xi’s
are now independent sources. It follows from Lemma 2.3.7 that with probability at least 1− ε1,
∑̀
i=1
ki ≥ k − `s− log(1/ε1). (9.1)
Consider any such good fixing of the states such that the above inequality holds. The proof now
goes via analysing two cases. Since we iterate this argument, each time with a new source, let
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X1 = X and k(1) = k.
Case 1: |{i ∈ [`] : ki ≥ kth}| ≥ C. The proof is direct in this case. For simplicity, suppose
X1, . . . ,XC each have min-entropy at least k
α. We fix the sources XC+1, . . . ,X`. Now, for each
i ∈ [C], define the source Yi on n bits whose projection onto the the i’th block is Xi and the
rest of the co-ordinates are fixed to 0. It follows that X = η +
∑C
i=1 Yi (for some constant string
η ∈ {0, 1}n) and hence is a (n, k′, C)-sumset source. Thus X is at distance at most ε1 from a convex
combination of such sumset sources.
Case 2: |{i ∈ [`] : ki ≥ kth}| < C. Using (9.1), it follows that there exists distinct C−1 partitions,
say i1, . . . , iC−1 such that
C−1∑
j=1
kij ≥ k(1) − `(s+ kα)− log(1/ε1).
Thus, by an averaging argument, it follows that there exists some j ∈ [C − 1], such that
kij ≥
k(1) − `(s+ kα)− log(1/ε1)
C − 1
.
Hence the source Xij (on n1 = n/` bits) has min-entropy rate




Thus, using the fact that k(1) > (sk












We now repeat the argument (i.e, analyzing the Cases 1 and 2) with X1 replaced by X2 =
Xij (and we fix all other sources). However, for different iterations of the argument, we do not
change values of the parameters `, ε, kth, and they are fixed to k
α, 2−k
α
and kα respectively, where
k = H∞(X).
Suppose, if possible, that for h iterations of this argument, each time we end up in Case 2.
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Thus, we now have a source Xh on n/`h bits with min-entropy rate at least ( `2C )
h · kn . To derive a











> (skα/2 + 2k2α)1+α.
(The first condition is to ensure that the min-entropy rate is more than 1, the second condition
ensures that the length of the source Xh is large enough and finally the third condition is a lower
bound the min-entropy of Xh, which is required when we apply our argument on Xh−1.)
Pick h = 1+ logn−log klog `−log(2C) . It is easy to check that the first condition holds. Further the second
and third conditions follow from the fact that k > s1+10α2log
0.5+α(n). Thus, it must be that in at
most h iterations of the argument, we are in Case 1 and hence X is close to a convex combination









Consider the following natural generalization of small-space sources.
Definition 9.3.1 (Any-Order-Small-Space-Sources). An any-order-space s source X on [r]n is
generated by an r-way branching program of length n and width 2s and a permutation t : [n]→ [n]
in the following way: The r-way branching program is a layered graph with n + 1 layers and a
single start vertex. Each edge is labeled with a variable Xj, a probability value and a symbol in
[r]. Further all edges between the ith and (i+ 1)th layer are labelled with same variable Xt(i). The
output of the source is a random walk starting from the start vertex, assigning the symbol on the
edge to the corresponding variable and finally outputting the generated string.
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It is easy to see that the reduction in the above section generalizes to the class of any-order
small-space sources. Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 21. For any constant α > 0 and for all n, k, s ∈ N with k ≥ 2log0.5+α(n)s1+10α, there
exists a polynomial time computable extractor for the class of any-order space s sources on n bits
with min-entropy at least k, with error n−Ω(1) and output length kα.
9.4 Total Entropy and Some-Where Entropy Sources
As an intermediate model to extract from small space sources, [KRVZ11] introduced the above
mentioned total entropy independent sources. This is a collection of r independent sources of length
` such that the total min-entropy of all r sources is at least k. By the probabilistic method,
one can show that error ε extractors exist for total min-entropy k independent sources as long as
k ≥ max{`, log log(r/ε)}+log r+2 log(1/ε)+O(1).2 Essentially, k can be as small as `+log r+O(1).
However, the best known extractors in [KRVZ11] are far from this. Specifically, the extractors there
need to have either k ≥ Ω(r`) or k ≥ (2` log r)C for some constant C > 1.
We substantially improve these results by constructing a new extractor that only requires
min-entropy O(`) + polylog(r`), which comes close to the probabilistic bound. In particular, we
have the following result.
Theorem 9.4.1. There exist constants c, C > 0 and a small constant β > 0 such that for all
r, `, k ∈ N with k ≥ C(` + logc(r`)), there exists a polynomial time computable extractor for r
independent sources over {0, 1}` with total min-entropy k, with error (r`)−Ω(1) and output length
kβ.
To prove the theorem we show the following lemma.
Lemma 9.4.2. For any t, C ∈ N, let X1, · · · ,Xr ∈ ({0, 1}`)r be r independent sources over {0, 1}`
2Note that k > ` is necessary, otherwise the entropy could be contained in just one source, making extraction
impossible.
140
with total min-entropy k ≥ C(`+ t). Then there exists a partition of the r sources into C disjoint
subsets Y1, · · · ,YC such that each Yi has min-entropy at least t.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on C. For the case where C = 1, one can view the whole
set X1, · · · ,Xr as a partition Y1, and it is clear that Y1 has min-entropy k ≥ `+t > t. Now suppose
the lemma holds for some C ∈ N, we show that it holds for C + 1.
First notice that for two independent sources X,Y, we have that H∞(X ◦Y) = H∞(X) +
H∞(Y). Now, consider the smallest i such that X1 ◦ · · · ◦Xi has min-entropy at least t. We know
such an i exists because X1 ◦ · · · ◦Xr has min-entropy at least k ≥ (C + 1)(`+ t) > t. Since i is the
smallest, we know that X1 ◦ · · · ◦Xi−1 has min-entropy at most t. Note that Xi has min-entropy at
most `, thus X1 ◦· · ·◦Xi has min-entropy at most t+`. Next, since X1 ◦· · ·◦Xr has min-entropy at
least k ≥ (C+1)(`+ t), we know that Xi+1 ◦ · · · ◦Xr has min-entropy at least k− (t+ `) = C(t+ `).
Now we can apply the induction hypothesis and we see that there exists a partition of Xi+1 · · ·Xr
into C disjoint subsets such that each subset has min-entropy at least t. Put in X1 ◦ · · · ◦Xi we
get C + 1 disjoint subsets.
By setting t = logc(r`) and combining the lemma with Theorem 19, we immediately obtain
Theorem 9.4.1.
In order to extract from total entropy independent sources, [KRVZ11] actually argues that
since the total entropy is at least k, some of the independent sources will have entropy at least k′
(the relation between k and k′ depends on the number of sources). Therefore, total entropy sources
reduce to independent sources where some of them have a certain amount of min-entropy. We call
such sources somewhere entropy independent sources.
Definition 9.4.3. An (n, k, `)-somewhere-C source consists of ` independent sources X1, . . . ,X`,
each on n bits, such that at least C of the Xi’s have min-entropy at least k.
Note that C here needs to be at least 2. In this context, our extractor for sumset sources
from Theorem 19 actually gives an extractor for an (n, k, `)-somewhere-C source with k ≥ logc n
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for some constants C, c > 1, and outputs kΩ(1) bits. Note that the number of sources ` here is
irrelevant since we can just take the sum of the sources and fix any other source that does not have
min-entropy k.
In fact, we can use a simpler method to get a slightly stronger result. We show that we can
extract from (n, k, `)-somewhere 2 sources for k = polylog(n) and any integer ` (with the extractor
running in time poly(n, `)).
Theorem 9.4.4. There exists a constant c > 0 and a small constant β > 0 such that for all
n, k, ` ∈ N with k ≥ logc n, there exists an extractor computable in time poly(n, `) for (n, k, `)-
somewhere-2 sources, with error n−Ω(1) and output length Ω(k).
Proof. Let 2Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, m = k/10 be the 2-source extractor from Theorem
14 set to extract from min-entropy k/2 with error ε = 1/nΩ(1). Define the function Ext : {0, 1}`n →
{0, 1}m as




We claim that for any (n, k, `)-somewhere 2-source X = {X1, . . . ,X`},
|Ext(X)−Um| ≤ ε.
We prove this in the following way. Since the function Ext is symmetric, we can assume without
loss of generality that the sources X1 and X2 have min-entropy at least k each. Fix the sources
X3, . . . ,X`. Thus, after this fixing














variable on {0, 1}m and is deterministic function of X1. Thus, we fix A, and using Lemma 2.3.7, X1





is a random variable on {0, 1}m and is deterministic function of X2. Thus, we fix B, and X2 has
min-entropy at least 0.9k −m with probability 1− 2−k0.1 . Thus, after this fixing
Ext(X) = 2Ext(X1,X2) + s
′,
for some constant s′ ∈ {0, 1}m. Further X1 and X2 are still independent, each with min-entropy
at least 0.8k (with probability at least 1− 2−kΩ(1)). The result now follows since 2Ext is a 2-source
extractor for min-entropy k/2.
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Chapter 10
Extractors for Interleaved Sources
1
Raz and Yehudayoff [RY11] introduced a natural generalization of the class of independent
sources, which we call interleaved sources. To formally define this class of sources, we introduce
some notation. Let σ : [n]→ [n] be any permutation. For any string w ∈ {0, 1}n, define the string
s = wσ ∈ {0, 1}n such that sσ(i) = wi for i = 1, . . . , n.
Definition 10.0.1 (Interleaved Sources). Let X1, . . . ,XC be independent (n, k)-sources on {0, 1}n
and let σ : [Cn]→ [Cn] be any permutation. Then Z = (X1 ◦ . . . ◦XC)σ is an (n, k, C)-interleaved
source.
Besides being a natural generalization of independent sources, the original motivation for
studying these sources came from an application found by Raz and Yehudayoff [RY11] in proving
lower bounds for arithmetic circuits. Further, such extractors give examples of explicit functions
with high best-partition communication complexity.
Using the probabilistic method, one can show that extractors exist for (n, k, C)-interleaved
sources with C = 2 and k = O(log n). However the known constructions are far from this in
terms of entropy requirement. The construction in [RY11] works for (n, k, C)-interleaved sources
1parts of this chapter have been previously published [CZ16b]
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for k > (1− δ)n and C = 2, where δ is a small constant.
10.1 Our Results and Applications
The results in this chapter are based on joint works with Xin Li and David Zuckerman [CZ16b,
CL16b].
Note that an (n, k, C)-interleaved source is also a special case of an (n, k, C)-sumset source,
by naturally extending each source in the definition to have bits 0 in all other positions. Using
our extractor for sumset sources from Chapter 8, we thus substantially improve previous results in
terms of min-entropy requirement for a large enough constant C. In particular, we obtain explicit
extractors that work for the interleaving of a constant number of independent sources, each with
polylogarithmic min-entropy.
Theorem 22. There exist constants c, C > 0 and a small constant β > 0 such that for all n, k ∈ N
with k ≥ logc n, there exists a polynomial time computable extractor for (n, k, C)-interleaved sources,
with error n−Ω(1) and output length kβ.
Proof. Suppose X on Cn is an interleaving of the independent sources X1, . . . ,XC (each on n
bits). Define independent sources Y1, . . . ,YC , each on Cn bits, such that Yi matches X on the
co-ordinates belonging to the source Xi, and Yi is fixed to 0 everywhere else. Hence X =
∑C
1 Yi
and thus, X is a (Cn, k, C)-sumset source. The result now follows from Theorem 19.
However note that this does not yield extractors for (n, k, 2)-interleaved sources since C (in
the above theorem) is a large constant.
To extract from (n, k, 2) sources, we develop a simple technique that yields explicit extractors
that work for lower min-entropy rates. In particular, our method yields explicit extractors for min-
entropy rate 0.51 for two interleaved sources, when the sources are over a finite field of large enough
(constant) characteristic.
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We show how to convert any two-source extractor that is a function of the sum of its inputs
into an extractor for a 2-interleaved source. Our method of converting a two-source extractor into
an extractor for interleaved sources is based on explicit constructions of certain combinatorial sets,
which we call (r, s)-spanning sets. These spanning sets are essentially subspace-evasive sets with
different parameters than studied earlier (see Section 10.2.1 for more details). It turns out that the
columns of parity check matrices of linear codes with good erasure list-decodability form spanning
sets with good parameters. We discuss this in detail later.
Next, we observe that an existing two-source extractor from [CG88] is a function of the
sum of the inputs. This leads to our construction of an extractor for 2-interleaved sources with
one source having min-entropy at least (1− α)n and the other source having min-entropy at least
λ log n (for some α, λ > 0). In particular, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 23. For some δ > 0 and any λ > 0, there exists an explicit function ext : {0, 1}2n →
{0, 1}m, m = λ log n, such that if X, Y are independent sources on Fn2 with min-entropy k1, k2
respectively satisfying k1 > (1− δ)n and k2 > 35 max{log n,m}, t : [2n]→ [2n] is any permutation,
then
|ext((X ◦Y)t) ◦X− Um ◦X| = n−Ω(1).
Next, we show that for any large enough constant prime p, if the 2-interleaved source is on
[p]2n, we can extract when one source has min-entropy rate at least 0.51 and the other source has
min-entropy rate at least c log n/n.
Theorem 24. There exists c > 0 such that for any δ, λ > 0 and any prime p > 2
c
δ , there exists an
explicit function extp : F2np → {0, 1}m, m = λ log n, such that if X and Y are independent sources on
Fnp with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively, satisfying k1 > (12+δ)n log p and k2 >
5
δ max{log n log p,m},
t : [2n]→ [2n] is any injective map, then
|extp((X ◦Y)t) ◦X− Um ◦X| = n−Ω(1).
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We give various related constructions achieving different tradeoffs between min-entropy,
error, and output length. This is summarized in Table 10.1.
We show that random sets are (r, s)-spanners with high probability (see Lemma 10.3.10). By
our proof technique, any improved construction of an (r, s)-spanning set matching the probabilistic
method will yield extractors for 2-interleaved sources on {0, 1}2n that have essentially the same
min-entropy requirement as the standard (non-interleaved) setting.
10.1.1 Best-Partition Communication Complexity
Since Yao introduced communication complexity in 1978 Yao [Yao79], there has been an extensive
amount of research done on various models of communication (see [KN97] for formal definitions and
background). We recall the definition of the randomized best-partition communication complexity
of an arbitrary function f : [R]2n → {0, 1}, which generalizes the usual setting where the partition
of inputs is known.
Let Alice and Bob be two players who want to collectively compute f following a protocol
Π and having access to a common random string r. Fix an arbitrary partition of the set [2n] into
2 subsets of equal size, say S and T . For arbitrary x, y ∈ [R]n, Alice is given x and Bob receives y
and the goal is to compute f(z) with probability at least 1− ε, where z ∈ [R]2n such that zS = x
and zT = y.
For any protocol Π, the randomized communication cost of f with respect to an equi-
partition S, T ⊂ [2n] denoted by RεΠ,S,T (f), is defined to be the maximum communication between
Alice and Bob over all inputs x, y in the scenario described above. The best-partition communica-







Lower bounds on the best-partition communication complexity of f implies lower bounds
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on branching programs computing f [AM86] and also imply time/space tradeoffs for VLSI circuits
[Len90].
Raz and Yehudayoff [RY11] proved the following lower bound.
Theorem 10.1.1 ([RY11]). For some β > 0, there exists an explicit function f : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}
such that the randomized best-partition communication complexity of f with error ε = 12 − 2
−βn is
at least βn.
The constant β in the above theorem is, however, extremely small and arises from arguments
in additive combinatorics. A similar bound also follows from their work for inputs on [R]2n (for
any constant R) and it appears nontrivial to use their techniques to obtain bounds for larger β.
Our Results
We obtain the following result.
Theorem 25. There exists c > 0 such that for any δ, γ > 0 and any prime p > 2
c
δ , there exists
an explicit function f : [p]2n → {0, 1} such that the randomized best-partition communication
complexity of f with error ε = 12 − p
−γn is at least (14 − δ − γ)n log p.
We prove this using a well known technique of lower bounding randomized communication
complexity by discrepancy. Our explicit function is the 1-bit extractor constructed in Theorem
10.4.7. However, we need to analyze the error of the extractor more carefully to obtain the above
bound. We prove Theorem 25 in Section 10.6.
10.1.2 Interleaved Non-Malleable Extractors
We introduce the natural generalization of non-malleable extractors in the interleaved model.
We first recall the definition of a non-malleable extractor.
Definition 10.1.2 (Non-Malleable Extractor). A function nmExt : [R]2n → {0, 1}m is a non-
malleable extractor for min-entropy k and error ε if the following holds: If X is a source (on [R]n)
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with min-entropy k, and f : [R]n → [R]n is any function with no fixed points, then
|nmExt(X ◦ U[R]n) ◦ nmExt(X ◦ f(U[R]n)) ◦ U[R]n − Um ◦ nmExt(X ◦ f(U[R]n) ◦ U[R]n | ≤ ε.
The first explicit construction of a non-malleable extractors was given in [DLWZ14], with
subsequent improvements of parameters achieved in [CRS12, Li12b]. However these constructions
require min-entropy > 0.49n. In a recent work [CGL16], the min-entropy required was improved
to O(log2 n).
We initiate the study of non-malleable extractors in the interleaved model, where the ex-
tractor is guaranteed to work even when symbols from the source X and tampered seed U[R]n arrive
to the non-malleable extractor in a fixed but unknown interleaved order.
We formally define interleaved non-malleable extractors.
Definition 10.1.3 (Interleaved Non-Malleable Extractor). A function nmExt : [R]2n → {0, 1}m
is a non-malleable extractor in the any-order model for min-entropy k and error ε if the following
holds: If X is a source (on [R]n) with min-entropy k, f : [R]n → [R]n is any function with no fixed
points and t : [2n]→ [2n] is any permutation, then
|nmExt((X ◦ U[R]n)t) ◦ nmExt((X ◦ f(U[R]n))t) ◦ U[R]n − Um ◦ nmExt((X ◦ f(U[R]n))t) ◦ U[R]n | ≤ ε,
where Um is independent of U[R]n.
In the above definition, when the seed has some min-entropy instead of being uniform, we
say that the interleaved non-malleable extractor is weak-seeded.
Our Results
We give the first explicit construction of an interleaved non-malleable extractor. Further our non-
malleable extractor is weak-seeded.
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Theorem 26. There exists λ > 0 such that for any δ > 0, c > c(δ) and any prime p > 2
λ
δ ,
there exists an explicit function nmExt : F2np → {0, 1}m, m = O(log n), such that if X, Y are
independent sources on Fnp with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively, satisfying k1 > (12 + δ)n log p and
k2 > cm, t : [2n]→ [2n] is any permutation and f : Fnp → Fnp is any function with no fixed points,
then
|nmExt((X ◦Y)t) ◦ nmExt((X ◦ f(Y))t) ◦Y − Um ◦ nmExt((X ◦ f(Y))t) ◦Y| = n−Ω(1).
As before, if we are allowed to run the non-malleable extractor in sub-exponential time, we
can extract Ω(n) bits with error 2−Ω(n). See Theorem 10.5.4 for more details.
10.2 Outline of Constructions
10.2.1 Extractors for 2-Interleaved Sources
Our extractor for interleaved sources exploits the existence of good 2-source extractors which are
functions of X + Y. To do this, we encode our source in a new way. Our encoding is based on
explicit constructions of certain combinatorial sets, which we call spanning vectors.
Definition 10.2.1. A set of vectors S ⊆ F¯̀p is (r, s)-spanning if the span of any r vectors of S has
dimension at least s.
Note that this is the same as a subspace-evasive set: Any (s − 1)-dimensional subspace
contains at most (r−1) vectors in the set. However our parameters are quite different than studied
previously [Gur11,DL12].
Our explicit constructions of spanning vectors are based on using the columns of a parity
check matrix of a linear codes with good erasure list-decodability. Informally, an (e, L)-erasure list-
decodable code C satisfies the property that at most L codewords agree on any particular subset
of coordinates of size n− e. This property can then be used to lower bound the rank of any subset
of e columns of the parity check matrix of C. We refer the reader to Section 10.3 for more details.
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We define the following encoding based on spanning vectors.
Definition 10.2.2. For any (r, s)-spanning set S = {v1, . . . , v`} ⊆ F
¯̀
p of size `, the function







is called an (r, s)-encoding from F`p to F
¯̀
p.
Consider the following setting: Let Z = (X ◦Y)t be any 2-interleaved source on {0, 1}2n,
where X and Y are arbitrary independent sources on {0, 1}n with min-entropy k1 and k2 respec-
tively, and t : [2n]→ [2n] is any permutation.
Our first step is to use an (n, s)-encoding enc from F2n2 to Fn̄2 to encode Z. Thus,










where S = {v1, . . . , v2n} is an (n, s)-spanning set of vectors.
The idea is to argue that the independent sources X′ and Y′ (on {0, 1}n̄) have enough min-
entropy. Since (by construction) the span of the set of vectors {vt(1), . . . , vt(n)} has dimension at least
s, Lemma 2.3.12 implies that H∞(X
′) = k′1 ≥ k1 − (n− s). Similarly H∞(Y′) = k′2 ≥ k2 − (n− s).
We now associate Fn̄2 with F2n̄ . A character sum estimate of Karatsuba2 [Kar71, Kar91]
implies that for any nonprincipal multiplicative character χ of F∗2n̄ ,
EX′ |EY′ [χ(X′ + Y′)]| ≤ 2−δk
′
2
whenever: k1 ≥ (12 + 3δ)n̄+ (n− s) and k2 ≥
4
δ log n̄ log p+ (n− s).
2this character sum was also used in [CG88] for constructing explicit two-source extractors.
151
Suppose k1 and k2 satisfy these conditions.
We then follow a standard approach and define the function:
ext(Z) = logg(X
′ + Y′) (mod M),
where M = 2δk
′
2/2 and g is a primitive element of F2n̄ . Using a version of the Abelian XOR lemma
(see Lemma 2.6.2), it follows that ext is an extractor with output length δk′2/2 and error 2
−Ω(k′2).
Further the extractor is strong in the source X. However, the running time of this extractor is
subexponential since it involves computing discrete logs over finite fields. This gives us a semi-
explicit extractor construction.
To get a polynomial time extractor, we compute discrete log over a smaller multiplicative
subgroup of F∗2n̄ . Let M |2
n̄ − 1 and M = nλ for any constant λ (we show in Theorem 10.4.2 that




Thus ext1(Z) is a distribution on the multiplicative subgroup G = {x
2n̄−1
M : x ∈ F∗2n̄} (of F
∗
2n̄) of
size M (in fact ext1(Z) is a distribution on G ∪ {0}, but Pr[ext1(Z) = 0] = 2−Ω(n) and hence we
ignore this and add this to the error). Let g be a generator of G. It now follows by using the
character sum estimate of Karatsuba [Kar71] that the function:
ext(Z) = logg(ext1(Z))
is an extractor.
We need to find a generator g of G efficiently. For this, we use an efficient algorithm of
Shoup [Sho90] for finding a small set of elements such that one of them is a primitive element of
F2n̄ . We use a straightforward method to find g from this set in polynomial time. We achieve
output length of λ log n and error n−Ω(1). The extractor is strong in the source X.
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Reducing the Min-Entropy Rate For some c and any δ > 0, let p > 2
c
δ be any prime. When
the source Z = (X ◦Y)t is on [p]2n, we can reduce the min-entropy rate requirement of the source
X to (12 + δ). The construction follows the same outline as above (using (n, s)-encodings from F
2n
p
to Fn̄p ), and the improvement is achieved by using the fact that over alphabet [p], we can construct
(n, n)-spanning sets in Fn̄p with n̄ = n(1 + δ5) (using explicit codes from [GI02]). The output length
of the extractor obtained is λ log n (for any constant λ) and achieves error n−Ω(1). Further the
extractor is strong in the source X.
Improving the Output Length We improve the output length of the above extractor to Ω(n)
when both sources X and Y (on [p]n) have min-entropy at least (12 + δ)n log p. Our construction is
as follows. Let SExt be an explicit strong seeded extractor for linear min-entropy with linear output
length and polynomially small error with seed seed length O(log n), for example from the work of
[GUV09]. Let Z[n] denote the projection of Z to the first n coordinates and let extp denote the
extractor constructed in the previous paragraph (for 2-interleaved sources on [p]2n). Our extractor
is the following function:
extp,long(Z) = SExt(Z[n], extp(Z)).
We sketch the proof of correctness. Without loss of generality, suppose that X has more symbols
in Z[n] than the source Y. Let S ⊆ [n] be the coordinates of X which are in Z[n] and let XS denote
the projection of X to the coordinates indexed by S. Let T ⊂ [n] be the coordinates of Y which
are in Z[n] and let YT denote the projection of Y to the coordinates indexed by T . Further, we
use XS ◦YT to denote Z[n]. Note that, by assumption |S| ≥ n2 and |T | ≤
n
2 . It follows by Lemma
2.3.7 that Y|YT is close to a source with min-entropy > δn log p2 with probability 1− 2
−Ω(n). Also
note that XS has min-entropy ≥ δn log p.
Consider such a good fixing YT = yT . Since X and Y|YT = yT have enough min-entropy,
it follows that even under this fixing, W = extp(Z) is close to uniform. We now use the property
that extp is strong with respect to the source XS , i.e.,
|(XS ,W )− (XS , Ud)| ≤ n−Ω(1).
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Using a probability lemma from [Sha06], it follows that for any W = w,
|XS − (XS |(W = w))| ≤ n−Ω(1),
(using that w is of length O(log n)).
Hence, SExt(XS◦YT ,W )|YT = yT is n−Ω(1)-close to the convex combination:
∑
w Pr[(W |YT =
yT ) = w]SExt(XS ◦YT , w)|YT = yT . Since as observed above, W |YT = yT is n−Ω(1)-close to Ud,
it follows that SExt(XS ◦YT ,W )|YT = yT is n−Ω(1)-close to SExt(XS ◦ yT , Ud). The correctness
now follows using the fact that SExt is a seeded extractor for linear min-entropy.
Probabilistic Method We show in Lemma 10.3.10, that a random set S ⊂ Fn2 of size 2n is an
(n, n− 2
√
n)-spanning set with high probability. Thus, using the proof technique described above,
any explicit construction of such a set will yield explicit extractors for 2-interleaved sources on
{01}2n when one source has min-entropy at least 0.51n and the other source has min-entropy at
least cn
1
2 . We leave it as an interesting open problem to explicitly construct such a set S.3
We give formal proofs of the above extractor constructions and other related constructions
in Section 10.4.
10.2.2 Interleaved Non-Malleable Extractors
For some c > 0 and any δ > 0, let p > 2
c
δ be any prime. Let X be a source on [p]n with min-entropy
k1 and Y be a weak- eed on [p]
n with min-entropy k2. Let f : [p]
n → [p]n be any function with
no fixed points. Thus the non-malleable extractor has access to Z = (X ◦ Y)t for an artitrary
permutation t : [2n]→ [2n]. Let Zf denote the tampered source (X ◦ f(Y))t.
We show that the extractor extp constructed for 2-interleaved sources (described in the
previous section) is also non-malleable. We prove it in the following way. Recall the construction
3This is related to finding explicit constructions of binary erasure list-decodable codes with almost optimal pa-






Zivi, ext1(Z) = enc(Z)
pn̄−1
M , extp(Z) = logg(ext1(Z)),
where S = {v1, . . . , v2n} is an (n, n)-spanning set in Fn̄p , M = poly(n), n̄ = n(1 + δ5) and g is a
generator of the multiplicative subgroup G = {x
2n̄−1
M : x ∈ F∗2n̄}.
Since extp is a distribution on ZM , it follows by a version of the Abelian XOR lemma proved
in [DLWZ14] that to prove non-malleability, it is enough to prove the bound:
|E[ψa(extp(Z))ψb(extp(Zf ))]| ≤ n−Ω(1),
for all additive characters ψa and ψb (of ZM ) such that ψa is nontrivial. When ψb is the trivial
character, the above quantity can be bounded by the fact that extp is an extractor for 2-interleaved
sources. Thus, suppose both ψa and ψb are nontrivial.
It follows that
|E[ψa(extp(Z))ψb(extp(Zf ))]| = |E[χa(enc(Z))χb(enc(Zf ))]|










Z = X′ + Y′, Zf = X






i=j Yjvt(n+j) and f




|E[ψa(extp(Z))ψb(extp(Zf ))]| = |E[χa(X′ + Y′)χb(X′ + f ′(Y′))]|.
Using the work of Dodis et al. [DLWZ14], we can prove the required upper bound on the quantity
on the right hand side if f ′ does not have any fixed points. We indeed show that f ′ has no fixed
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points (by using the fact that L is one-one and f has no fixed points). This completes the proof
sketch. The non-malleable extractor outputs λ log n bits (for any constant λ) and achieves error
n−Ω(1). See Section 10.5 for more details.
Notation
For any permutation t : [n] → [n], define the string w = (s)t ∈ [R]n such that wi = st(i) for
i = 1, . . . , n. Further for any t ⊂ [n], let sT denote the |T | length string that is the projection of s
onto the coordinates indexed by T .
For any x ∈ [p]n1 , y ∈ [p]n2 and disjoint subsets S, T ⊂ [n1 + n2] with |S| = n1, |T | = n2, we define
z = xS ◦ yT such that zS = x and zT = y.
10.3 Constructing Spanning Vectors
A key ingredient in our extractor construction are explicit constructions of spanning vectors. Recall
that a set of vectors S ⊆ F¯̀p is (r, s)-spanning if the span of any r vectors of S has dimension at
least s (see Definition 10.2.1). Our constructions of spanning vectors are simple and are based on
explicit linear codes. Recall that a linear code of block length n, dimension k and distance d over
any field F is a k dimensional subspace over F with the number of zero coordinates of any vector
in this subspace being at most n− d. The relative rate of the code is k/n and the relative distance
is d/n.
We show that the columns of the parity check matrix of any linear code with good erasure
list-decoding radius (defined below) can be used as a spanning set.
Definition 10.3.1 (Erasure List-Decoding Radius [Gur03]). We say that a linear code [n, k, d] code
C over a finite field F is (e, L)-erasure list-decodable if for every for every r ∈ Fn−e and T ⊆ [n] of
size n− e, |{c ∈ C : cT = r}| ≤ L.
We now establish a simple connection between erasure list-decodable codes and spanning
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sets.
Lemma 10.3.2. Let C be a linear [n, k, d] code over a finite field F, which is (e, L)-earasure list-
decodable. Let H be parity check matrix of C, and let S be the set of columns of H. Then S ⊂ Fn−k
is a (r, s)-spanning set of size n, with r = e and s = e− log|F|(L).
Proof. Since C is (e, L)-erasure list-decodable, it follows that the size of the null space of any e
columns of the parity check matrix H is at most L. By the rank-nullity theorem, it follows that
the rank of the sub-matrix of H restricted to these e columns is at least e − log|F|(L). Thus by
definition, the set of columns of H form a (e, e− log|F|(L))-spanning set.
The following lemma relates the minimum distance of a code to its erasure list-decoding
radius, and can be seen as an analogue of the Johnson bound for erasure list-decoding.
Lemma 10.3.3 ([Gur04b]). Let C be a code with block length n and relative distance δ over an alpha-






and L = q(q−1)ε .
Combining the above results, the following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 10.3.4. For any δ > 0, let C be a binary linear code with relative distance 14 + δ, and block
length 2n. Then the columns of the parity check matrix of H form a (r, s)-spanning set, with r = n






Proof. Using Lemma 10.3.3, it follows that C is (n, 1δ )-erasure list-decodable. Now applying Lemma
10.3.2, the lemma follows directly.
A similar result follows for the case of q-ary linear codes.
Lemma 10.3.5. For any δ > 0, let C be a linear code with relative distance q−12q + δ and block
length 2n over a finite field of size q. Then the columns of the parity check matrix of H form a







To instantiate the above results, we recall some explicit code constructions. Using standard
code concatenation, there are known constructions of binary linear codes achieving the Zyablov
bound.
Theorem 10.3.6. For any ε, γ > 0, there exists an explicit construction of a binary linear code






Over larger alphabets, the following explicit codes were constructed in the work of Gu-
ruswami and Indyk [GI02].
Theorem 10.3.7 ([GI02]). There exists c > 0 such that for every γ > 0 and any prime p > 2
c
γ
there is an efficient construction of a linear code C ⊂ Fnp with relative distance δ = 12 −
1
4p and rate
R = 12 − γ.
Using the above codes, we now have explicit constructions of spanning sets.
Lemma 10.3.8. There exist constants γ > 0 and c such that for any n, there exists an explicit
(n, n− c)-spanning set S ⊂ F2n̄ of size 2n, where n̄ = 2n(1− γ).
Proof. Let H be the parity check matrix of the explicit linear code C ⊂ F2n2 from Theorem 10.3.6
for relative distance 14 + δ, for some small constant δ. Let S = {v1, . . . , v2n} be the set of columns
of H. Thus S ⊂ Fn̄2 , n̄ = 2n(1− γ), γ being the relative rate of the code. Applying Lemma 10.3.4,
the result is now immediate.
Lemma 10.3.9. There exists c > 0 such that for any γ > 0 and any prime p > 2
c
γ , there is
an efficient construction of an explicit set (n, n − C)-spanning set S ⊂ F2n̄ of size 2n, where
n̄ = n(1 + 2γ) and C = 2cγ .
Proof. Let H be the parity check matrix of the explicit linear code C ⊂ F2np from Theorem 10.3.7




2 − γ . Let S = {v1, . . . , v2n} be the set of columns of H.
The result now follows by Lemma 10.3.5.
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We show that random sets are (r, s)-spanning sets with overwhelmingly high probability.
Guruswami’s existence proof of subspace evasive [Gur11] targets different parameters and does not
apply here. This lemma is more related to the existence of good erasure list-decodable codes.
Lemma 10.3.10. Let S be a random subset of Fn2 of size 2n. Then,
Pr[S is not a (n, n− 2
√
n)-spanning set ] ≤ 2−n.
Proof. Let t > 0. Consider any subset R ⊂ S, |R| = n. By standard arguments, it follows that



















The lemma follows by setting t = 2
√
n+ 1.
10.4 Extractors for 2-Interleaved Sources
10.4.1 Extractors for 2-Interleaved Sources on {0, 1}2n
Our extractor constructions are based on encoding the interleaved-sources using spanning vectors.
Recall that any (r, s)-encoding from F`p → F
¯̀
p is defined in the following way: For any (r, s)-spanning







is an (r, s)-encoding from F`p → F
¯̀
p.
The following is a key lemma in our extractor constructions.
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Lemma 10.4.1 (Main Lemma). Fix any δ > 0. Let p be any prime and let Z = (X ◦Y)t be any
2-interleaved source on F2np , where X and Y are independent sources on Fnp with min-entropy k1
and k2 respectively, and t : [2n] → [2n] is any permutation. Also suppose χ is any nonprincipal
multiplicative character of F∗pn̄ and enc is an arbitrary (n, s)-encoding from F
2n
p to Fn̄p . Then,
EX|EY[χ(enc(Z))]| ≤ 2−δ(k2−(n−s) log p),
whenever
• k1 ≥ (12 + 3δ)n̄ log p+ (n− s) log p, and
• k2 ≥ 4 log n̄ log pδ + (n− s) log p.

























xivt(i) : x ∼ X, Y′ =
n∑
j=1
yjvt(n+j) : y ∼ Y.
Using Lemma 2.3.12, it follows that: k′1 = H∞(X
′) ≥ k1− (n− s) log p and k′2 = H∞(Y′) ≥


















where the last inequality follows using Theorem 2.5.5.
Using the above main lemma, we construct extractors for 2-interleaved sources on F2n2 .
Theorem 10.4.2. For some δ > 0 and any λ > 0, there exists an explicit function ext : {0, 1}2n →
[M ], M = nλ, such that if X and Y are independent sources on Fn2 with min-entropy k1, k2 respec-
tively satisfying k1 > (1 − δ)n and k2 > 35 max{log n, logM}, t : [2n] → [2n] is any permutation,
then
|ext((X ◦Y)t) ◦X− UM ◦X| = 2−Ω(k2).
Proof. Let H be the parity check matrix of a code C ⊂ F2n2 with relative distance = 14 + δ1 (for
some small constant δ1) and constant rate R, where we fix R as follows. Let RZ be the rate of
the code from Theorem 10.3.6. Let ε1 << RZ be a small constant. We choose R in the interval
[RZ − ε1, RZ ] such that n̄ = 2n(1−R) is divisible by integer m, m = λ log n. Since 2RZε1n >> m,
we can indeed find such an R. Fix M = 2m − 1. We note that M |2n̄ − 1. Set δ = R6 .
Let S = {v1, . . . , v2n} be the set columns of H. By Lemma 10.3.8, S is (n, n−C)-spanning,




M : x ∈ F∗2n̄}.
A generator g of G can be found efficiently in the following way: Using Theorem 2.7.1, we
can efficiently construct a set S = {a1, . . . , al}, l = poly(n), such that one of the ai’s, say aj , is a
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primitive element of F2n̄ . Let S′ = {a
2n̄−1
M
1 , . . . , a
2n̄−1
M
l }. We note that a
2n̄−1
M
j ∈ S′ is an element of
order M . Thus, it is enough to enumerate over the elements in S′ and compute the order of each
element. Since the order of any element in S′ is bounded by M = poly(n), the search procedure
can be implemented efficiently.




zivi, ext1(z) = (enc(z))
2n̄−1
M , ext(z) = logg(ext1(z)).
We note that ext1 and ext are efficiently computable functions. Further note that enc is an
(n, n− C)-encoding from F2n2 to Fn̄2 .
Using the above lemma, we prove the following claim.
Claim 10.4.3. Let ψ(x) = eM (βx), β 6= 0 (mod M), be any nontrivial character of the additive
group ZM .
Then,
EX |EY[ψ(ext2((X ◦Y)t))]| ≤ 2−δk2 .
We note that Theorem 10.4.2 follows directly from Claim 10.4.3 by using Lemma 2.6.1.
Thus it is enough to prove Claim 10.4.3.
Proof of Claim 10.4.3. We have,
ψ(ext(z)) = eM (β logg(ext1(z)))
= χ (enc(z)) ,





EX |EY[ψ(ext2((X ◦Y)t))]| = Ex∼X |Ey∼Y [χ (enc(Z))]|
≤ 2−δk2 ,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 10.4.1.
It is direct from the above theorem, that if we insist that the output of the above extractor
is a bit string, we have the following result.
Theorem 10.4.4 (Theorem 23 restated). For some δ > 0 and any λ > 0, there exists an explicit
function ext : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m, m = λ log n, such that if X, Y are independent sources on Fn2 with
min-entropy k1, k2 respectively satisfying k1 > (1− δ)n and k2 > 35 max{log n,m}, t : [2n] → [2n]
is any permutation, then
|ext((X ◦Y)t) ◦X− Um ◦X| = n−Ω(1).
10.4.2 Extracting from 2-Interleaved Sources on F2np
If the sources X and Y are on Fnp (for some large enough prime p), we can reduce the min-entropy
rate requirement of the source X to about 12 .
Theorem 10.4.5 (Theorem 24 restated). There exists c > 0 such that for any δ, λ > 0 and any
prime p > 2
c
δ , there exists an explicit function extp : F2np → {0, 1}m, m = λ log n, such that if X and
Y are independent sources on Fnp with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively, satisfying k1 > (12 + δ)n log p
and k2 >
5
δ max{log n log p,m}, t : [2n]→ [2n] is any injective map, then
|extp((X ◦Y)t) ◦X− Um ◦X| = n−Ω(1).
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Proof. Let S = {v1, . . . , v2n} be an explicit (n,n-C)-spanning set in Fn̄p from Lemma 10.3.9. Further,
as in the proof of Theorem 10.4.2, we choose the rate of the code in Lemma 10.3.9 such that m|n̄
and m = λ logp n. Thus we can ensure that n̄ ≤ n(1 + δ5).




zivi, ext1(z) = (enc(z))
pn̄−1
M , ext(z) = logg(ext1(z))
where g is a generator of G = {x
pn̄−1
M : x ∈ F∗pn̄}. The proof now follows using Lemma 10.4.1 and
Lemma 2.6.1.
10.4.3 Improving the Output Length
The output length of the extractor in Theorem 10.4.5 is Ω(log n). We improve the output length
to Ω(n) bits when the min-entropy rate of both the sources (on Fnp ) are slightly more than 12 .
A general technique to improve the output length extractors was introduced by Shaltiel
[Sha06]. In particular, Shaltiel showed that the function:
SExt(X, 2ext(X,Y)) ◦ SExt(Y, 2ext(X,Y))
is 2-source extractor with longer output length, where 2ext is a 2-source extractor with short output
length and SExt is a seeded extractor set to appropriate parameters.
However this does not work in our case since it requires access to the individual sources X
and Y. Surprisingly, we show that the construction: SExt(((X ◦Y)t)[n], 2extp((X ◦Y)t)) can be
proved to be an extractor.
Theorem 10.4.6. There exists c > 0 such that for any δ > 0 and any prime p > 2
c
δ , there exists an
explicit function extp,long : F2np → {0, 1}m, m = Ω(n), such that if X and Y are independent sources
on Fnp with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively satisfying k1 > (12 + δ)n log p and k2 > (
1
2 + δ)n log p,
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t : [2n]→ [2n] is any injective map, then
|extp,long((X ◦Y)t)− Um| = n−Ω(1).
Proof. Let SExt be the seeded-extractor from Theorem 2.1.2 with parameters β = δ, α = δ/2 and
ε = n−Ω(1). Let the seed length of SExt with this setting of the parameters be d = λ log n. Let
Z = (X ◦Y)t. Define
extp,long(Z) = SExt(Z[n], extp(Z)),
where extp is the extractor from Theorem 10.4.5 designed to extract from 2-interleaved sources with
one source at min-entropy k1 ≥ (12 + δ)n log p and the other source with min-entropy k2 ≥
δn log p
2
with error εp = n
−2λ and output length mp = λ log n.
Let S = {i ∈ [n] : Zi = Xi} and T = {j ∈ [n] : Zj = Yj}. Also let S̄ = [n] \ S and
T̄ = [n] \ T . Without loss of generality, we can assume that |S| ≥ n2 . It follows from Lemma 2.3.7
that there exists a set Goody such that for any yT ∈ Goody, YT̄ |YT = yT is 2−Ω(n)-close to a source
with entropy more than δn log p2 , and Pr[Yt ∈ Goody] > 1− 2
−Ω(n).
Let yT ∈ Goody. It follows by the setting of extp that
|(extp(Z|YT = yT ) ◦XS − Um ◦XS | ≤ n−2λ.
Using Lemma 2.3.9, it follows that
|XS − (XS |(extp(Z|YT = yT ) = e))| ≤ n−λ+1. (10.1)
Let pyT = Pr[YT = yT ] and let pe|yT = Pr[extp(Z|YT = yT ) = e].
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pyT |SExt(XS ◦ yT , Ud)− Um|
+ n−Ω(1)
= n−Ω(1).
where the last line follows from the fact that XS has min-entropy at least δn log p.
10.4.4 One Bit Extractors for 2-Interleaved Sources on F2np with Exponentially
Small Error
Note that all our extractor constructions so far have polynomially small error if we insist that the
output of the extractor is a bit string. Here we show how to achieve exponentially small error for
2-interleaved sources on Fp, for any large enough prime. However we can output only 1 bit.
Theorem 10.4.7. There exists c > 0 such that for any δ > 0 and any prime p > 2
c
δ , there
exists an explicit function ext1bit : F2np → {0, 1}, such that if X and Y are independent sources on
Fnp with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively, satisfying k1 > (12 + δ)n log p and k2 > (5 log n log p)/δ,
t : [2n]→ [2n] is any injective map, then
|ext1bit((X ◦Y)t) ◦X− U1 ◦X| = 2−Ω(k2).






zivi, ext(z) = QR (enc(z)) ,
where QR is the quadratic character of F∗pn̄ . The proof now follows using Lemma 10.4.1.
10.4.5 Semi-Explicit Extractors for 2-Interleaved Sources with Linear Output
Length and Exponentially Small Error
We note that the extractors constructed so far have either achieved linear output length or ex-
ponentially small error, but not both simultaneously. We show that if we allow the extractors to
run in sub-exponential time, then we can indeed construct such extractors. (Note that the trivial
algorithm to find such an extractor runs in doubly exponential time.) The non-polynomial running
time comes from having to compute the discrete logarithm. To reduce the running time, we can in
fact use a heuristic algorithm for finding discrete logarithm [BGJT14], which runs in time nO(logn)
on fields of small characteristics under plausible assumptions.
Theorem 10.4.8. For some δ > 0, there exists a semi-explicit function ext : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m,
such that if X and Y are independent sources on Fn2 with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively satisfying
k1 > (1− δ)n and k2 > 10δ max{log n,m}, t : [2n]→ [2n] is any permutation, then
|ext((X ◦Y)t) ◦X− Um ◦X| = 2−Ω(k2).
Proof. Let S = {v1, . . . , v2n} be an explicit (n, n−C)-spanning set in Fn̄2 constructed using Lemma
10.3.8. Let m = δk22 . For any z ∈ F
2n




zivi, ext1(z) = logg(enc(z)), ext(z) = ext1(z) (mod 2
m)
where g is a generator of F∗2n̄ . The proof now follows using Lemma 10.4.1 and Lemma 2.6.2.
Using the (n, n−C)-spanning sets from Lemma 10.3.9 to encode the sources, we obtain the
167
following theorem using Lemma 10.4.1.
Theorem 10.4.9. There exists c > 0 such that for any δ > 0 and any prime p > 2
c
δ , there exists
a semi-explicit function ext : F2np → {0, 1}m, such that if X, Y are independent sources on Fnp
with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively satisfying k1 > (
1
2 + δ)n log p and k2 >
5
δ max{log n log p,m},
t : [2n]→ [2n] is any permutation, then
|ext((X ◦Y)t) ◦X− Um ◦X| = 2−Ω(k2).
10.4.6 Extractors for 2-Interleaved Sources with Linear Min-Entropy Under the
Generalized Paley Graph Conjecture
In this section, we show how to construct extractors for sources with linear min-entropy under the
widely believed Generalized Paley Graph Conjecture.
Generalized Paley Graph Conjecture. Let χ be any non-principal multiplicative character of





Assuming the above conjecture, we obtain the following improved version of Lemma 10.4.1.
Lemma 10.4.10. Assume the Generalized Paley graph Conjecture. Fix any δ > 0 and any prime
p. Let Z = (X◦Y)t be any 2-interleaved source on F2np , where X and Y are independent sources on
Fnp with min-entropy k1 and k2 respectively, and t : [2n] → [2n] is any permutation. Also suppose
χ is any nonprincipal multiplicative character of F∗pn̄ and enc is an arbitrary (n, s)-encoding from




• k1 ≥ δn̄ log p+ (n− s) log p, and
• k2 ≥ δn̄ log p+ (n− s) log p.

























xivt(i) : x ∼ X, Y′ =
n∑
j=1
yjvt(n+j) : y ∼ Y.
Using Lemma 2.3.12, it follows that: H∞(X














∣∣EY′ [χ (X′ + Y′)]∣∣
≤ p−γn
where the last inequality follows using the Generalized Paley Graph Conjecture.
Using the above lemma, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 10.4.11. Assume the Generalized Paley Graph Conjecture. For any δ, λ > 0, there
exists an explicit function extconjecture : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m, m = λ log n, such that if X and Y are
independent sources with min-entropy δn each, and t : [2n]→ [2n] is any permutation, then
|extconjecture((X ◦Y)t)− Um| = n−Ω(1).
Proof. Let S = {v1, . . . , v2n} be an explicit (n, n−C)-spanning set in Fn̄p constructed using Lemma
10.3.8. Further, as in the proof of Theorem 10.4.2, we choose the rate of the code in Lemma 10.3.9




zivi, ext1(z) = (enc(z))
pn̄−1
M , ext(z) = logg(ext1(z))
where g is a generator of G = {x
2n̄−1
M : x ∈ F∗2n̄}. The proof now follows using Lemma 10.4.10 and
Lemma 2.6.1.
We note that assuming the above conjecture, the output length of the above extractor can
be improved to Ω(n) if both X and Y have min-entropy rate more than 14 by using the proof
method of Theorem 10.4.6.
10.5 Interleaved Non-Malleable Extractors
In this section, we show that the proof technique developed in constructing extractors for 2-
interleaved sources can be used to construct non-malleable extractors in the interleaved model.
Theorem 10.5.1. There exists λ1 > 0 such that for any δ, λ2 > 0, c > c(δ) and any prime
p > 2
λ1
δ , there exists an explicit function nmExt : F2np → {0, 1}m, m = λ2 log n, such that if X, Y
are independent sources on Fnp with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively, satisfying k1 > (12 + δ)n log p
and k2 > cmax{m, log n}, t : [2n] → [2n] is any injective map and f : Fnp → Fnp is any function
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with no fixed points, then
|nmExt((X ◦Y)t) ◦ nmExt((X ◦ f(Y))t) ◦Y − Um ◦ nmExt((X ◦ f(Y))t) ◦Y| = n−Ω(1).
To prove the above theorem, we recall a character sum estimate of Dodis et al. [DLWZ14].
Theorem 10.5.2. For any δ > 0 and η < 12 , suppose S and T are non-empty subsets of Fq
satisfying |S| > q
1
2
+δ and |T | > max{( 1η )
7
δ , (log q)8}. Let f : Fq → Fq be any arbitrary function






∣∣∣∣∣ < η|S||T |.
Proof of Theorem 10.5.1. We use encoding based on spanning vectors. In particular, let S =
{v1, . . . , v2n} be an explicit (n, n−C)-spanning set in Fn̄p constructed using Lemma 10.3.9. Further,
as in the proof of Theorem 10.4.2, we choose the rate of the code in Lemma 10.3.9 such that m|n̄
and m = λ2 logp n. Let M = n




zivi, ext1(z) = (enc(z))
pn̄−1
M , ext(z) = logg(ext1(z))
where g is a generator of G = {x
pn̄−1
M : x ∈ F∗pn̄}. We prove the following claim.
Claim 10.5.3. Let ψa and ψb be arbitrary characters of the additive group ZM such that ψa is
nontrivial. Then,
Ey∼Y |Ex∼X[ψa(nmExt((X ◦Y)t))ψb(nmExt((X ◦ f(Y))t))]| = n−Ω(1).
Before proving this claim, we note that Theorem 10.5.1 follows directly from Claim 10.5.3
by using Lemma 2.6.3.
Proof of Claim 10.5.3. Let t([n]) = T1 and t([n+1, 2n]) = T2. Since S is (n, n)-spanning, it follows
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that the set {vi : i ∈ T1} consists of linearly independent vectors. Similarly {vj : j ∈ T2} is a set of
linearly independent vectors.
Let ψa(x) = eM (ax), where a 6= 0 (mod M). Also let ψb(x) = eM (bx). If b = 0 (mod M),
the claim follows from Lemma 10.4.1. Thus suppose b 6= 0 (mod M).
We have,



































X′ + f ′(Y′)
)
where f ′ = L ◦ f ◦ L−1 and χb(x) = eM (b logg(x)) is a nonprincipal multiplicative character of F∗pn̄
of order Mgcd(M,b) .
We claim that f ′ has no fixed points. This can be proved in the following way. Suppose
f ′(x) = x for some x. This implies that f(L−1(x)) = L−1(x) and hence f(w) = w for w = L−1(x).
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This contradicts our assumption on f . Thus f ′ has no fixed points.
It now follows from Theorem 10.5.2 that
Ex′∼X′ |Ey′∼Y′ [χa(x′ + y′)χb(x′ + f ′(y′))]| = n−Ω(1).
If we allow the non-malleable extractor to run in sub-exponential time, then using the
proof method of the above theorem, it can be shown that the extractor from Theorem 10.4.9 is
non-malleable. Thus, we have the following result.
Theorem 10.5.4. There exists λ > 0 such that for any δ > 0, c > c(δ) and any prime p > 2
λ
δ ,
there exists a semi-explicit function nmExt : F2np → {0, 1}m, m = Ω(n), such that if X, Y are
independent sources on Fnp with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively, satisfying k1 > (12 + δ)n log p and
k2 > cmax{m, log n}, t : [2n] → [2n] is any permutation and f : Fnp → Fnp is any function with no
fixed points, then
|nmExt((X ◦Y)t) ◦ nmExt((X ◦ f(Y))t) ◦Y − Um ◦ nmExt((X ◦ f(Y))t) ◦Y| = 2−Ω(k2).
We note that under the Generalized Paley Graph Conjecture, we can reduce the min-entropy
requirement of the source X in Theorem 10.5.1 to βn, for any constant β > 0.
10.6 Proof of Theorem 25
We briefly recall some definitions from communication complexity. We refer the reader to [KN97]
for more background. For convenience, we define boolean functions with range {−1, 1} (instead of
{0, 1}).
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Definition 10.6.1. Let f : [p]2n → {−1, 1} be any function. Fix any equi-partition of [2n] into
subsets S, T . For any rectangle R and probability distribution µ on [p]2n, denote
Discµ,RS,T (f) = |Prµ [f(xS , yT ) = 1 and (x, y) ∈ R]− Prµ [f(xS , yT ) = −1 and (x, y) ∈ R]|.
Definition 10.6.2. The discrepancy of f : [p]2n → {−1, 1} with respect to an equi-partition of [2n]









Definition 10.6.3. The maximal-equipartition discrepancy of f : [p]2n → {0, 1} with respect to a








The following theorem provides a method to lower bound randomized best-paritition com-
munication complexity of f using its maximal-equi-partition discrepancy. A proof can be found in
[KN97].
Theorem 10.6.4. For every function f : [p]2n → {−1, 1}, every probability distribution µ on [p]2n










We now prove Theorem 25.
Proof of Theorem 25. We show that the explicit extractor from Theorem 10.4.7 is the required
function. Recall the construction of the extractor.
Let S = {v1, . . . , v2n} be an explicit (n,n-C)-spanning set in Fn̄p constructed using Lemma






zivi, ext(z) = QR (enc(z)) ,
where QR is the quadratic character of F∗pn̄ .
We claim that the randomized best partition discrepancy of ext with error 12 − p
−γn is at
least (14 − δ − γ)n log p.
Let µ be the uniform distribution on [p]2n.













We note that the proof of Theorem 25 is direct from Claim 10.6.5 by using Theorem 10.6.4.
Proof of Claim 10.6.5. Fix any rectangle R = X × Y , for arbitrary subsets X,Y ⊆ [p]n. We use
X to denote the flat distribution supported on the sets X (and similarly ley Y denote the flat




|Ex∈X,y∈Y[QR (enc(xS ◦ yT ))]|
We note that if |X| ≤ p
3n
4 or |Y | ≤ p
3n
4 , the claim follows easily.
Thus suppose |X|, |Y | > p
3n
4 . Define the distribution Z = (X ◦Y)π, where π : [2n] → [2n]
is a permutation defined in the following way: Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} and T = {t1, . . . , tn} such that
s1 ≤ . . . ≤ sn and t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tn. For any i ∈ [n], define π(i) = si and for any j ∈ [n+ 1, 2n], define
π(j) = tj (thus, π([n]) = S and π([n+ 1, 2n]) = T ).
We note that enc is an (n, n)-encoding from F2np → Fn̄p . Thus,
enc(Z) = X′ + Y′,
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where X′ and Y′ are independent sources on Fn̄p with H∞(X′) = log(|X|) and H∞(Y′) = log(|Y |).
Using Theorem 2.5.4, with λ = 1, we have








































































p k1 k2 Output
Length
Error Reference Remarks
2 ≥ (1− β)n ≥ (1− β)n γn,
γ < β
2−Ω(n) [RY11] Not strong
2 ≥ (1− α)n ≥ 35λ log n λ log n n−α Theorem 23 Strong in X
2 ≥ (1− α)n ≥ 35λ log n Output
in ZM ,
M = nλ
2−Ω(k2) Theorem 24 Strong in X
any p > 2
c
δ ≥ (12 +
δ)n log p
≥ c1(δ, λ, p) log n λ log n n−α Theorem
10.4.5
Strong in X
any p > 2
c
δ ≥ (12 +
δ)n log p




any p > 2
c
δ ≥ (12 +
δ)n log p
≥ c2(δ, λ, p) log n 1 bit 2−Ω(k2) Theorem
10.4.7
Strong in X
any p > 2
c
δ ≥ (12 +
δ)n log p
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Table 10.1: Results on Extractors for 2-Interleaved Sources. The setting is as follows: Z = (X◦Y)t
is an arbitrary 2-interleaved source on [p]2n, where X and Y are independent sources on [p]n
(for some prime p) with min-entropy k1 and k2 respectively, and t : [2n] → [2n] is an arbitrary
permutation. Let α be a small enough constant and c a large enough constant. Also let λ > 1 be




1 Cheraghchi and Guruswami [CG14b] introduced seedless non-malleable extractors as a natural
generalization of seeded non-malleable extractors (see Chapter 4 for more details on seeded non-
malleable extractors). They also showed a way to construct non-malleable codes from efficient
constructions of such seedless non-malleable extractors. Informally, non-malleable codes are a
generalization of error-detecting codes to handle a much larger class of tampering functions (rather
than just bit erasure or modification). We refer the reader to Chapter 12 for more details and our
results on non-malleable codes. Thus apart from a natural notion, the applications to non-malleable
codes provides further motivation for explicitly constructing seedless non-malleable extractors.
Definition 11.0.1 (Seedless C-Non-Malleable Extractor). A function nmExt : ({0, 1}n)C →
{0, 1}m is a seedless C-non-malleable extractor for min-entropy k and error ε if it satisfies the
following property: Let X1, . . . ,XC be independent (n, k)-sources and for each i ∈ [C], let fi :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be arbitrary tampering functions, such that at least one fi has no fixed points.
Then,
|nmExt(X1, . . . ,XC), nmExt(f1(X1), . . . , fC(XC))−Um,nmExt(f1(X1), . . . , fC(XC))| < ε.
1parts of this chapter have been previously published [CZ14,CGL16]
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In [CG14b], it was left as an open problem to construct a seedless C-non-malleable extractor
even for k = n, for any C = o(n).
Using the probabilistic method, Cheraghchi and Guruwsami [CG14b] showed the existence
of seedless 2-non-malleable extractor for k = Ω(log n) and ε = 2−Ω(k) with m = Ω(k). However
giving explicit constructions turns out to be tricky, even for k = n, and there were no known
constructions prior to work in this thesis. More specifically, it appears nontrivial to extend existing
constructions of seeded non-malleable extractors when both sources are tampered. For example,
for sources on Fp, the 2-source extractor from Lemma 2.5.4: χ(x + y), where χ is the quadratic
character was shown to be a seeded non-malleable extractor [DLWZ14]. However it fails to work
against tampering functions f(x) = x+ 1 and g(y) = y − 1, even for full entropy.
11.1 Our Results
The results in this chapter are based on joint works with Vipul Goyal, Xin Li, and David Zuckerman
[CZ14,CGL16]. We provide two different constructions of seedless non-malleable extractors, which
rely on very different set of techniques.
Our first construction however requires access to 10 sources but has the advantage the the
output length is Ω(k) and error 2−Ω(n). In fact, as we will see in Chapter 12, we use this extractor
to give the first explicit constructions of non-malleable codes with constant rate. This construction
relies on techniques from the area of additive combinatorics.
Theorem 27. For some δ > 0 there exists a polynomial time construction of a (k, ε)-seedless non-
malleable extractor for 10 independent sources nmExt : ({0, 1}n)10 → {0, 1}m with k = (1 − δ)n,
ε = 2−Ω(n) and m = Ω(k).
We present the proof of Theorem 27 in Section 11.2.
Our second construction resolves the open problem posed by Cheraghchi and Guruswami,
and gives explicit non-malleable extractors for 2 sources. However, the output length of this ex-
tractor is polynomially small. An advantage of this construction is that it generalizes to handle
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multiple tamperings, which yields generalized non-malleable codes. This construction is based on
techniques developed in Chapter 3, and in particular the construction is very similar to the seeded
non-malleable extractor construction in Theorem 1. To present our result in full generality, we
introduce seedless (C, t)-non-malleable extractors.
Definition 11.1.1 (Seedless (C, t)-Non-Malleable Extractor). A function nmExt : ({0, 1}n)C →
{0, 1}m is a seedless C-non-malleable extractor for min-entropy k and error ε if it satisfies the
following property: Let X1, . . . ,XC be independent (n, k)-sources. Further, for each i ∈ [C], j ∈ [t],
let fi,j : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be an arbitrary tampering function, such that for each j ∈ [t], at least
one fi,j has no fixed points. Then,
|nmExt(X1, . . . ,XC), nmExt(f1,1(X1), . . . , f1,C(XC)), . . . ,nmExt(ft,1(X1), . . . , ft,C(XC))
−Um, nmExt(f1,1(X1), . . . , f1,C(XC)), . . . ,nmExt(ft,1(X1), . . . , ft,C(XC))| < ε.
The following is the second main result of this chapter.
Theorem 28. There exists a constant γ > 0 such that for all n > 0 and t ≤ nγ, there exists an
efficient seedless (2, t)-NM extractor at min-entropy n − nγ with error 2−nΩ(1) and output length
m = nΩ(1).
We present the construction in Theorem 28 in Section 11.3.
11.2 An Explicit Seedless Non-Malleable Extractor for 10 Sources
We prove Theorem 27 in this section. We first introduce some tools which are used in our con-
struction.
Notation For a vector v ∈ Fnp , we use ΠS(v) to denote the projection of v to the coordinates
indexed by the elements in S ⊂ [n]. We extend the action of ΠS to sets in the obvious manner. We
use Πi for Π{i}.
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11.2.1 Some Results from Additive Combinatorics
We recall some well known results from additive combinatorics. We refer the reader to the excellent
book by Tao and Vu [TV06] for more details.
Definition 11.2.1. For vectors v, w ∈ Fnp , where v = (v1, . . . , vn) and w = (w1, . . . , wn), we define
v  w = (v1w1, . . . , vnwn)
Definition 11.2.2. For subsets A,B ⊆ Fnp , define the sets :
A+B = {a+ b : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}
AB = {a b : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}
Observation 11.2.3. (F∗p)n is a group under the operation .











Lemma 11.2.6 (Balog-Szemerédi-Gowers lemma [BS94,Gow98]). Let A,B be finite subsets of an
additive group G and let |A|1−ρ1 ≤ |B| ≤ |A|1+ρ1. If cp(A + B) ≥ |A|−(1+ρ2−ρ1), then there exists
subsets A′ ⊆ A, B′ ⊆ B such that |A′| ≥ |A|1−10ρ2, |B′| ≥ |B|1−10ρ2, and |A′ +B′| ≤ |A|1+ρ1+10ρ2.
181
11.2.2 Some Known Extractor Constructions
We recall some known results on multi-source extractors and non-malleable extractors. We recall
a 3-source extractor constructed in [Rao09a].
Theorem 11.2.7 ([Rao09a]). For every n and and constant δ > 0 there exists an explicit function
3ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, m = Ω(n), such that if X1,X2,X3 are independent (n, δn) sources then
|3Ext(X1,X2,X3)− Um| < 2−Ω(n)
Explicit constructions of seeded non-malleable extractors follow from works of [DLWZ14]
and [Li12b]. The output length in [DLWZ14] relies on an unproven but widely believed conjecture
on primes while the output length in [Li12b] is unconditional. Further, either of the non-malleable
extractors from [DLWZ14] or [Li12b] is also a strong 2-source extractor.
Theorem 11.2.8 ([DLWZ14, Li12b]). Let δ > 0 be a constant. For all n, there exists an explicit
function snmExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, m = Ω(n), satisfying: Suppose X,Y are independent
sources on {0, 1}n with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively.
1. If (k1 + k2) ≥ (1 + δ)n, then
|snmExt(X,Y),X−Um,X| < 2−Ω(n), |snmExt(X,Y),Y −Um,Y| < 2−Ω(n)
2. If k1, k2 > (1− δ)n and f is any tampering function with no fixed points, then
|snmExt(X,Y), snmExt(X, f(Y))−Um, snmExt(X, f(Y))| < 2−Ω(n)
11.2.3 A Sum-Product Estimate
We recall a sum-product theorem over prime fields follows from [BKT04,BGK06,Kon03].
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Theorem 11.2.9 (Sum-product over prime fields). Let Fp be any prime field and let A ⊂ Fp be
any non-empty subset such that |A| < p1−δ for some constant δ > 0. Then there exists a constant
τ = τ(δ) > 0, such that
|A+A|+ |A ·A| ≥ |A|1+τ
An analogue of Theorem 11.2.9 over Fp×Fp was proved by Bourgain in [Bou05a]. We extend
this to sets over F4p in the following theorem and use it in our proof of Theorem 3. It is stated in a
convenient way.
Theorem 11.2.10. There exists τ0 > τ1 > 0 such that the following holds: Let A be a subset of
F4p satisfying |A ∩ (F∗p)4| ≥
|A|
2 . Suppose that for any subset A1 ⊆ A satisfying |A1| ≥ p
−τ1 |A|, the
following conditions holds.
1. Π{1,2}(A1) ≥ p1+τ0 and Π{3,4}(A1) ≥ p1+τ0.
2. A1 * P , where P is a 2-dimensional linear subspace of F4p of the form
(a) {(x1, x2, c1x1, c2x2) : x1 ∈ Fp, x2 ∈ Fp} or
(b) {(x1, x2, c2x2, c1x1) : x1 ∈ Fp, x2 ∈ Fp}.
Then there exists a constant τ > 0 (depending on τ0, τ1) such that if |A| < p7/3−τ1, then
|A+A|+ |AA| > pτ |A|
We present the proof of Theorem 11.2.10 in Section 11.2.7. The proof of Theorem 11.2.10
closely follows and extends the arguments in the sum-product estimate over F2p proved by Bourgain.
Definition 11.2.11. We call a set A satisfying the conclusion of Theorem 11.2.10 to be sum-product
friendly. We call a flat distribution sum-product friendly if its support is sum-product friendly.
11.2.4 A Sum-Product Friendly Encoding
Let τ, τ0, τ1 be the constants from Theorem 11.2.10. Let p be any prime satisfying : p
τ0 > 16.
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Define enc : Fp → F2p in the following way.
enc(x) = (x, x4 + x2 + x)
Lemma 11.2.12. Let S1, S2 ⊂ Fp be subsets of size p1−δ, p > 3. Define the distribution
Xf,1,2 = (enc(x1) + enc(x2), enc(f1(x1)) + enc(f2(x2))) : x1 ∼ S1, x2 ∼ S2
where f1, f2 are arbitrary functions.
Then Xf,1,2 is O(p
−δ)-close to a convex combination of at most 4 flat distributions supported
on sets of the form
Ti = {(enc(x1) + enc(x2), enc(f1(x1) + enc(f2(x2))) : (x1, x2) ∈ Gi},
where Gi ⊂ F2p and |Gi| = |Ti| ≥ p2−3δ.
Proof. Let T ⊂ F4p denote the support of Xf,1,2. We partition T into at most 4 parts in the following
way.
For any t ∈ T , let s(t) ⊂ F2p be the set of all (x1, x2) ∈ S1 × S2 such that (enc(x1) +
enc(x2), enc(f1(x1)) + enc(f2(x2))) = t. Let r(x) denote the cardinality of the set s(x).
We claim that for any t ∈ T , 1 ≤ r(x) ≤ 4. The upper bound follows from the following
calculation. Let t = (t1, t2, t3, t4) ∈ F 4p . Thus for any (x1, x2) ∈ s(t), we have
x1 + x2 = t1
x41 + x
2




2 + x2 = t2
Substituting for x2, we have
x41 + (t2 − x1)4 + q(x1, t1, t2) = 0
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where q(x1, t1, t2) has degree at most 2 in x1. Thus x1 must satisfy a polynomial of degree exactly 4.
For each fixing of x1, notice that x2 also gets fixed. Thus r(t) ≤ 4 for all t ∈ T .
For i ∈ [4], we define the sets
Ti = {t ∈ T : r(t) = i}
Thus the Ti’s form a partition of T .
Define sets Gi ⊂ F2p, i ∈ [4], such that for all t ∈ Ti, |Gi ∩ s(t)| = 1. In other words Gi is
constructed by picking exactly one element from s(t) for each t ∈ Ti. Thus |Gi| = |Ti|.
We note that for any t ∈ Ti, Pr[Xf,1,2 = t] = i|S1||S2| and hence





















(enc(x1) + enc(x2), enc(f1(x1)) + enc(f2(x2))) : (x1, x2) ∼ Gi
)
where we set w′i’s as follows. Set w
′
i = 0 for all i such that wi < i · p−δ. Pick a j such that
wj ≥ j · p−δ and set w′j = wj +
∑
i:wi<i·p−δ wi. For the remaining unset w
′
i’s, set it equal to wi.
Lemma 11.2.13. Choose a small δ1 > τ0. Let f1, f2 be functions with maximum pre-image
size bounded by pδ1. Further assume f1 has no fixed points. Define the set A = {enc(x1) +
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enc(x2), enc(f1(x1)) + enc(f2(x2)) : (x1, x2) ∈ G} where G ⊂ F2p is a subset of size at least p1+10δ1.
Then the set A ⊂ F4p is sum-product friendly.
Proof. We begin by noting that p1+9δ1 < |A| << p7/3.
We need the following claim.
Claim 11.2.14. Define the set B = {(enc(y1) + enc(y2), enc(g1(y1)) + enc(g2(y2))) : (y1, y2) ∈ H}
where H ⊂ F2p is a subset of size at least p1+10δ1 and g1, g2 are tampering functions with pre-image
size bounded by pδ1. Then following inequalities hold :
• |B ∩ ({0} × F3p)| ≤ p
• |B ∩ (Fp × {0} × F2p)| ≤ 4.p
• |B ∩ (F2p × {0} × Fp)| ≤ p1+δ1
• |B ∩ (F3p × {0})| ≤ 4p1+δ1
Proof. We have,
B = {(y1 +y2, y41 +y21 +y1 +y42 +y22 +y2, g1(y1)+g2(y2), g1(y1)4 +g1(y1)2 +g1(y1)+g2(y2)4 +
g2(y2)
2 + g2(y2)) : (y1, y2) ∈ H}.
We prove the inequality:
|B ∩ (F3p × {0})| ≤ 4p1+δ1
The other inequalities follow using similar arguments.
Fix y1 to some value in Fp. We note that g2(y2) is the root of a monic degree 4 polynomial
and hence has at most 4 choices. Thus y2 can take at most 4p
δ1 values by using the bound on the
pre-image size of g2. The inequality now follows by observing that y1 can take at most p values.
Using Claim 11.2.14, we have |A ∩ (F∗p)4| ≥ (1− p−7δ1)|A| > 12 |A|.
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Consider any subset A1 ⊆ A such that |A1| ≥ p−τ1 |A|. It follows that there exists G1 ⊆ G
such that
A1 = {(enc(x1) + enc(x2), enc(f1(x1)) + enc(f2(x2))) : (x1, x2) ∈ G1}
Thus |A1| > p1+8δ1 . We also note that |G1| ≥ |A1| > p1+8δ1 .
We note that |Π1,2(A1)| = |A1| > p1+τ0 . Further |Π3,4(A1)| > |A1|p−2δ1 > p1+6δ1 > p1+τ0 .
The final part of the proof is to bound the intersection of A1 with any 2-dimensional linear
space P of the forms specified in Theorem 11.2.10.
Suppose A1 ⊂ P = {(y1, y2, c1y1, c2y2) : y1, y2 ∈ Fp}. Thus we have for all (x1, x2) ∈ G1:
f1(x1) + f2(x2) = c1(x1 + x2)
f1(x1)
4 + f1(x1)
2 + f1(x1) + f2(x2)
4 + f2(x2)









Fix x2 = α such that (x1, α) ∈ G1 for all x1 ∈ S1 ⊂ Fp, |S1| ≥ |G1|p ≥ p
8δ1 . Let f2(α) = β. We thus
have for all x1 ∈ S1,
f1(x1) = c1x1 + c1α− β (11.1)
f1(x1)
4 + f1(x1)
2 + f1(x1) + β




1 + x1 + α
4 + α2 + α) (11.2)
(11.3)
Thus for all x ∈ S1, the following holds:
(c1x1 + c1α− β)4 + (c1x1 + c1α− β)2 + (c1x1 + c1α− β) + β4 + β2 + β
−c2(x41 + x21 + x1 + α4 + α2 + α) = 0 (11.4)
To derive a contradiction, we split it into the following cases.
• c1 6= 0 , c1α− β 6= 0
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In this case notice that the LHS of (11.4) is of degree at least 3 and at most 4 in x1 and hence
can have at most 4 roots, which is a contradiction since |S1| ≥ p8δ1 > 4.
• c1 = 0
In this case we see that from (11.1), f1 is constant on S1 which contradicts the assumption
that f1 has pre-image size at most p
δ1 .
• c1α− β = 0, c1 6= 0







1 + c1x1 + β
4 + β2 + β − c2(x41 + x21 + x1 + α4 + α2 + α) = 0 (11.5)
We see that this is at least a linear equation and at most a degree 4 equation in x1 ( and thus
a contradiction, as argued above) unless c41 = c
2
1 = c1 = c2. Thus c1 = 1 ( since c1 6= 0). But
by (11.1), we then have f1(x1) = x1 for all x1 ∈ S1. This contradicts the fact that f1 has no
fixed points.
This contradicts our assumption that A1 ⊆ {(y1, y2, c1y1, c2y2) : y1, y2 ∈ Fp}.
Now suppose A1 ⊆ P = {(y1, y2, c2y2, c1y1) : y1, y2 ∈ Fp}. We arrive at a contradiction
using similar arguments as above. We have for all (x1, x2) ∈ G1











2 + f1(x1) + f2(x2)
4 + f2(x2)
2 + f2(x2) = c1(x1 + x2)
Fix x2 = α such that (x1, α) ∈ G1 for all x1 ∈ S1 ⊂ Fp, |S1| ≥ |G1||p| ≥ p
8δ1 . Let f2(α) = β. We thus
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1 + x1 + α
4 + α2 + α)− β (11.6)
f1(x1)
4 + f1(x1)
2 + f1(x1) + β
4 + β2 + β = c1(x1 + x2) (11.7)
(11.8)






1 + x1 + α








1 + x1 + α







1 + x1 + α
4 + α2 + α)− β
)
+ β4 + β2 + β − c1(x1 + α) = 0
(11.9)
We note that (11.9) is a degree 16 equation in x1 (and hence a contradiction since p
8δ1 > 16)
unless c2 = 0. But if c2 = 0 then from (11.6) we have f1 is constant on S1 which contradicts our
assumption that f1 has pre-image size at most p
δ1 . This completes our proof that A is sum-product
friendly.
In the following lemmas, we shall abuse notation and for any set A, we will also use A to
denote the flat distribution with support A.
Choose δ1 small enough such that for a sum-product friendly set A of size p
2−5·103δ1 we have
|A + A| + |A  A| > |A|p5·104δ1 . This can be ensured by choosing δ1 = 10−5 · τ , where τ is the
constant from Theorem 11.2.10.
Lemma 11.2.15. Let G1, G2, G3 ⊂ F2p be subsets of size at least p2−δ1. Let f1, . . . , f6 be functions
with pre-image size at most p10δ1. Further assume f1 has no fixed points. For i ∈ [3] define the
sets Ai = {(enc(x2i−1) + enc(x2i), enc(f2i−1(x2i−1)) + enc(f2i(x2i))) : (x2i−1, x2i) ∈ Gi}. Then
A1 A2 +A3 is O(p−δ1)-close to a distribution with min-entropy (2 + 10δ1) log p.
To prove the above lemma, we borrow ideas from [BIW06] and use the proof technique
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developed in their work.
We begin by proving the following lemmas.
Lemma 11.2.16. Let A ⊂ (Fp∗)4, p2−300δ1 ≤ |A| < p2 be such that any subset A′ ⊆ A of size
greater than p2−5·10
3δ1 is sum-product friendly. Supose that for some B ⊂ (F∗p)4, we have |AB| ≤
p2+300δ1, p2−300δ1 ≤ |B| < p2. Then for any C ⊂ (F∗p)4 such that p2−δ1 ≤ |C| < p2, we have
cp(A+ C) ≤ p−(2+12δ1).
Proof. Since |A  B| ≤ p2+300δ1 , using Lemma 11.2.4 we have |A  A| ≤ |A|p2400δ1 . Suppose
there is some set C such that |C| > p2−δ1 and cp(A + C) > p−(2+12δ1). Using Lemma 11.2.6 with
ρ1 = 200δ1 and ρ2 = 220δ1, it follows that there exists sets A
′ ⊆ A, C ′ ⊆ C, |A′ + C ′| ≤ p2+5·103δ1
and |A′|, |C ′| > p2−5·103δ1 . Using Lemma 11.2.4, we get that |A′ + A′| ≤ |A′|p4·104δ1 . We also
have |A′  A′| ≤ |A  A| ≤ |A′|p104δ1 . By our choice of δ1, this contradicts A′ being sum-product
friendly.
Switching the roles of addition and multiplication gives the following.
Lemma 11.2.17. Let A ⊂ (Fp∗)4, p2−300δ1 ≤ |A| < p2 be such that any subset A′ ⊆ A of size
at least p2−5·10
3δ1 is sum-product friendly. Let B ⊂ (F∗p)4 be a set such that |A + B| ≤ p2+300δ1,
p2−300δ1 ≤ |B| < p2. Then for any C ⊂ (F∗p)4 such that p2−δ1 ≤ |C| < p2, we have cp(A  C) ≤
p−(2+12δ1).
We say that a set is plus-friendly if it satisfies the conclusion of Lemma 11.2.16. Similarly
we say that a set is times-friendly if it satisfies the conclusion of Lemma 11.2.17.
Lemma 11.2.18. Let A1 ⊂ F4p be the set defined in Lemma 11.2.15. Then A1 = A+ ∪ A× ∪ A11
such that the following hold:
1. A+ is empty or plus-friendly
2. A× is empty or times-friendly
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3. |A11| ≤ |A1|p−δ1
Proof of Lemma 11.2.18. We start out by replacing A1 by A1 ∩ (F∗p)4. We can do this without loss
of generality since as observed in the proof of Lemma 11.2.13, |A1 ∩ (F∗p)4| > (1 − p−δ1)|A1| and
hence we add the set A1 \ (F∗p)4 to A11.
Note that by Lemma 11.2.13, any subset of A1 of size at least p
2−5·103δ1 is sum-product
friendly. Let A× = A1 and A+ = ∅. We maintain the invariance that A+ is either plus-friendly or
empty. If A× is times-friendly then we are done. Else there exists some B of size at least p
2−δ1
such that cp(A×  B) > p−(2+12δ1). Using Lemma 11.2.6 with ρ1 = 2δ1 and ρ2 = 14δ1, we have
that there exists sets A′ ⊆ A×, B′ ⊆ B, |A′  B′| ≤ p2+284δ1 and |A′|, |B′| ≥ p2−282δ1 . Thus, by
Lemma 11.2.16, A′ is plus-friendly. We remove A′ from A× and add it to A+. Further it can be
proved that unions of disjoint plus-friendly sets are also plus-friendly. We iterate as above till A×
is times-friendly or |A×| ≤ |A1|p−δ1 .
Proof of Lemma 11.2.15. By Lemma 11.2.18 we have A1 = A+ ∪ A× ∪ A′. Using Claim 11.2.14,
we have |A2 ∩ (F∗p)4| > (1 − p−δ1)|A2| and |A3 ∩ (F∗p)4| > (1 − p−δ1)|A3|. Thus A1  A2 + A3 is
O(p−δ1)-close to a convex combination of distributions of the form:
1. A+  a2 +A3, a2 ∈ A2 ∩ (F∗p)4
2. A× A2 + a3, a3 ∈ A3 ∩ (F∗p)4
By Lemma 11.2.16 and Lemma 11.2.17, we thus have that A1  A2 + A3 is O(p−δ1)-close to a
distribution with collision probability at most p−(2+12δ1). Thus by using Lemma 2.3.3, we have
that A1 A2 +A3 is O(p−δ1)-close to a distribution with min-entropy (2 + 10δ1) log p.
Theorem 11.2.19. Let X1, . . . ,X8 be independent sources on Fp with min-entropy (1 − δ) log p.
Let f1, f2, . . . , f8 be arbitrary functions such that at least one of the fi’s has no fixed points. Further
suppose that the pre-image of each fi is bounded by p
10δ. Define the source
Xf,i,j = enc(Xi) + enc(Xj), enc(fi(Xi)) + enc(fj(Xj))
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Then Xf,1,2Xf,3,4+Xf,5,6Xf,7,8 is O(p−δ)-close to a distribution with min-entropy (2+10δ) log p.
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose f1 has no fixed points. For all i ∈ [3], using Lemma
11.2.12 we have that Xf,2i−1,2i is O(p
−δ)-close to a convex combination of at most 4 flat distributions
Aij of the form (enc(x2i−1) + enc(x2i), enc(f1(x2i−1) + enc(f2(x2i))) : (x2i−1, x2i) ∼ Gij where
Gij ⊂ F2p, |Gij | ≥ p2−3δ.
With probability 1 − O(p−δ) over fixing of the sources X7,X8, we have Xf,1,2  Xf,3,4 +
Xf,5,6  xf,7,8 is O(p−δ)-close to a convex combination of at most 43 distributions of the form
A1j1 ·A2j2 +α·A3j3 , α ∈ (F∗p)4. Since f1 has no fixed points, by Lemma 11.2.15 with δ1 = 3δ, we have
that A1j1A2j2 +αA3j3 is O(p−δ)-close to a distribution with min-entropy (2+10δ) log p. Hence,
Xf,1,2 Xf,3,4 + Xf,5,6 Xf,7,8 is O(p−δ)-close to a distribution with min-entropy (2 + 10δ) log p.
11.2.5 Non-malleable extractors for functions with no fixed points
In this section we prove a special case of Theorem 3 where we have a restriction on the fixed points
of the tampering functions. We use this result in the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 11.2.20. There exists a constant δ > 0 such that for every n there exists an explicit
function nmExt : ({0, 1}n)8 × {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m, such that if X1,X2, . . . ,X8 are independent
(n, (1 − δ)n)-sources, X9 an independent (2n, 2(1 − δ)n)-source and f1, f2, . . . , f9 are arbitrary
tampering functions such that there exists j ∈ [8] such that fj has no fixed points, then
|nmExt(X1, . . . ,X9),nmExt(f1(X1), . . . , f9(X9))− Um, nmExt(f1(X1), . . . , f9(X9))| < 2−Ω(n)
Proof. We view each Xi, i ∈ [8], as a source on Fp for a prime p satisfying 2n < p < 2n+1. If
pτ0 ≤ 16, we do a brute-force search for nmExt (in constant time). Thus assume pτ0 > 16.
Let snmExt : {0, 1}2n×{0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m, m = Ω(n), be the seeded non malleable extractor
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from Theorem 11.2.8. Define the functions










nmExt(x1, . . . , x9) = snmExt(ext1(x1, . . . , x8), x9)
We show that nmExt satisfies the conclusion of Theorem 11.2.20.
Let Si ⊂ Fp be the support of the flat source Xi for all i ∈ [8]. Also let S9 ⊂ {0, 1}2n be the
support of X9. We partition each Si into Si0 and Si1 based on the pre-image of fi as follows.
Si0 = {s ∈ Si : |f−1i (s) ∩ Si| ≤ p
20δ}, Si1 = Si \ Si1.
Let Xij be the flat source on Sij for j = 0, 1.
We thus have




wI · |nmExt(X1I(1), . . . ,X9I(9)),nmExt(f1(X1I(1)), . . . , f9(X9I(9)))−









We bound each term in (11.11). In particular we show that
wI · |nmExt(X1I(1), . . . ,X9I(9)),nmExt(f1(X1I(1)), . . . , f9(X9I(9)))−
Um,nmExt(f1(X1I(1)), . . . , f9(X9I(9)))| < 2−Ω(n) (11.12)
for each I ∈ {0, 1}9. Since there are 29(= constant) such terms in (11.11), we get the required
bound on (11.10).
We now prove (11.12). Fix any I ∈ {0, 1}9. The following two cases can occur.
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1. Suppose for some j ∈ [9], |SjI(j)| ≤ p−δ|Sj |. Then wI < p−δ and hence the bound in (11.12)
follows.
2. Thus suppose |SiI(i)| ≥ p−δ|Sj | for all i ∈ [9].
Define the random variables :
W I = ext1(X1I(1), . . . ,X8I(8)), V
I = ext1(f1(X1I(1)), . . . , f8(X8I(8)))
We prove that the following holds.
Pr
v∼VI
[(WI |VI = v) is O(p−δ)-close to a distribution with min-entropy at least 10δ log p] ≥ 1− p−δ
(11.13)
The following two cases arise depending on I.
(a) Suppose I(j) = 0 for all j ∈ [8]. It follows from Theorem 11.2.19 that (WI ,VI) is
p−δ-close to a source with min-entropy (2 + 20δ) log p. Using Lemma 2.3.7, we have that
Pr
v∼VIi
[(WIi |VIi = vi) is O(p−δ)-close to a distribution with min-entropy at least 10δ log p] ≥ 1−p−δ
(b) Suppose there exists some j ∈ [8] such that I(j) = 1. Consider fixing fj(XjI(j)) and all
XiI(i), i ∈ [8] \ {j}. Without loss of generality suppose j = 1.
Under this fixing W I has min-entropy at least 20δ log p unless sources X3I(3),X4I(4) are
fixed such that enc(x3I(3)) + enc(x4I(4)) /∈ (F ∗p )2. But it follows from Claim 11.2.14 that
Pr[enc(X3) + enc(X4) /∈ (F∗p)2] < p−δ. Thus,
Pr
v∼V I
[(W I |V I = v) is O(p−δ)-close to a distribution with min-entropy at least 20δ log p] = 1
This completes the proof of (11.13).
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We continue with the proof of (11.12). For each i ∈ [C ′], define the set
GoodI = {v ∈ support(VI) : (WI |VI = v) is O(p−δ)-close to a distribution with
min-entropy at least 10δ log p}
It follows from (11.13) that Prv∼VI [v ∈ GoodI ] > 1− p−δ.
It follows from Theorem 11.2.8 that snmExt is a strong 2-source extractor for independent
sources on 2n bits with entropies k1, k2 respectively satisfying k1 + k2 ≥ (2 + δ)n.
Thus we have,
|snmExt(W I ,X9I(9)), V I ,X9I(9) − Um, V I ,X9I(9)|
≤ (Pr[VI /∈ GoodI ]) + 2−Ω(n) + p−δ ≤ 2p−δ + 2−Ω(n) = 2−Ω(n)
Since nmExt(f1(X1I(1)), . . . , f9(X9,I(9))) is a deterministic function of the random variables
V I and X9I(9), the bound in (11.12) is now immediate.
11.2.6 Non-malleable extractor for arbitrary functions
We now prove a slightly stronger version of Theorem 28.
Theorem 11.2.21 (Theorem 28 restated, stronger version). There exists a constant δ > 0 such that
for every n there exists an explicit function nmExt : ({0, 1}n)8 × {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m, m = Ω(n),
such that if X1,X2, . . . ,X8 are independent (n, (1−δ)n)-sources, X9 an independent (2n, 2(1−δ)n)-
source and f1, f2, . . . , f9 are arbitrary tampering functions, such that at least one of the fi’s have
no fixed points. Then
|nmExt(X1, . . . ,X9), nmExt(f1(X1), . . . , f9(X9))−Um, nmExt(f1(X1), . . . , f9(X9))| ≤ 2−Ω(n).
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Proof. We view each Xi, i ∈ [8], as a source on Fp for a prime p satisfying 2n < p < 2n+1. We
assume pτ0 > 16 (else we do a constant time brute-force search for nmExt).
Let snmExt : {0, 1}2n×{0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m, m = Ω(n), be the seeded non-malleable extractor
from Theorem 11.2.8.
Define the functions










nmExt(x1, . . . , x9) = snmExt(ext1(x1, . . . , x8), x9)
We need the following claims.
Claim 11.2.22. Let Y1, . . . ,Y8 be sources on Fp with min-entropy (1−2δ)·log p. Then ext1(Y1, . . . ,Y8)
is 2−Ω(n)-close to a source with min-entropy (1− 2δ) · 2 log p.
Proof. We claim that enc(Y1) + enc(Y2) is a source with min-entropy 2(1 − 2δ) log p − 2. This




1 + y1 + y2 + y
2
2 + y2) = (a, b) has at most 4 solutions
in (y1, y2). Also it follows from Claim 11.2.14 that Pr[enc(Y3) + enc(Y4) /∈ (F∗p)2] < p−δ. Thus
ext1(Y1, . . . ,Y8) is p
−δ-close to a source with min-entropy 2(1− 2δ) log p− 2.
Claim 11.2.23. Let Y1, . . . ,Y8 be independent (n, (1 − 2δ)n)-sources and Y9 an independent
(2n, 2(1− 2δ)n)-source . Then
|nmExt(Y1, . . . ,Y9)− Um| < 2−Ω(n)
Proof. Follows directly from Claim 11.2.22 and Theorem 11.2.8.
For each i ∈ [8], let Si ⊂ Fp be the support of the (flat) source Xi. Let S9 ⊂ {0, 1}2n be the
support of X9. We partition each Si into Si0 and Si1 such that fi has no fixed points in Si1. Thus
Si0 = {s ∈ Si : fi(s) = s}, Si1 = Si \ Si0
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Let Xij be the flat source that is supported on Sij , i = 1, .., 9, j = 0, 1. Let f
I
i denote fi with its
domain restricted to the set SiI(i). Thus f
I
i is a function from SiI(i) to Fp.





I ∈ {0, 1}9.
Recall that to prove Theorem 11.2.21, we need to show the following bound.






wI · |nmExt(X1I(1), . . . ,X9I(9)), nmExt(f I1 (X1I(1)), . . . , f I9 (X9I(9)))−
Um,nmExt(f
I




We prove the following claim.
Claim 11.2.24. For every I ∈ {0, 1}9 \ {~0} the following holds:
wI · |nmExt(X1I(1), . . . ,X9I(9)),nmExt(f1(X1I(1)), . . . , f9(X9I(9)))−
Um,nmExt(f
I
1 (X1I(1)), . . . , f
I
9 (X9I(9)))| < 2−Ω(n) (11.16)
We use the above claim to conclude (11.14).
Proof of (11.14) using Claim 11.2.24. Note that there are 29 − 1 terms in RHS of (11.15). Each
term is bounded by 2−Ω(n) using Claim 11.2.24. We can thus bound LHS of (11.14) by 2−Ω(n).
Proof of Claim 11.2.24. Fix some I ∈ {0, 1}9 \ {~0}.
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We split the proof into the following cases.
1. If for some i ∈ [9], |SiI(i)| < p−δ|Si|, then wI < p−δ and hence the bound in (11.16) follows.
2. Thus suppose |SiI(i)| ≥ p−δ|Si| for all i ∈ [9]. We consider the following cases.
(a) Suppose there exists some j ∈ [8] such that I(j) = 1. In this case we use Theorem
11.2.20 to conclude the bound in (11.16).
(b) Suppose for all i ∈ [8], I(i) = 0. We note that I(9) = 1 since I 6= ~0. Thus all f Ii , i ∈ [8],
are the identity functions over their respective domains and f I9 has no fixed points.
Using Claim 11.2.22, we have ext1(X1I(1), . . . ,X8I(8)) is 2
−Ω(n)-close to a source Z with
min-entropy (1− 2δ) · 2n.
Define the random variable: WI = ext1(X1I(1), . . . ,X8I(8)).
Thus we have
|nmExt(X1I(1), . . . ,X9I(9)),nmExt(f1(X1I(1)), . . . , f9(X9I(9)))
−Um,nmExt(f1(X1I(1)), . . . , f9(X9I(9)))|
= |snmExt(W I ,X9I(9)), snmExt(W I , f I9 (X9I(9)))−Um, snmExt(W I , f I9 (X9I(9)))|
≤ |snmExt(Z,X9I(9)), snmExt(Z, f I9 (X9I(9)))−Um, snmExt(Z, f I9 (X9I(9)))|+ 2−Ω(n)
Note that Z and X9I(9) are independent sources on {0, 1}2n, each with min-entropy rate
> (1− 2δ) and f I9 has no fixed points. Thus by Theorem 11.2.8, we have
|snmExt(Z,X9I(9)), snmExt(Z, f I9 (X9I(9)))− Um, snmExt(Z, f I9 (X9I(9)))| ≤ 2−Ω(n)
Thus, the bound in (11.16) follows.
This completes the proof of Claim 11.2.24.
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11.2.7 Proof of the sum-product estimate over F4p
We closely follow the proof of the sum-product estimate by Bourgain in [Bou05a] and prove Theorem
11.2.10, which we restate.
Theorem 1.9. There exists τ0 > τ1 > 0 such that the following holds: Let A be a subset of F4p
satisfying |A ∩ (F∗p)4| ≥
|A|
2 . Suppose that for any subset A1 ⊆ A satisfying |A1| ≥ p
−τ1 |A|, the
following conditions holds.
1. Π{1,2}(A1) ≥ p1+τ0and Π{3,4}(A1) ≥ p1+τ0.
2. A1 * P , where P is a 2-dimensional linear subspace of F4p of form
(a) {(x1, x2, c1x1, c2x2) : x1 ∈ Fp, x2 ∈ Fp} or
(b) {(x1, x2, c2x2, c1x1) : x1 ∈ Fp, x2 ∈ Fp}.
Then there exists some constant τ > 0 (depending on τ0, τ1) such that if |A| < p7/3−τ1, then
|A+A|+ |AA| > pτ |A|
We introduce some notations.
Definition 11.2.25. Let S ⊆ Fnp be any set of vectors. Define S2 = SS and S(k+1) = SkS
for k ≥ 2.
We prove Theorem 11.2.10 using the following lemmas.
Lemma 11.2.26. Let B be any subset of F4p such that |Π{1,2}(B)| ≥ p1+τ0 and |Π{3,4}(B)| ≥ p1+τ0.
Then one of the following holds.
1. There exists constant k = k(τ0) such that |kBk| ≥ p7/3 or
2. B ⊆ P where P is a 2-dimensional linear subspace of F4p of the form
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(a) {(x1, x2, c1x1, c2x2) : x1 ∈ Fp, x2 ∈ Fp} or
(b) {(x1, x2, c2x2, c1x1) : x1 ∈ Fp, x2 ∈ Fp}.
Lemma 11.2.27. Let B ⊂ (F∗p)4 such that |B| ≥ p1+τ0 and |B + B| + |B  B| ≤ pτ |B|. Fix any
k > 0. Then, there is a subset B1 of B such that
1. |B1| ≥ p−τ1 |B| and
2. |kBk1 | ≤ pτ1 |B1|
where τ1 = p
3k2τ .
Proof of Theorem 11.2.10. We replace A with its intersection with (F∗p)4. Choose τ small enough
such for k = k(τ0) (where k(τ0) is the constant from Lemma 11.2.26), it holds that: p
3k2τ <
τ1. Suppose that |A + A| + |A  A| ≤ pτ |A|. Using Lemma 11.2.27, there exists a subset A1,
|A1| ≥ p−τ1 |A|, such that |kAk1 | ≤ |A|pτ1 . Further, we have that A1 satisfies the hypothesis
of Lemma 11.2.26. Suppose, conclusion (1) of Lemma 11.2.26 holds. This implies that |A| ≥
p7/3−τ1 which contradicts our assumption on the size of A. Further, from the assumptions on the
structure of A1, we see that conclusion (2) in Lemma 11.2.26 cannot hold. Thus, it must be that
|A+A|+ |AA| > pτ |A|.
Lemma 11.2.27 follows directly from Lemma 4 in [Bou05a] by noticing that their proof works
over (F∗p)4 as well. Hence we do not present the proof of Lemma 11.2.27.
Thus we focus on proving Lemma 11.2.26.
We require the following lemma which was proved by Bourgain [Bou05a].
Lemma 11.2.28. For any B ⊆ F2p such that |B| ≥ p1+τ0 there exists a constant k = k(τ0) such
that |kBk| = p2.
We now proceed to prove Lemma 11.2.26.
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Proof of Lemma 11.2.26. Let Bij denote Π{i,j}(B). Using Lemma 11.2.28, there exists some k0
such that |kBk12 | = p2, |kB
k
34 | = p2 for k ≥ k0. We split the proof into two cases.
1. Suppose there exists some k ≥ k0 such that |kBk| > p2.
Thus, it must be the case that the projection map Π{1,2} is not one-one on kB
k. Thus there
exists b, b′ ∈ kBk such that Π{1,2}(b) = Π{1,2}(b′) but Π{3,4}(b) 6= Π{3,4}(b′). Consider the
set
kBk − (b− b′)kBk = {
(
x1, x2, x3 − (b3 − b′3)y3, x4 − (b4 − b′4)y4
)
:
(x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ kBk, (y1, y2, y3, y4) ∈ kBk}
Notice that (x1, x2) takes all values of F2p since |Π{1,2}(kBk)| = p2. Similarly (y3, y4) takes
all values of Fp×Fp since |Π{3,4}(kBk)| = p2. Further, at least one of (b3− b′3) or (b4− b′4) is
non zero. Without loss of generality, suppose b3 − b′3 6= 0. Then, for any fixing of x ∈ kBk,
Π3(x− (b− b′)kBk) = Fp and hence |kBk − (b− b′)kBk| ≥ p3.
We observe that
kBk − (b− b′)kBk ⊆ kBk − (kBk − kBk)kBk ⊆ k′Bk′ − k′Bk′
, where k′ = 3k2. Using Lemma 11.2.5 with A = k′Bk
′
and recalling that |k′Bk′ | > p2, we
have
|k′Bk′ + k′Bk′ | ≥
(
|k′Bk′ − k′Bk′ ||k′Bk′ |2
)1/3
> (p3p4)1/3 = p7/3
Setting a new k = 2k′, we have |kBk| ≥ p7/3.
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2. Suppose |kBk| = p2 for all k ≥ k0. Thus in particular we have
|k0Bk0 + k0Bk0 | = |k0Bk0 |
and
|k0Bk0  k0Bk0 | = |k0Bk0 |
Thus k0B
k0 must be a 2-dimensional affine subspace of F4p.
Let k0B
k0 = {z + λv + µw : λ, µ ∈ Fp}, z, v, w ∈ F4p . To complete the argument, we prove
the following claims about the structure of z, v, w.
Claim 11.2.29. We can assume v = (1, 0, α1, α2) and w = (0, 1, β1, β2) such that
span{(α1, α2), (β1, β2)} = F2p
Proof. The proof follows from the observation that Π{1,2}(k0B
k0) = Π{3,4}(k0B
k0) = F2p.
Claim 11.2.30. Let v = (1, 0, α1, α2) and w = (0, 1, β1, β2). Then αiβi = 0 for i ∈ [2].
Further z = 0.
We show how to complete the proof of Lemma 11.2.26, before proving the above claim.
Proof of Lemma 11.2.26 using Claim 11.2.29 and Claim 11.2.30. Since we have α1β1 = 0,
suppose α1 = 0. It follows from Claim 11.2.29 and Claim 11.2.30 that β1 6= 0, α2 6= 0 and
β2 = 0.
Thus k0B
k0 = {z + λv + µw : λ, µ ∈ Fp} = {(λ, µ, β1µ, α2λ) : λ, µ ∈ Fp}.
Fix any y = (y1, y2, y3, y4) ∈ k0B(k0−1) ∩ (F∗p)4. Note that there exists such a y since
B ∩ (F∗p)4 6= ∅ and k0Bk0 ∩ (F∗p)4 6= ∅.
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For any x = (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ B, since x y ∈ k0Bk0 = {(λ, µ, β1µ, α2λ) : λ, µ ∈ Fp}, there
exists λ, µ such that the following relations hold :
x4 = y
−1




B ⊆ {(x1, x2, c2x2, c1x1) : x1, x2 ∈ Fp}
where c1 = y
−1
4 α2y1, c2 = y
−1
3 β1y2.
For the case when α1 6= 0 (and hence β1 = 0), we use an identical argument to derive that
B ⊆ {(x1, x2, c1x1, c2x2 : x1, x2) ∈ Fp}.
We conclude by proving Claim 11.2.30.
Proof of Claim 11.2.30. Let S = (k0B
k0) (k0Bk0). Recall that k0Bk0 = {z + λv + µw :
λ, µ ∈ Fp} where v = (1, 0, α1, α2), w = (0, 1, β1, β2) and |S| = |k0Bk0 | = p2. Thus for each
i ∈ [4],
Πi(S) = {πi(λ1, λ2, µ1, µ2) : λ1, λ2, µ1, µ2 ∈ Fp}
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where
π1(λ1, λ2, µ1, µ2) = π1(λ1, λ2) = (z1 + λ1)(z1 + λ2)
= λ1λ2 + (λ1 + λ2)z1 + z
2
1
π2(λ1, λ2, µ1, µ2) = π2(µ1, µ2) = (z2 + µ1)(z2 + µ2)
= µ1µ2 + (µ1 + µ2)z2 + z
2
2





1 + α1β1(λ1µ2 + λ2µ1)+
(λ1 + λ2)α1z3 + (µ1 + µ2)β1z3 + z
2
3





2 + α2β2(λ1µ2 + λ2µ1)+
(λ1 + λ2)α2z4 + (µ1 + µ2)β2z4 + z
2
4
• We prove αiβi = 0, for i = 1, 2. Suppose not. Let α1β1 6= 0.
Fix λ2 = a2 6= −z1 and let λ1 = a1 6= λ2 and let π1(a1, a2) = a. Note that π1(a1, a2) =
π(b1, a2) iff a1 = b1. Thus |{π1(x, a2) : x ∈ Fp \ {a2}}| = p− 1.
We claim that for any such fixing of λ1 = a1, λ2 = a2, there exists µ1, µ2 such that
π2(µ1, µ2) = b and π3(a1, a2, µ1, µ2) = c for at least O(p
2) pairs (b, c) ∈ F2p. Suppose
π2(µ1, µ2) = µ1µ2 + (µ1 + µ2)z2 + z
2
2 = b
π3(a1, a2, µ1, µ2) = β
2
1µ1µ2 + γ1µ1 + γ2µ2 + γ3 = c
where γ1, γ2, γ3 ∈ Fp are constants ( does not depend on µ1, µ2) . By our choice of λ1, λ2,
we have that γ1 6= γ2 and hence the above system of equations has at most two pairs
of values of (µ1, µ2) which satisfy it. Since (µ1, µ2) takes p
2 values, there at least p2/2
distinct pairs (b, c) such that there (π2(µ1, µ2), π3(λ1, λ2, µ1, µ2)) = (b, c).
Thus we have shown that there exists λ1, λ2, µ1, µ2 such that (π1(λ1, λ2), π2(µ1, µ2), π3(λ1, λ2, µ1, µ2)) =
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(a, b, c) for at least 12(p− 1)p
2 distinct tuples (a, b, c) ∈ F3p, which is a contradiction since
|S| = p2. Thus α1β1 = 0. A similar argument implies that α2β2 = 0.
• We now prove z = 0. Suppose α1 = 0. Thus β1 6= 0, α2 6= 0 and β2 = 0. We again fix
λ2 = a2 6= −z1 and let λ1 = a1 6= λ2. Let (b, c) ∈ F2p. We bound the number of (µ1, µ2)
such that (π2(µ1, µ2), π3(a1, a2, µ1, µ2) = (b, c). We have the following equations.
µ1µ2 + (µ1 + µ2)z2 + z
2
2 = b
β21µ1µ2 + β1z3(µ1 + µ2) + γ0 = c
We see that the number of solutions of the above pair of equations is bounded by 2
unless z3 = β1z1. It follows that if z3 6= β1z2, there exists (λ1, λ2, µ1, µ2) such that




(a, b, c) ∈ F3p, which is a contradiction. Thus suppose z3 = β1z2.
Using an identical argument (but now fixing µ1, µ2 appropriately in π2 and arguing
about the range of π1 and π4 upon varying λ1, λ2), we get that z4 = α2z1. Thus
z = (z1, z2, β1z2, α2z1) = z1 · (1, 0, 0, α2) + z2 · (0, 1, β1, 0) = z1 · v + z2 · w ∈ span{v, w}.
Hence we can take z = 0.
11.3 An Explict Seedless (2, t)-Non-Malleable Extractor Construc-
tion
The result in this section is based on [CGL16]. The extractor construction is similar to the seeded
t-non-malleable in Section 4.3. Thus, we present the construction and omit the proof.
Subroutines and Parameters
1. Let γ be a small enough constant and C a large one. Let t = nγ/C .
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2. Let n1 = n
β1 , β1 = 10γ. Let IP : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2 , n2 = n110 , be the strong
two-source extractor from Theorem 2.5.3.
3. Let C be an explicit [nα , n,
1




α . Such explicit codes are known, for example from the work of Alon et al. [ABN+92].





be the sampler from Theorem 2.4.2. Let the number of samples
tSamp = n
β2 . Thus, β2 ≤ β1.
5. Let ` = 2(nβ1 + nβ2). Thus ` ≤ n11γ .
6. We set up the parameters for the components used by flip-flop (computed by Algorithm 1)
as follows.
(a) Let n3 = n
β3 , n4 = n
β4 , with β3 = 100γ and β4 = 50γ.
Let Extq : {0, 1}n3 × {0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n4 be the strong seeded linear extractor from
Theorem 2.1.5 set to extract from min-entropy kq =
n3
4 with error ε = 2
−Ω(nγq ), γq =
β4
2 .







Let Extw : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n4 be the strong linear seeded extractor from
Theorem 2.1.5 set to extract from min-entropy kw =
n
2 with error ε = 2
−Ω(nγq ).
(b) Let laExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n3 → {0, 1}2n4 be the look ahead extractor used by 2laExt
(recall that the parameters in the alternating extraction protocol are set as m = n4, u =
2 where u is the number of steps in the protocol, m is the length of each random
variable that is communicated between the players, and Extq,Extw are the strong seeded
extractors used in the protocol.).
(c) Let Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n3 be the linear strong seeded extractor from Theorem
2.1.5 set to extract from min-entropy n2 with seed length n4 and error 2
−Ω(nβ4/2).




Input: Bit strings x, y, each of length n.
Output: A bit string of length n4.
1 Let x1 = Slice(x, n1), y1 = Slice(y, n1). Compute v = IP(x, y).
2 Compute T = Samp(v) ⊂ [nα ].
3 Let z = x1 ◦ x2 ◦ y1 ◦ y2 where x2 = (E(x)){T}, y2 = (E(y)){T}.
4 Output ACB(x, y, z).
By following along the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, it is easy to obtain the following result.
Theorem 11.3.1. Let nmExt be the function computed by Algorithm 3. Then nmExt is a seedless






1 Error-correcting codes encode a message m into a longer codeword c enabling recovery of m even
after part of c is corrupted. We can view this corruption as a tampering function f acting on
the codeword, where f is from some small allowable family F of tampering functions. The strict
requirement of retrieving the encoded message m imposes restrictions on the kind of tampering
functions that can be handled. Unique decoding is limited by the minimum distance of the code-
word, and various bounds are known in the case of list decoding. Hence, many natural classes of
tampering functions cannot be handled in this framework.
One might hope to achieve a weaker goal of only detecting errors, possibly with high prob-
ability. Cramer et al. [CDF+08] constructed one such class of error-detecting codes, known as
Algebraic Manipulation Detection codes (AMD codes), where the allowable tampering functions
consist of all functions of the form fa(x) = a+x. However error detection is impossible with respect
to the family of constant functions. This follows since one cannot hope to detect errors against a
function that always outputs some fixed codeword.
Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [DPW10] introduced non-malleable codes as a natural
generalization of error-detecting codes. Informally, a non-malleable code with respect to a tam-
1parts of this chapter have been previously published [CZ14,CGL16]
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pering function family F is equipped with a randomized encoder Enc and a deterministic decoder
Dec such that Dec(Enc(m)) = m and for any tampering function f ∈ F the following holds: for
any message m, Dec(f(Enc(m))) is either the message m or is ε-close (in statistical distance) to a
distribution Df independent of m. The parameter ε is called the error.
We now formally define non-malleable codes. We need to define the following function.
copy(x, y) =

x if x 6= same?
y if x = same?
copy(t)((x1, . . . , xt), (y1, . . . , yt)) = (copy(x1, y1), . . . , copy(xt, yt))
Definition 12.0.1 (Coding schemes). Let Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n and Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k∪{⊥}
be functions such that Enc is a randomized function (i.e. it has access to a private randomness)
and Dec is a deterministic function. We say that (Enc,Dec) is a coding scheme with block length n
and message length k if for all s ∈ {0, 1}k, Pr[Dec(Enc(s)) = s] = 1 (the probability is over the
randomness in Enc).
Let Fn denote the set of all functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings.
Definition 12.0.2 (Non-malleable codes). A coding scheme (Enc,Dec) with block length n and
message length k is a non-malleable code with respect to a family of tampering functions F ⊂ Fn
and error ε if for every f ∈ F there exists a random variable Df on {0, 1}k ∪ {same?} which is
independent of the randomness in Enc such that for all messages s ∈ {0, 1}k, it holds that
|Dec(f(Enc(s)))− copy(Df , s)| ≤ ε
The rate of a non-malleable code C is given by kn .
As an easy example, suppose the tampering function family at hand is Fconstant, consisting
of all constant functions, fc(x) = c for all x. We can use any coding scheme and for any tampering
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function fc ∈ Fconstant, we may take Dfc to be Dec(c) with probability 1.
Note that there cannot exist a code with block length n which is non-malleable with respect
to Fn (recall this is family of all functions from n bits to n bits). This follows since the tampering
function could then use the function Dec to decode the message m, get a message m′ by flipping
all the bits in m, and use the encoding function to pick any codeword in Enc(m′).
Therefore, it is natural to restrict the size of the family of tampering functions. It follows
from the works in [DPW10, CG14a] that there exists non-malleable codes with respect to any
tampering function family of size bounded by 22
δn
with rate close to 1− δ and error 2−Ω(n), for any
constant δ > 0. The bounds obtained in these works are existential, and some progress has been
made since then in giving explicit constructions against useful classes of tampering functions.
12.0.1 Non-malleable Codes in the Split-State Model
An important and well studied family of tampering functions (which is also relevant to the current
work) is the family of tampering functions in the C-split-state model, for C ≥ 2. In this model,
each tampering function f is of the form (f1, . . . , fC) where fi ∈ Fn/C , and for any codeword
x = (x1, . . . , xC) ∈ ({0, 1}n/C)C we define (f1, . . . , fC)(x1, . . . , xC) = (f1(x1), . . . , fC(xC)). Thus
each fi independently tampers a fixed partition of the codeword. Non-malleable codes in this model
can also be viewed as non-malleable secret sharing. This is because the strings (x1, . . . , xC) can be
seen as the shares of s and tampering each share individually does not allow one to “maul” the
shared secret s.
There has been a lot of recent work on constructing explicit and efficient non malleable codes
in the C-split-state model. Since C = 1 includes all of Fn, the best one can hope for is C = 2. A
Monte-Carlo construction of non-malleable codes in this model was given in the original paper on
non-malleable codes [DPW10] for C = 2 and then improved in [CG14a]. However, both of these
constructions are inefficient. For C = 2, these Monte-Carlo constructions imply existence of codes
of rate close to 12 and corresponds to the hardest case. On the other extreme, when C = n, it
corresponds to the case of bit tampering where each function fi acts independently on a particular
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bit of the codeword.
The best known explicit construction of non-malleable codes in the C-split-state model for
the case when C = 2 is due to the work of Aggarwal, Dodis and Lovett [ADL14], who construct a
code with rate = Ω(n−6/7) and error = 2−Ω(n
−1/7). Their proof of non-malleability uses methods
from additive combinatorics. The drawback of this construction is the polynomially small rate of
the code.
12.0.2 Our Result
The results in this chapter are based on joint works with Vipul Goyal, Xin Li, and David Zuckerman
[CZ14,CGL16].
Our main result on non-malleable codes is for the model of C-split-state adversaries when
C = 10. We give explicit constructions of non-malleable codes in this model with rate = Ω(1) and
error = 2−Ω(n). In particular, we have the following result.
Theorem 29. For all n > 0 there exists an explicit construction of efficient non-malleable codes
on {0, 1}n in the 10-split-state model with constant rate and error = 2−Ω(n).
We note that the best known non-malleable code in the O(1)-split-state prior to this work
was the non-malleable code in the 2-split-state model from [ADL14], which as mentioned above,
has rate Ω(n−6/7) and error is 2−Ω(n
−1/7). Thus we give the first explicit construction of constant
rate non-malleable codes in the split-state model for a fixed integer C that do not rely on any
unproven assumptions; in fact, this is the first for C = o(n). We further obtain optimal error.
For the case of bit tampering (C = n), the best known explicit constructions of non-malleable
codes were given in the work of [CG14b] with rate = (1−o(1)) and error = 2−Ω(n−1/7). We improve
upon the error and obtain the following result.
Theorem 30. For all n > 0 there exists an explicit construction of efficient non-malleable codes
on {0, 1}n in the bit tampering model with rate = (1− o(1)) and error = 2−Ω(n).
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We obtain Theorem 30 from the following observation. The construction against bit tam-
pering in [CG14b] uses a possibly sub-optimal rate non-malleable code against bit-tampering in
its construction and shows a way to improve the rate to (1 − o(1)) while maintaining the error
bound. The sub-optimal rate non-malleable code used was the code from [ADL14] which resulted
in the sub-optimal error bound of 2−Ω(n
−1/7). By plugging in our non-malleable code construction
from Theorem 29 as the sub-optimal non-malleable code in the construction of [CG14b], we deduce
Theorem 30.
Subsequent Work: Aggarwal et al. [ADKO15] constructed explicit non-malleable codes
in the 2-split model with constant rate and optimal error. A crucial part of their contruction is our
10-split-state non-malleable code from Theorem 29.
Other Results on Non-Malleable Codes Apart from the previous work stated above,
there has been other work in constructing non-malleable codes. However they did not improve the
parameters achieved in [ADL14] in the C-split model for C = o(n). Before the work of [ADL14],
the only unconditional efficient non-malleable code in the C-split-state model, for C = o(n), was by
Dziembowski, Kazana, and Obremski [DKO13]. However, they could encode only 1 bit messages.
In the model of global tampering, Agrawal et al. [AGM+14] constructed efficient non-
malleable codes with rate 1 − o(1) against the family of permutations. There were also some
conditional results. Liu and Lysyanskaya [LL12] constructed efficient constant rate non-malleable
codes in the split-state model against computationally bounded adversaries. Their proof of non-
malleability relies on the existence of robust public-key cryptosystems and existence of robust
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems for some language in NP. They also use the common
reference string (CRS) assumption which roughly states that one has access to an untampered
random string. The work of Faust et al. [FMVW13] constructed almost optimal non-malleable
codes against the class of polynomial sized circuits in the CRS framework. [CCP12, CCFP11,
CKM11,FMNV14] considered non-malleable codes in other models.
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12.1 Multi-Tampered Non-Malleable Codes
We introduce the notion of non-malleable codes that can handle multiple tamperings in the infor-
mation theoretic setting.
Definition 12.1.1 (One-Many Non-malleable codes). A coding scheme (Enc,Dec) with block length
n and message length k is a non-malleable code with respect to a family of tampering functions
F ⊂ (Fn)t and error ε if for every (f1, . . . ft) ∈ F , there exists a random variable D~f on ({0, 1}
k ∪
{same?})t which is independent of the randomness in Enc such that for all messages s ∈ {0, 1}k,
it holds that
|(Dec(f1(X)), . . . ,Dec(ft(X)))− copy(t)(D~f , s)| ≤ ε
where X = Enc(s). We refer to t as the tampering degree of the non-malleable code.
Thus one-many non-malleable codes is a natural more robust version of the well studied
notion of non-malleable codes, and can be used in all applications of non-malleable codes in tamper-
resilient cryptography with this stronger form of security.
An expert in cryptography by now would have noticed this is analogous to the well studied
notion of one-many non-malleable commitments [PR08]. Even though both notions deal with
related concerns, we note non-malleable codes and non-malleable commitment are fundamentally
different objects with the latter necessarily based on complexity assumptions. To start with, we
prove a simple impossibility result for one-many non-malleable codes (whereas for one-many non-
malleable commitments, a corresponding positive result is known [PR08]).
Lemma 12.1.2. One-many non-malleable codes which work for any arbitrary tampering degree
and ε < 1/4 cannot exist for a large class of tampering functions.
Proof. The class of tampering functions which we consider are the ones where each function is
allowed to read any one bit Xi of its choice from the input code X, and output a fresh encoding
of Xi. Most natural tampering functions (including split state ones [DPW10, CG14a]) considered
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in the literature fall into this class. Assume that the encoded value s has at least 4 possibilities
(length 2 bits or higher). The case of a single bit s is discussed later.
Recall that n is the length of the code. We set t = n. Let X = Enc(s) be the input codeword
where s is chosen at random. We consider n tampering functions where Fi simply reads Xi and
outputs a fresh encoding Wi = Enc(Xi). Now consider (Dec(f1(X)), . . . ,Dec(fn(X))). Observe
that this is exactly the bits of the string X. If the distinguisher applies the decode procedure on
X, it will recover s. Now consider any possible output (d1, . . . , dn) of D~f . Now note that there
cannot exist di which is same
?. This is because otherwise it will be replaced by s (see Definition
12.1.1) which is at least 2 bits while Dec(Wi) is just a single bit. This in turn implies that the value
copy(D~f , s) (from Definition 12.1.1) is independent of s and X. Thus a distinguisher (given access
to s) can easily have an advantage exceeding ε.
For a single bit s, we modify our tampering functions to encode two bits: Wi = Enc(Xi||0).
Then again we can argue that neither of di will be same
? since then it will be replaced by s which is
only one bit. This in turn again implies that copy(D~f , s) is independent of s and X. This concludes
the proof.
We also introduce a natural generalization which we call many-many non-malleable codes.
This refers to the situation where the adversary is given multiple codewords as input.
Definition 12.1.3 (Many-Many Non-malleable codes). A coding scheme (Enc,Dec) with block
length n and message length k is a non-malleable code with respect to a family of tampering functions
F ⊂ (Fn)t and error ε if for every (f1, . . . ft) ∈ F , there exists a random variable D~f on ({0, 1}
k ∪
{same?i}i∈[u])t which is independent of the randomness in Enc such that for all vector of messages
(s1, . . . , su), si ∈ {0, 1}k, it holds that
|(Dec(f1(~X)), . . . ,Dec(ft(~X)))− copy(D~f , (s1, . . . , su))| ≤ ε
Where Xi = Enc(si) and ~X = (X1, . . . , Xu)
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The following lemma relates one-many non-malleable codes to many-many non-malleable
codes. This lemma is analogous to a similar lemma for non-malleable commitments [PR08].
Lemma 12.1.4. One-many non-malleable codes with tampering degree t and error ε are also many-
many non-malleable codes for tampering degree t and error uε (where u is as in Definition 12.1.3).
Proof. This proof relies on a simple hybrid argument and the fact that all sources X1, . . . ,Xu
are independent. We only provide a proof sketch here. Assume towards contradiction that there
exists a one-many code with error ε, which, under the many-many tampering adversary has error
higher than u.ε. That is, the adversary ~(f) is given as input (X1, . . . ,Xu) which are encodings of
(s1, . . . , su) respectively. This is referred to as the hybrid 0. Now consider the following hybrid
experiment. In the i-th hybrid experiment, the code Xi is changed to be an encoding of 0 (as
opposed to be an encoding of si). We claim that in this experiment, the error changes by at most
ε. This is because otherwise we can construct a one-many tampering adversary with error higher
than ε. To construct such an adversary ~(f i), each f ij has Xkk 6=i hardcoded in it and takes Xi as
input. This would show an adversary against which one-many non-malleable codes have an error
higher than ε.
By the time we reach (u − 1)-th hybrid experiment, the error could only have reduced by
at most (u − 1)ε. However in the (u − 1)-th hybrid experiment, the error can at most be ε since
it corresponds to the one-many setting. Hence, the error in the hybrid 0 could have been at most
u.ε. This concludes the proof.
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 31. There exists a constant γ > 0 such that for all n > 0 and t ≤ nγ, there exists an
efficient construction of one-many non-malleable codes in the 2-split state model with tampering




Relation to Continuous Non-Malleable Codes A primitive related to one-many non-malleable
codes that we introduce, known as continuous non-malleable codes, was introduced by Faust et
al. [FMNV14]. Informally, in a continuous non-malleable code, the codewords are allowed to be
tampered multiple times (without allowing fresh encoding of the message), with the additional
guarantee that the tampering experiment stops (called “self destruct”) whenever an error message
is detected. This model is weaker than the notion we consider since we do not allow for such a
self-destruct option. However the work of [FMNV14] allows for unbounded number of tamperings.
On the other hand, their constructions are based on computational assumptions while ours are
purely information-theoretic.
The work of Jafargholi and Wichs [JW15] studied variants of continuous non-malleable
codes, depending on whether the tampering is persistent (i.e., the new tampering is on the current
tampered version of the codeword) or non-persistent (i.e., the tampering is always on the original
codeword). Further [JW15] considered variants depending on whether the self-destruct option is
available.
It was shown in [FMNV14] that continuous non-malleable codes against unbounded tamper-
ing in the non-persistent model cannot exist in the information theoretic setting. Subsequently, the
work of [JW15] proved the existence of continuous non-malleable codes against unbounded tam-
pering in the persistent model (with self-destruct) in the information theoretic setting. Following
this, in a recent work Aggarwal, Kazana and Ombreski [AKO15] provided explicit constructions of
such codes.
Thus, our result on one-many non-malleable codes can be interpreted as an explicit construc-
tion of continuous non-malleable codes in the non-persistent model (without self-destruct) against
a bounded tampering in the information-theoretic model. We note that as implied by the result
of [FMNV14], one cannot hope to handle unbounded tampering in this model in the information
theoretic setting.
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12.2 Non-malleable codes via Seedless non-malleable extractors
Seedless non-malleable extractors were introduced by Cheraghchi and Guruswami in [CG14b],
where it was shown that explicit constructions of such extractors can be used to construct non-
malleable codes2.
The following theorem generalizes a result of Cheraghchi and Gursuswami [CG14b].
Theorem 12.2.1. Let nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a polynomial time computable
seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractor for independent sources at min-entropy n− nγ with error ε.
Then there exists an explicit non-malleable code with an efficient decoder in the (2, t)-split-state




Proof. Let A1 = (f1, g1), . . . ,At = (ft, gt) be arbitrary 2-split-state adversaries. We partition
{0, 1}n in two different ways based on the fixed points of the tampering functions.
For any R ⊆ [t], define
W (R) = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : fi(x) = x if i ∈ R, and fi(x) 6= x if i ∈ [t] \R}.
Similalry, for any S ⊆ [t], define
V (S) = {y ∈ {0, 1}n : gi(y) = y if i ∈ S, and gi(y) 6= y if i ∈ [t] \ S}.
Thus the sets W (R), R ⊆ [t] defines a partition of {0, 1}n. Similarly V(S), S ⊆ [t] defines a partition
of {0, 1}n. For R,S ⊆ [t], let X(R) be a random variable uniform on W(R), and Y(S) be a random
variable uniform on V(S).





= (Un4 , Z
(R,S)
1 , . . . , Z
(R,S)
t )
2the encoder of the resulting non-malleable code may still be inefficient. Informally, to make the encoder efficient,
one needs to sample from the pre-image of any output of the extractor. See Section 12.4 for more details.
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(S))) if i ∈ [t] \ (R ∩ S)












We first prove the following claim.
Claim 12.2.2. Let




Then, for every R,S ⊆ [t], ∆R,S ≤ 2−n
γ
+ ε.
Proof. If |W(R)| ≤ 2n−nγ , it follows that αR,S ≤ 2−n
γ
, and hence the claim follows. Thus, assume
that H∞(X
(R)) ≥ n− nγ . Using a similar argument, we can assume that H∞(Y(S)) ≥ n− nγ .
Let R ∩ S = [t] \ (R ∩ S) = {i1, . . . , ij}. It follows that for any c ∈ R ∩ S, at least one the
following is true: (1) fc has no fixed points on W
(R) (2) gc has no fixed points on V
(S). Thus, using
the fact nmExt (2, t)-non-malleable extractor, we have
|nmExt(X(R),Y(S)),nmExt(fi1(X(R)), gi1(Y(S))), . . . ,nmExt(fij (X(R)), gij (Y(S)))
−Un4 , nmExt(fi1(X(R)), gi1(Y(S))), . . . ,nmExt(fij (X(R)), gij (Y(S)))| ≤ ε
The claim now follows by observing that for each c ∈ R ∩ S, fc and gc are the identity functions
on the sets W(R) and V(S) respectively.
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Let X,Y be independent and uniformly random on {0, 1}n. Thus, we have
|nmExt(X,Y),nmExt(A1(X,Y)), . . . ,nmExt(At(X,Y))
−Un4 , copy(t)(D~f,~g,Un4)| =
∑
R,S⊆[t]
∆R,S ≤ 22t(ε+ 2−n
γ
).
We now define the non-malleable code in the following way: For any message s ∈ {0, 1}m, the
encoder Enc(s) outputs a uniformly random string from the set nmExt−1(s) ⊂ {0, 1}Cn. For any
codeword c ∈ {0, 1}Cn, the decoder Dec outputs nmExt(c). It follows that for any t-tuple of
messages : (s1, . . . , st) ∈ ({0, 1}m)t, we have
|(Dec(f1(~X)), . . . ,Dec(ft(~X)))− copy(D~f,~g, (s1, . . . , st))| ≤ 2
mt|nmExt(X,Y),nmExt(A1(X,Y)),
. . . ,nmExt(At(X,Y))−Un4 , copy(t)(D~f,~g,Un4)|
≤ 2mt+2t(ε+ 2−nγ ).
Remark 12.2.3. Thus, note that to construct efficient non-malleable codes using a seedless non-
malleable extractor nmExt, we also need to sample efficiently from a distribution that is almost
uniform on nmExt−1(s) for any message s.
12.3 Efficient algorithms for non-malleable codes in the 10-split-
state model
In this section we prove efficiency of the non-malleable codes in the 10-split-state model that follow
via the non-malleable extractor construction in Section 11.2 (using Theorem 12.2.1). Recall that
for any message s, its encoding is a uniform element from nmExt−1(s) and for any codeword c, the
decoded message is nmExt(c). Thus the efficiency of the decoder follows from the fact that nmExt
is a polynomial time function.
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We construct an efficient algorithm which takes as input a message s ∈ {0, 1}n and samples
from a distribution that is 2−Ω(n)-close to uniform on nmExt−1(s) and use this as our encoder.
This is indeed sufficient, since we only add an exponentially small error when we use this algorithm
instead of sampling uniformly from nmExt−1(s).
Our sampling algorithm is based on the following observations.
• The uniform distribution on the set nmExt−1(s) is a convex combination of uniform distri-
butions on algebraic varieties of low degree.
• Sampling almost uniformly from such algebraic sets can be done efficiently [CS09].
• Further, obtaining the weights in the convex combination reduces to approximately counting
the size of such algebraic sets for which there are efficient algorithms [HW98]. However,
the number of distributions in the convex combination can be exponentially large. To get
around this difficulty, we use the method of rejection sampling. The proof of correctness of
the algorithm relies on estimates on the number of rational points on algebraic varieties.
12.3.1 Tools from algebraic geometry
Let g ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xc] and let H ⊆ Fcp be its set of zeroes. We call H the algebraic hypersurface
defined by g.
The following version of the Lang-Weil bound for hypersurfaces in Fcp was proved by Cafure
and Matera [CM06].
Theorem 12.3.1 (Lang-Weil bound). Let c, d be constant integers and let p be a large prime.
Let H ⊂ Fcp be a hypersurface defined by a degree d polynomial. Then there exists an integer s,
0 ≤ s ≤ d, such that
||H| − spc−1| ≤ O(sign(s) · pc−
3
2 + pc−2)
where sign(s) = 1 if s > 0 and sign(0) = 0.
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Lemma 12.3.2 (Schwartz-Zippel Lemma [Sch80, Zip79]). Let g(x1, . . . , xc) be a non-zero multi-
variate polynomial of degree d with coefficients in Fp. Then the hypersurface H ⊂ Fcp defined by g
is of size at most dpc−1.
We need some previous work on efficient sampling and approximate counting of algebraic
varieties.
Theorem 12.3.3 ([CS09]). Let c, k, d be constant integers such that c > k and let p be a prime.
There exists an efficient randomized algorithm A1 such that the following holds:
Let g1, . . . , gk ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xc] be arbitrary polynomials of degree at most d and let S ⊆ Fcp
be the set of common zeroes of g1, . . . , gk. A1 takes as input the description of g1, . . . , gk and a
parameter δ and outputs a sample from a distribution which is O(1/p1−δ)-close to the uniform
distribution on S. The worst-case running time of A1 is bounded by poly(log p).
Theorem 12.3.4 ([HW98]). Let c, k, d > 0 be constant integers and let p be a prime. There exists
an efficient randomized algorithm A2 such that the following holds:
Let g1, . . . , gk ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xc] be arbitrary polynomials of degree at most d and let S ⊆ Fcp be
the set of common zeroes of g1, . . . , gk. A2 takes as input the description of g1, . . . , gk and outputs
an integer v such that
1
|S|
· |v − |S|| < O(p−1/2)
The worst-case running time of A2 is bounded by poly(log p).
12.3.2 A new extractor
In the construction of the seedless non-malleable extractor nmExt in Section 11.2, we needed a
seeded non-malleable extractor snmExt (with some additional properties, see Theorem 11.2.8). We
carefully choose snmExt such that it is easy to sample almost uniformly from nmExt−1(s). The
main idea is to pick snmExt such that nmExt−1(s) is a convex combination of algebraic varieties
of low degree over a field with large characteristic. Thus, the constructions in [Li12b] look to be a
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good choice for the seeded non-malleable extractor. However, for this choice, we face the following
difficulty:
Let σM : Fp → ZM be defined as σM (x) = x (mod M). nmExt is of the form σM ◦ext2◦ext1,
where ext1 : F10p → F4p, ext2 : F2q → Fq, and p, q are primes satisfying p2 ≤ q ≤ 2p2 (and interpreting
the output of ext1 as an element in F2q). Changing the characteristic of the field destroys the low
degree properties of the function ext2 ◦ ext1.
To fix this, we construct a new extractor for ext2 (satisfying the conditions of Theorem
11.2.8) which allows us to work over the same field as ext1. The extractor is a variation of a
construction by Bourgain [Bou05b]. The proof is easy to obtain by using ideas from [Bou05b,Li12b],
and we omit it.
Theorem 12.3.5. Let p be a prime. Define the functions ext2 : (F2p) × (F2p) → Fp and snmExt :
(F2p)× (F2p)→ ZM in the following way:







j ), snmExt(x, y) = σM (ext2(x, y))
where σM (x) = x (mod M). Suppose X,Y are independent sources on F2p with min-entropies k1, k2
respectively.
1. If (k1 + k2) ≥ (2 + δ) log p, then
|snmExt(X,Y) ◦ X− UM ◦ X| < p−Ω(1), |snmExt(X,Y) ◦ Y − UM ◦ Y| < p−Ω(1)
2. If k1, k2 > (2− δ) log p and f is any tampering function with no fixed points, then
|snmExt(X,Y) ◦ snmExt(X, f(Y))− UM ◦ snmExt(X, f(Y))| < p−Ω(1).
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12.3.3 A generic sampling algorithm
We construct an algorithm for almost uniformly sampling from certain structured sets.
Theorem 12.3.6. Let S1, S2, and S3 be finite sets. For arbitrary functions g : S2 → S3, h : S1 →
S2, there exists a sampling algorithm B which takes as input z ∈ S3 and a parameter ε ≥ ε0, runs
in time poly(log(|S1| · |S2|), log(1ε )), and outputs a sample from a distribution that is O(ε)-close to
uniform on the set (g ◦ h)−1(z), if the following conditions hold:
1. There exists an algorithm B1, which takes as input z ∈ S3, runs in time poly(log(|S2|)), and
outputs a sample from a distribution that is uniform on the set g−1(z).
2. There exists an algorithm B2, which takes as input y ∈ S2 and ε, runs in time poly(log(|S1|), log(1ε )),
and outputs a sample from a distribution that is ε-close to uniform on the set h−1(y).
3. There exists an algorithm B3, which takes as input y ∈ S2 and ε, runs in time poly(log(|S1|), log(1ε )),
and outputs an approximation Ay for |h−1(y)| with a multiplicative error of at most ε, i.e.,
1− ε ≤ Ay|h−1(y)| ≤ 1 + ε.
4. There exist constants β > 0 and λ ≥ 1, and an efficiently computable value max such that
for all ε ≥ ε0 the following holds: There exists a subset S′2 ⊆ S2 such that for all y ∈ S′2,
max
λ ≤ |h
−1(y)| ≤ max. Further, 1|(g◦h)−1(z)|
∑
y∈S2\S′2




Proof. The idea is to use the method of rejection sampling.
Algorithm B (given input z ∈ S3 and error parameter ε):
1. Use B1 to sample y from g−1(z). Compute an approximation Ay for |h−1(y)| with error ε using
algorithm B3. If Ay < max ·( 1λ − ε), reject y. Else accept y with probability wt(y) =
Ay
max .
Iterate this step till some y is accepted. If no sample is accepted after O(log 1ε ) iterations,
accept the next sample.
2. Once y is accepted, sample from h−1(y) using B2 (with error ε).
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Proof of correctness of Algorithm B: Consider any subset T ⊆ (g ◦ h)−1(z). Let pT,1 be the



















The above expression is derived in the following way: Consider any y ∈ g−1(z). Let Ay be the
approximation of |h−1(y)| computed by algorithm B3. The probability of y being picked by B1




max ± ε. Further, if y is
accepted, |T∩h
−1(y)|
|h−1(y)| ±ε is the probability that some element from the set T is picked by algorithm B2













Let k = O(log 1ε ). The probability pT that some element from T is picked by B in at most





















∣∣∣∣pT − |T |N





max ·|g−1(z)| +O(ε) = O(ε)
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where the equality in the last step follows from the fact that N
max ·|g−1(z)| = O(1) (by Condition (4)
in the hypothesis).






Let B(z, ε) denote the output distribution of algorithm B. Thus,
|B(z, ε)− U(g◦h)−1(z)| = max
T⊆(g◦h)−1(z)
∣∣∣∣Pr[B(z, ε) ∈ T ]− |T |N
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣pT +O(ε)− |T |N
∣∣∣∣ = O(ε)
12.3.4 An efficient encoder
We recall the seedless non-malleable extractor constructed in Theorem 3.
Let enc : Fp → F2p be defined as enc(x) = (x, x4 + x2 + x).
Then nmExt : F10p → ZM is defined to be:
nmExt(x1, . . . , x10) = ext3(ext2(ext1(x1, . . . , x10)))
where, ext1 : F10p → F4p, ext2 : F4p → Fp, and ext3 : Fp → ZM are defined in the following way:
ext1(x1, . . . , x10) =
( 1∑
i=0
(enc(x4i+1) + enc(x4i+2)) (enc(x4i+3) + enc(x4i+4)), x9, x10
)







j ), ext3(w) = σM (w) = w (mod M)
We set M = pδ such that the error in the extractor nmExt is ε = p−2δ. Note that, as discussed
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before, we use the extractor from Subsection 12.3.2 for ext2 in nmExt instead of the constructions
in [DLWZ14,Li12b].
An efficient encoder for the constructed non-malleable codes in the 10-split-state model
follows from the following theorem.
Theorem 12.3.7. There exists a randomized algorithm which takes as input z ∈ ZM and a param-
eter ε > O(p−1/2) and samples from a distribution O(ε)-close to uniform on the set (nmExt)−1(z).
The worst case running time of the algorithm is bounded by poly(log p, log(1ε )).
We prove Theorem 12.3.7 using the following lemma.
Lemma 12.3.8. For s ∈ ZM , let Ts = ext−13 (s) ⊂ Fp and S = nmExt−1(s). For a ∈ Fp, define
Wa = (ext2 ◦ ext1)−1(a) ⊂ F10p . Define Is = {a ∈ Ts :
|Wa|
p9












Proof of Theorem 12.3.7 assuming Lemma 12.3.8. We show that for g = ext3 and h = ext2 ◦ ext1,
all the conditions of Theorem 12.3.6 are satisfied.
1. It is easy to uniformly sample from g−1(z).
2. An efficient algorithm for almost uniformly sampling from h−1(y) follows from Lemma 12.3.3.
3. An efficient algorithm for approximately counting h−1(y) follows from Lemma 12.3.4.
4. Using Lemma 12.3.8, we have that for at least (1/19)th fraction of the y’s in g−1(z),
0.9p9 < |h−1(y)| ≤ 18p9.







Thus by Theorem 12.3.6, there exists an efficient algorithm to sample almost uniformly from the
set (nmExt)−1(z).
Proof of Lemma 12.3.8. We begin by proving some claims.
Claim 12.3.9. For any s ∈ ZM ,
p10−δ(1− p−δ) < |nmExt−1(s)| < (p10−δ)(1 + p−δ)
Proof. Let X1, . . . ,X10 be uniform on Fp. Using the fact that nmExt is an extractor for independent
sources with error at most ε = p−2δ, we have |Pr[nmExt(X1, . . . ,X10) = s]− 1M | < ε. The bound
on |nmExt−1(s)| now follows.
Claim 12.3.10. For any a ∈ Fp, let Wa = (ext2 ◦ext1)−1(a) ⊂ F10p . Then there exists a polynomial
g ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , x10] of degree at most 18 with coefficients in Fp such that Wa is the set of zeroes of g.
Proof. Define g(x1, . . . , x10) = ext2 ◦ ext1(x1, . . . , x10)− a.
For a ∈ Fp, define Na = |Wa|. Note that |Ts| = p1−δ.
Using Claim 12.3.9, we have
p10−δ − p10−2δ ≤
∑
a∈Ts
Na ≤ p10−δ + p10−2δ
It follows from Lemma 12.3.2 and Claim 12.3.10 that for any a ∈ Fp, Na ≤ 18p9. Further, Theorem
12.3.1 and Claim 12.3.10 imply that if Na < 0.9p
9 for some a ∈ Fp, then Na < Cp8 for some
constant C.
Thus,
p10−δ − p10−2δ ≤ |Is| · Cp8 + (|Ts| − |Is|) · 18p9 (12.1)
for some constant C.
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Since |Is| ≤ |Ts| = p1−δ, |Is| · Cp8 ≤ Cp9−δ. It follows that,



















12.4 Efficient Encoding and Decoding Algorithms for One-Many
Non-Malleable Codes
In this section, we construct efficient algorithms for almost uniformly sampling from the pre-image
of any output of a modified version of the (2, t)-non-malleable extractor constructed in Section
11.3. Combining this with Theorem 12.2.1 and Theorem 11.3.1 gives us efficient constructions of
one-many non-malleable codes in the 2-split state model, with tampering degree t = nΩ(1), relative
rate nΩ(1)/n and error 2−n
Ω(1)
.
A major part of this section is on modifying the components used in the construction of
nmExt (Algorithm 10) so that the overall extractor is much simpler to analyze as a function, and
this enables us to develop efficient sampling algorithms from the pre-image. We present the modified
extractor construction in Section 12.4.2. However, we first need to solve a simpler problem.
12.4.1 A New Linear Seeded Extractor
A crucial sub-problem that we have to solve is almost uniformly sampling from the pre-image of a
linear seeded extractor in polynomial time. Towards this, we recall a well known property of linear
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seeded extractors.
Lemma 12.4.1 ([Rao09b]). Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a linear seeded extractor for
min-entropy k with error ε < 12 . Let X be an affine (n, k)-source. Then
Pr
u∼Ud
[|Ext(X, u)−Um| > 0] ≤ ε.
Definition 12.4.2. For any seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, any s ∈ {0, 1}d and
r ∈ {0, 1}m, we define:
• Ext(·, s) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m to be the map Ext(·, s)(x) = Ext(x, s).
• Ext−1(r) to be the set {(x, y) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d : Ext(x, y) = r}.
• Ext−1(·, s) to be the set {x : Ext(x, s) = r}.
We now present a natural way of sampling from pre-images of linear seeded extractors.
Claim 12.4.3. Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a linear seeded extractor for min-entropy
k with error ε < 2−1.5m. For any r ∈ {0, 1}m, consider the following efficient sampling procedure S
which on input r does the following: (a) Sample s ∼ Ud, (b) sample x uniformly from the subspace
Ext(·, s)−1(r). (c) Output (x, s). Let Dr be the distribution uniform on Ext−1(r), and let S(r)
denote the distribution produced by S on input r.
Then,
|S(r)−Dr| ≤ 2−Ω(m)
Proof. Define the sets:
Good = {s ∈ {0, 1}d : rank(Ext(·, s)) = m}, Bad = {0, 1}d \Good.
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It follows by Lemma 12.4.1 that |Good| ≥ (1−ε)2d. Thus, for any s ∈ Good, |Ext(·, s)−1(r)| = 2n−m.
Thus, we have ∑
s∈Good
|Ext−1(·, s)(r)| ≥ 2d+n−m−1.
Further, for any s′ ∈ Bad, |Ext−1(·, s′)(r)| ≤ 2n, and hence
∑
s′∈Bad
|Ext−1(·, s′)(r)| ≤ ε2d+n < 2d+n−1.5m.
Thus | ∪s′∈bad Ext−1(·, s′)(r)| < 2−0.5m|Ext−1(r)|. It now follows that
|S(r)−Dr| ≤ 2−0.4m
We note that ε must be o(2−m) for the above sampling procedure to work with low enough
error. However, this would require a seed length of d = O(m2) (by Theorem 2.1.5). For each step
of the alternating extraction protocol the seed length then goes down by a quadratic factor, which
is insufficient for our application.
To get past this difficulty, we construct a new strong linear seeded extractor for high min-
entropy sources with the seed length close to the output length with the property that the size
of the pre-image of any output is the same for any fixing of the seed. Algorithm 11 provides this
construction.
Parameters and Subroutines:
1. Let δ > 0 be any constant. Let d = nδ. Let d = d1 + d2, where d1 = n
δ1 , δ > 10δ1. Let
m = d/2.
2. Let Samp : {0, 1}d1 → [n]t, t = d2, be an (µ, θ, γ) averaging sampler with distinct samples,
such that µ = (δ−2τ)log(1/τ) , θ =
τ
log(1/τ) and γ = 2
−Ω(d1), τ = 0.05.
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3. Let IP : {0, 1}d2 × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}
d
2 be the strong 2-source extractor from Theorem 2.5.3.
Algorithm 11: iExt(x,s)
Input: Bit strings x, s of length n, d respectively.
Output: A bit string of length m.
1 Let s1 = Slice(s, d1). Let s2 be the remaining d2 bits of s.
2 Let T = Samp(s1) ⊂ [n]. Let x1 = x{T}.
3 Output IP(x1, s2).
Informally the construction of iExt is as follows. Given a uniform seed S, we use a slice S1
of S to sample co-ordinates from the weak source X, and then apply a strong 2-source extractor
(based on the inner product function) to the source X1 (which is the projection of X to the sampled
co-ordinates) and the remaining bits S2 of S to extract
d
2 uniform bits.
The correctness of this procedure relies on the fact that by pseudorandomly sampling co-
ordinates of X and projecting X to these co-ordinates, the min-entropy rate is roughly the preserved
for most choices of the uniform seed [Zuc97,Vad04,Li12a]. Thus, we can fix S1, and the strong two-
source extractor IP now receives two independent inputs S2 and X2 with almost full min-entropy.
Thus, the output is close to uniform. Further we show that the number of linear constraints on the
source X is the same for any fixing of the seed. This allows us to show that size of the pre-image
of any particular output is the same for any fixing of the seed. We now formally prove these ideas.
We need the following theorem proved by Vadhan [Vad04].
Theorem 12.4.4 ([Vad04]). Let 1 ≥ δ ≥ 3τ > 0. Let Samp : {0, 1}r → [n]t be an (µ, θ, γ)
averaging sampler with distinct samples, such that µ = (δ−2τ)log(1/τ) and θ =
τ
log(1/τ) . If X is a (n, δn)
source, then the random variable (Ur,X{Samp(Ur)}) is (γ + 2
−Ω(τn))-close to (Ur,W ) where for
every a ∈ {0, 1}r , the random variable W |Ur = a is a (t, (δ − 3τ)t)-source.
Lemma 12.4.5. Let iExt be the function computed by Algorithm 11. If X is a (n, 0.9n) source
and S is an independent uniform seed on {0, 1}d, then the following holds:




Further for any r ∈ {0, 1}m and any s ∈ {0, 1}d, |iExt(·, s)−1(r)| = 2n−m.
Proof. Using Theorem 12.4.4, it follows that X1 is 2
−nΩ(1)-close to a source with min-entropy at
least 0.8n for any fixing of S1. Further, we note that after fixing S1, S2 and X1 are independent
sources. We now think of X1,S2 as sources in {0, 1}d2+1 by appending a 1 to both the sources, so
that S2 6= ~0, and then apply the inner product map. This results in an entropy loss of only 1. It
now follows by Theorem 2.5.3 that
|iExt(X, S), S −Um, S| < 2−n
Ω(1)
.
It is easy to see that for any fixing of the seed S = s, iExt(·, s) is a linear map. Let X
be uniform on n bits. We note that for any fixing of S2 = s2, X1 lies in a subspace of dimension
d2 −m over F2. Further, the bits outside T have no restrictions placed on them. Thus the size of
iExt(·, s)−1(r) is exactly 2d2−m+n−d2 = 2n−m. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Based on the above lemma, we construct an efficient procedure for sampling uniformly from
the pre-image of the function iExt.
Claim 12.4.6. Let iExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be the function computed by Algorithm 11.
Then there exists a polynomial time algorithm Samp1 that takes as input r ∈ {0, 1}m, and samples
from a distribution that is uniform on iExt−1(r).
Proof. It follows by Lemma 12.4.5 that for any fixing of the seed s, the size of the set iExt(·, s)−1(r)
is exactly 2n−m. Thus we can use the following strategy: (a) Sample s ∼ Ud (b) Sample x uniformly
random from the subspace iExt(·, s)−1(r) (c) Output (x, s). It follows that each element in iExt−1(r)
is picked with probability exactly 1
2d
· 1
2n−m . Thus the output of our sampling procedure is indeed
uniform on iExt−1(r).
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12.4.2 A Modified Construction of the Seedless (2, t)-Non-Malleable Extractor
We first describe the high level ideas involved in modifying the construction of nmExt (Algorithm
3), before presenting the formal construction.
• We use the linear seeded extractor iExt (Algorithm 11) for any seeded extractor used in the
construction of nmExt.
• Next we divide the sources X and Y into blocks of size n1−δ respectively for a small constant
δ. Since each of X and Y have almost full min-entropy, we now have two block sources, where
each block has almost full min-entropy conditioned on the previous blocks. The idea is to use
new blocks of X and Y for each round of alternating extraction in nmExt.
To implement this however, we need some care. Recall that the alternating extraction protocol
is run for two rounds between either X and Qh, or X and Qh in the function 2laExt. The
idea now is to run these two of alternating extraction by dividing Qh into two blocks, and
using two new partitions of X (each round being run by using a block from either X or Qh).
Now to generate these Qh’s, we use a O(t) blocks of Y, and for each block apply the strong
seeded extractor iExt, using as seed the output of the alternating extraction from the previous
step, and finally concatenate the outputs. This works because these O(t) blocks form a block
source, and using the same seed to extract from all the blocks is a well known technique of
extracting from block sources.
• By appropriate setting of the lengths of the seeds in the alternating extraction, we ensure that
each block of X and Y still has min-entropy rate 1−o(1) even after fixing all the intermediate
seeds, the random variables Qh,Qh and their tampered versions. This can be ensured since
each of these variables are of length at most nδ1 for some small constant δ1, and the number
of adversaries is also nΩ(1)).
• The above modification is almost sufficient for us to successfully sample from the pre-image of
any output. One final modification is to use a specific error correcting code (the Reed-Solomon
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code over a field of size n + 1 with characteristic 2) in the initial step of the construction,
when we encode the sources and sample bits from it. We give some intuition as to why this is
necessary. Since we are using linear seeded extractors in the alternating extraction, by fixing
the seeds we impose linear restrictions on the blocks of X and Y. Now, if we fix the output
of the initial sampling step (the random variable Z in Algorithm 3), we are imposing more
linear constraints on the blocks (assuming we are using a linear code). Now, it is not clear
if the constraints imposed by the linear seeded extractor is independent from the constraints
imposed by Z, and thus for different fixings of the Z and the seeds the size of the pre-image
of any output of the non-malleable extractor may be different.
To get past this difficulty, our idea is to first partition X and Y into slightly smaller blocks
(which does not affect the correctness of the extractor) such that at least half of the blocks are
unused by the alternating extraction steps. Now, we show that by using the Reed-Solomon
code over F = F2log(n+1) to encode the sources, fixing Z imposes linear constraints involving
the variables from these unused blocks, and we show that this is sufficient to argue that it
is linearly independent of the restrictions imposed by the alternating extraction part. We
provide complete details of the sampling algorithms in Section 12.4.3.
We now proceed to present the extractor construction. Recall that if Za,Za+1, . . . ,Zb are
random variables, we use Z[a,b] to denote the random variable Za, . . . ,Zb.
Subroutines and Parameters (used by Algorithm 12, Algorithm 13, Algorithm
14)
1. Let γ be a small enough constant and C a large one. Let t = nγ/C .
2. Let n1 = n
β1 , β1 = 10γ. Let n2 = n − n1. Let IP1 : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n3 , n3 = n110
be the strong two-source extractor from Theorem 2.5.3.
3. Let F be the finite field F2log(n+1) . Let n4 =
n2
log(n+1) . Let RS : F
n4 → Fn be the Reed-Solomon
code encoding n4 symbols of F to n symbols in F (we overload the use of RS, using it to
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denote both the code and the encoder). Thus RS is a [n, n4, n − n4 + 1]n error correcting
code.
4. Let Samp : {0, 1}n3 → [n]n5 be a (µ, 110 , 2
−nΩ(1)) averaging sampler with distinct samples. By
using the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 2.1.2, we can set n5 = n
β2 , β2 < β1/2.
5. Let ` = 2(n1 + n5 log n) < 4n
β1 . Thus ` ≤ n11γ .
6. Let n6 = 50Ct`. Let IP2 : {0, 1}n6 × {0, 1}n6 → {0, 1}2nq , nq = 10Ct`, be the strong two-
source extractor from Theorem 2.5.3.
7. Let n7 = n− n1 − n6. Let nx = n78` . Let ny =
n7
16Ct` . Thus nx, ny ≥ n
1−15γ .
8. Let d1 = 80`.
9. Let iExt1 : {0, 1}nx × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}d2 , d2 = 40`, be the extractor computed by Algorithm
11.
10. Let iExt2 : {0, 1}nq × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}d3 , d3 = 20`, be the extractor computed by Algorithm
11.
11. Let iExt3 : {0, 1}nx × {0, 1}d3 → {0, 1}d4 , d4 = 10` be the extractor computed by Algorithm
11.
12. Let iExt4 : {0, 1}ny × {0, 1}d4 → {0, 1}d5 , d5 = 5`, be the extractor computed by Algorithm
11.
13. Let Ext : {0, 1}4Ctny ×{0, 1}d4 → {0, 1}2nq be defined in the following way. Let v1, . . . , v4t be
strings, each of length ny. Define Ext(v1 ◦ . . . ◦ v4Ct, s) = iExt4(v1, s) ◦ . . . ◦ iExt4(v4Ct, s).
Theorem 12.4.7. Let inmExt be the function computed by Algorithm 13. Then inmExt is a





Input: Bit strings x, y, each of length n.
Output: A bit string of length m.
1 Let x1 = Slice(x, n1), y1 = Slice(y, n1). Compute ν = IP1(x, y).
2 Let x2, y2 be n2 length strings formed by cutting x1, y1 from x, y respectively.
3 Let T = Samp(ν) ⊂ [n].
4 Interpret x2, y2 as elements in Fn4 .
5 Let x2 = RS(x2), y2 = RS(y2).
6 Let x1 = (x2){T}, y1 = (y2){T}, interpreting x2, y2 ∈ Fn.
7 Let z = x1 ◦ x1 ◦ y1 ◦ y1, where z is interpreted as a binary string.
8 Interpret x2, y2 as binary strings.
9 Output inmExt1(x2, y2, z).
Algorithm 13: inmExt1(x2, y2, z)
1 Let x3 = Slice(x2, n6), y3 = Slice(y2, n6). Let w, v be the remaining parts of x2, y2
respectively.
2 Let IP2(x3, y3) = (q1,1, q1,2), where each of q1,1, q1,2 is of length nq.
3 Let w1, . . . , w8` be an equal sized partition of the string w into 8` stings.
4 Let v1, . . . , v16t` be an equal sized partition of the string v into 16Ct` stings.
5 for h = 1 to ` do
6 (qh+1,1, qh+1,2) = 2ilaExt(v[8C(h−1)t+1,8Cht], w[4h−3,4h], qh,1, qh,2, h, z{h})
7 end
8 Ouput (q`+1,1, q`+1,2).
The proof of the above theorem is essentially the same as that the construction in Section
11.3, and we omit it. The correctness of inmExt follows directly from the proof of Theorem 11.3.1,
and the correctness of the extractor iExt (Lemma 12.4.5), the fact that by our choice of parameters
each block of X and Y still has min-entropy rate at least 0.9 after appropriate conditioning of the
intermediate random variables and their tampered versions, and the fact that using the RS in place
of a binary error correcting code does not affect correctness of the procedure.
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Algorithm 14: 2ilaExt(v[8C(h−1)t+1,8Cht], w[4h−3,4h], qh,1, qh,2, h, b)
1 Let sh,1 = Slice(qh,1, d1), rh,1 = Ext1(w4h−3, sh,1), sh,2 = Ext2(qh,2, rh,1),
rh,2 = Ext3(w4h−2, sh,2).
2 if b = 0 then
3 Let rh = Slice(rh,1, d4).
4 else
5 Let rh = rh,2
6 end
7 Let Ext(v[8C(h−1)t+1,8(h−1)t+4Ct], rh) = (qh,1, qh,2), where both qh,1, qh,2 are of length nq.
8 Let sh,1 = Slice(qh,1, d1), rh,1 = Ext1(w4h−1, sh,1), sh,2 = Ext2(qh,2, rh,1),
rh,2 = Ext3(w4h, sh,2).
9 if b = 0 then
10 Let rh = rh,2.
11 else
12 Let rh = Slice(rh,1, d4).
13 end
14 Let Ext(v[8C(h−1)t+4Ct+1,8Cht], rh) = (qh+1,1, qh+1,2), where both qh+1,1, qh+1,2 are of
length nq.
15 Ouput (qh+1,1, qh+1,2).
12.4.3 Efficiently Sampling from the Pre-Image of inmExt
Since the construction of the non-malleable extractor inmExt (Algorithm 12, Algorithm 13, Algo-
rithm 14) is composed of various sub-parts and sub-functions, we first argue about the invertibility
of these parts and then show a way to compose these sampling procedure to sample almost uniformly
from the pre-image of inmExt. We refer to all the variables, sub-routines and notations introduced
in these algorithms while developing the sampling procedures. Unless we state otherwise, by a
subspace we mean a subspace over F2.
We first show how to sample uniformly from the pre-image of 2ilaExt (Algorithm 14), since
it is a crucial sub-part of inmExt. We have the following claim.
Claim 12.4.8. For any fixing of the variables {s1,i, r1,i, s1,i, r1,i : i ∈ {1, 2}}, and any b ∈ {0, 1}
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define the set:
2ilaExt−1(q2,1, q2,2) = {(x3, y3, v[1,4Ct], w[1,4]) ∈ {0, 1}2n6+4Ctny+4nx :
2ilaExt(v[1,4Ct], w[1,4], q1,1, q1,2, b) = (q2,1, q2,2)}
There exists an efficient algorithm Samp2 that takes as input q2,1, q2,2, b, {s1,i, r1,i, s1,i, r1,i : i ∈
{1, 2}}, and samples uniformly from 2ilaExt−1(q2,1, q2,2).
Further, the set 2ilaExt−1(q2,1, q2,2) is a subspace over F2 of dimension d1, and its size does
not depend on the inputs to Samp2.
Proof. The general idea is that by fixing the seeds in the alternating extraction, each block of w
takes values independent of the fixing of the other blocks of w and the qi,j ’s, and similarly the qi,j ’s
takes values independent of each other and the blocks of w. We now formally prove this intuition.
Since, s1,1 is a slice of q1,1 it follows that q1,1 is restricted to the subspace of size 2
nq−d1 .
Since r1,1 = iExt1(w1, s1,1), it follows that w1 is restricted to the set iExt1(·, s1,1)−1(r1,1). Further,
it follows by Lemma 12.4.5 that this is a subspace of size 2nx−d2 . Similar arguments show that q1,2
is restricted to the subspace of dimension 2nq−d3 , and w2 is restricted to a subspace of dimension
2nx−d4 . Further, we note that each of these variables have no correlation.
By repeating this argument for the next two rounds of alternating extraction, it follows that
q1,1 is restricted to a subspace of size 2
nq−d1 , w3 is restricted to a subspace of size 2
nx−d2 , q1,2 is
restricted to a subspace of size 2nq−d3 , and w4 is restricted to a subspace of size 2
nx−d4 .
Further since (q2,1, q2,2) = Ext(v[4Ct+1,8t], r1) = iExt4(v4Ct+1, r1) ◦ . . . ◦ iExt4(v8Ct, r1), it
follows by an application of Lemma 12.4.5 that for any fixed q2,1, v[4Ct+1,6t] is restricted to a subspace
of size 22Ct(ny−d5). A similar argument shows that for any fixed q2,2, v[6Ct+1,8Ct] is restricted to a
subspace of size 22Ct(ny−d5).
Finally, since IP1(x3, y3) = (q1,1, q1,2), it follows that for any fixed x3, q1,1, q1,2, the variable
y3 lies in a subspace of size 2
n6−log(2nq) since by fixing the variables x3, q1,1, q1,2, we are restricting
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over the field F2log(2nq) .
It is clear from the arguments that we did not use any specific values of the inputs given to
the algorithm Samp1 (including the value of the bit b) to argue about the size of 2ilaExt
−1(q2,1, q2,2).
Also note that each of x3, y3, v[1,4Ct], w[1,4] is restricted to some subspace. Since 2ilaExt
−1(q2,1, q2,2)
is the cartesian product of these subspaces, it follows that it is a subspace over F2. Thus the lemma
now follows since we can efficiently sample from a given subspace.
Using arguments very similar to the above claim, we obtain the following result.
Claim 12.4.9. For any h ∈ {2, . . . , `}, any fixing of the variables {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : i ∈ {1, 2}},
and any b ∈ {0, 1} define the set:
2ilaExt−1(qh+1,1, qh+1,2) = {(v[8C(h−1)t−4Ct+1,8C(h−1)t+4Ct], w[4h−3,4h]) ∈ {0, 1}8Ctny+4nx :
2ilaExt(v[8C(h−1)t+1,8Cht], w[4h−3,4h], q1,1, q1,2, b) = (qh+1,1, qh+1,2)}.
There exists an efficient algorithm Samph+1 that takes as input qh+1,1, qh+1,2, b, {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i :
i ∈ {1, 2}}, and samples uniformly from 2ilaExt−1(qh+1,1, qh+1,2).
Further, 2ilaExt−1(qh+1,1, qh+1,2) is a subspace over F2, and its size does not depend on the
inputs to Samph+1.
We now show a way of efficiently sampling from the pre-image of the function inmExt1
(Algorithm 13).
Claim 12.4.10. For any string α ∈ {0, 1}`, and any fixing of the variables {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈
[`], i ∈ {1, 2}} define the set:
inmExt−11 (q`+1,1, q`+1,2) = {(x2, y2) ∈ {0, 1}
2n2 : inmExt1(x2, y2, α) = (q`+1,1, q`+1,2)}.
There exists an efficient algorithm Sampnm1 that takes as input {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [`], i ∈
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{1, 2}}, α, q`+1,1, q`+1,2, and samples uniformly from inmExt−11 (q`+1,1, q`+1,2).
Further, inmExt−11 (q`+1,1, q`+1,2) is a subspace over F2, and its size does not depend on the
inputs to Sampnm1.
Proof. We observe that once we fix all the seeds {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [`], i ∈ {1, 2}}, for different
h ∈ [`], the blocks (v[8C(h−1)t−4Ct+1,8C(h−1)t+4Ct], w[4h−3,4h]) can be sampled independently. Thus,
by using the algorithms {Samph+1 : h ∈ `} from Claim 12.4.8 and Claim 12.4.9, we sample the
variable x3, y3, w[1,4], v[1,4Ct], {v[8C(h−1)t−4Ct+1,8C(h−1)t+4Ct], w[4h−3,4h] : h ∈ [`]}.
Finally, since Ext(v[8C(`−1)t+4Ct+1,8C`t], r`) = (q`+1,1, q`+1,2), it follows by the arguments in
Lemma 12.4.8, that the block v[8C(`−1)t+4Ct+1,8C`t)] is restricted to a subspace of size 2
4Ct(ny−d5).
Thus, we can efficiently sample this block as well.
Further the variable w[4`+1,8`] is unused by the algorithm inmExt1, and hence takes all values
in {0, 1}4`nx . Similarly the variable v[8C`t+1,16C`t] is unused by the algorithm inmExt1 and hence
takes all values in {0, 1}8Ct`. Thus, we sample these variables as uniform strings of the appropriate
length.
Since x2, y2 are concatenations of the various blocks sampled above, we can indeed sample
efficiently from a distribution uniform on {(x2, y2) ∈ {0, 1}2n2 : inmExt(x, y, α) = (q`+1,1, q`+1,2)}.
Further since by Claim 12.4.8 and Claim 12.4.9, the size of the pre-images of each of the blocks gen-
erated do not depend on the inputs (and is also a subspace), it follows that 2inmExt−11 (q`+1,1, q`+1,2)
is a subspace, and its size does not depend on the inputs to Sampnm1 .
We now proceed to construct an algorithm to uniformly sample from the pre-image of any
output of the function inmExt (Algorithm 12), which will yield the required efficient encoder for
the resulting one-many non-malleable codes.
Claim 12.4.11. For any fixing of the variable z = x1◦x1◦y1◦y1 and the variables {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i :
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h ∈ [`], i ∈ {1, 2}}, define the set:
inmExt−1(q`+1,1, q`+1,2) = {(x, y) ∈ {0, 1}2n : inmExt(x, y) = (q`+1,1, q`+1,2)}.
There exists an efficient algorithm Sampnm that takes as input {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [`], i ∈
{1, 2}}, z, q`+1,1, q`+1,2, and samples uniformly from inmExt−1(q`+1,1, q`+1,2).
Further, inmExt−1(q`+1,1, q`+1,2) is a subspace over F2, and its size does not depend on the
inputs to Sampnm.
Proof. We fix the variables x1 and y1. Let T = Samp(ν) = {t1, . . . , tn5}. We now think of x2 as an
element in Fn4 , F = F2log(n+1) . Let x2 = (x2,1, . . . , x2,n4), where each x2,i is in F. Recall that the
n4 × n generator matrix G of the code RS is the following:
G =

1 1 · · · 1







2 · · · αn4−1n





1 1 · · · 1








· · · αn4−1tn5

Since x1 = RS(x2){T}, we have the following identity:
(
x2,1 · · · x2,n4
)
GT = x1 (12.3)
Thus, for any fixing of x1, the variable x2 is restricted to a subspace of dimension (n4 − n5) over
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the field F.
Now, let j ∈ [n4] be such that (x2,1, . . . , x2,j) is the string (x3, w[1,4`]), and (x2,j+1, . . . , x2,n4)
is the string w[4`+1,8`]. Clearly, (n4−j) log n = 4`nx, and thus by our choice of parameters it follows






3 < n4 − n5.
We further note since any n5 × n5 sub-matrix of GT has full rank (since it is the Vander-
monde’s matrix), it follows by the rank-nullity thorem that any j × n5 sub-matrix of GT has null
space of dimension exactly j − n5. Thus for any λ ∈ Fn5 , the equation:
(













· · · αn4−1tn5
 = x1 + λ (12.4)
has exactly |F|(j−n5) solution.
Thus, for any fixing of the variables, x2,1, . . . , x2,j , equation (1) has exactly |F|j−n5 solutions.
In other words, for any fixing of x3, w[1,4`], x1, the variable w[4`+1,8`] is restricted to a subspace, and
the size of the subspace does not depend on the fixing of x3, w[1,4`], x1. Using, a similar argument, we
can show that for any fixing of y3, v[1,8Ct`], y1, the variable v[8Ct`+1,16Ct`] is restricted to a subspace,
and the size of the subspace does not depend on the fixing of y3, v[1,8Ct`], y1.
Now consider any fixing of the variables {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [`], i ∈ {1, 2}}, z. As
proved in the Claim 12.4.10, we can efficiently sample the variables x3, w[1,4`], y3, v[1,8Ct`]. By the
above argument, the variables v[4`+1,8`] and w[8Ct`+1,16Ct`] now lie in a subspace, and hence we can
efficiently sample these variables as well. Thus we have an efficient procedure Sampnm for uniformly
sampling (x, y) from the set inmExt−1(q`+1,1, q`+1,2) .
It also follows by Claim 12.4.10, that the total size of the pre-image of the variables
x3, w[1,4`], y3, v[1,8Ct`] does not depend on z or the variables {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [`], i ∈ {1, 2}}.
Further, for any fixing of x3, w[1,4`], y3, v[1,8Ct`], z, as argued above, the variables v[4`+1,8`] and
w[8Ct`+1,16Ct`] now lie in a subspace, whose size does not depend on the fixed variables. Thus,
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overall the size of the total pre-image of x, y does not depend on the inputs to Sampnm.
We now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 12.4.12. There exists an efficient procedure that given an input (q`+1,1, q`+1,2) ∈ {0, 1}nq×
{0, 1}nq , samples uniformly from the set {(x, y) : inmExt(x, y) = (q`+1,1, q`+1,2)}.
Proof. We use the following simple strategy.
1. Uniformly sample the variables z, {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [`], i ∈ {1, 2}},
2. Use the variables sampled in Step (1) as input to the algorithm Sampnm to sample (x, y).
The correctness of this procedure follows directly from Claim 12.4.11, since it was proved that for
any fixing of the variables of Step 1, the size of pre-image of inmExt is the same.
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